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Rubie Mcmurrian et al vs.
Creslenn Oil Company et al, a
10-YEAR ETHICAL
DILEMNA

Brian H. Ratcliff

RULE 3.4. FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL, AR R RPC Rule 3.4

West’s Arkansas Code Annotated
Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct (Refs & Annos)
Advocate (Rules 3.1 to 3.9)
Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 3.4
RULE 3.4. FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL
Currentness

A lawyer shall not:

(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material
having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;

(b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;

(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no
valid obligation exists;

(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a
legally proper discovery request by an opposing party;

(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by
admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal
opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of
an accused; or

(f) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:

(1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; and

(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person’s interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such
information.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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Editors’ Notes
COMMENT
[1] The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshaled competitively by the
contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of
evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like.
[2] Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary
privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an
important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed.
Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a
pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense.
Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. Applicable law may permit a
lawyer to take temporary possession of physical evidence of client crimes for the purpose of conducting a limited
examination that will not alter or destroy material characteristics of the evidence. In such a case, applicable law may require
the lawyer to turn the evidence over to the police or other prosecuting authority, depending on the circumstances.
[3] With regard to paragraph (b), it is not improper to pay a witness’s expenses or to compensate an expert witness on terms
permitted by law. The common law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for
testifying and that it is improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee.
[4] Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client to refrain from giving information to another party, for the
employees may identify their interests with those of the client. See also Rule 4.2.
CODE COMPARISON (MODEL RULES)
With regard to Rule 3.4(a), DR 7-109(A) provides that “a lawyer shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a
legal obligation to reveal.” DR 7-109(B) provides that “a lawyer shall not advise or cause a person to secrete himself ... for
the purpose of making him unavailable as a witness....” DR 7-106(C)(7) provides that a lawyer shall not “intentionally or
habitually violate any established rule of procedure or of evidence.”
With regard to Rule 3.4(b), DR 7-102(B)(6) provides that a lawyer shall not “participate in the creation or preservation of
evidence when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false.” DR 7-109 provides that “a lawyer shall not pay, offer to
pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent on the content of his testimony or the outcome of
the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee or acquiesce in the payment of: (1) expenses reasonably incurred by a witness
in attending or testifying; (2) reasonable compensation to a witness for his loss of time in attending or testifying; (or) (3) a
reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.” EC 7-28 states that “witnesses should always testify
truthfully and should be free from any financial inducements that might tempt them to do otherwise.”
Rule 3.4(c) is substantially similar to DR 7-106(A), which provides that “A lawyer shall not disregard ... a standing rule of a
tribunal or a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding, but he may take appropriate steps in good faith to test the
validity of such rule or ruling.”
Rule 3.4(d) has no counterpart in the Code.
Rule 3.4(e) substantially incorporates DR 7-106(C)(1), (2), (3) and (4). DR 7-106(C)(2) proscribes asking a question
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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“intended to degrade a witness or other person,” a matter dealt with in Rule 4.4. DR 7-106(C)(5), providing that a lawyer
shall not “fail to comply with known local customs of courtesy or practice,” is too vague to be a rule of conduct enforceable
as law.
With regard to Rule 3.4(f), DR 7-104(A)(2) provides that a lawyer shall not “give advice to a person who is not represented
... other than advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict
with the interests of his client.”
Notes of Decisions (14)

Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 3.4, AR R RPC Rule 3.4
Current with amendments received through November 1, 2014
End of Document
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Board of Educ. of McDowell County v. Zando, Martin &..., 182 W.Va. 597 (1990)
390 S.E.2d 796, 59 Ed. Law Rep. 1179

Defendant in negligence action has right to join
joint tort-feasor on cause of action for
contribution before judgment; this is “inchoate
right to contribution,” as distinguished from
statutory right of contribution after joint
judgment. Code, 55–7–13.

182 W.Va. 597
Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF McDOWELL
COUNTY
v.
ZANDO, MARTIN & MILSTEAD, INC.

7 Cases that cite this headnote

No. 18773. | Feb. 22, 1990.
School board filed action for damages against architect
alleging failure adequately to design and supervise the
construction of building. Architect filed third-party
complaint against contractors, and school board filed
alternate complaint against contractors. The Circuit Court,
Kanawha County, John Hey, J., dismissed contribution
claim of architect but refused to grant verdict credit for
settlements between board and contractors. Architect
appealed. The Supreme Court of Appeals, Miller, J., held
that: (1) architect was not entitled to contribution from
settling contractors, and (2) architect was entitled to
verdict credit for settlements made by board and
contractors.

[3]

Negligence
Joint and several liability
Plaintiff may elect to sue any or all of those
responsible for his injuries and collect his
damages from whoever is able to pay, whatever
the percentage of fault; modified rule for
contributory negligence did not remove joint
and several liability. Code, 55–7–13.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
[4]

West Headnotes (23)
[1]

Contribution
Joint Wrongdoers
Contribution
Measure of contribution
Action seeking right of contribution before
judgment may be brought by joint tort-feasor on
any theory of liability that could have been
asserted by injured plaintiff, even though
amount of recovery in third party action based
on contribution is controlled by amount
recovered by plaintiff in main action. Code,
55–7–13.

Contribution
Nature and grounds of obligation
Contribution
Payment or discharge of common liability
Right to contribution arises if persons having
common obligation are sued on that obligation
and one party is forced to pay more than his pro
tanto share of obligation. Code, 55–7–13.

14 Cases that cite this headnote

3 Cases that cite this headnote
[5]
[2]

Contribution
Time for bringing action

Contribution
Defenses
Joint tort-feasor shall be given credit for amount
of any payments made by another joint

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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Reparation by wrongdoer

tort-feasor in satisfaction of wrong, if payment
is made and release obtained. Code, 55–7–13.

If there is single indivisible loss arising from
actions of multiple parties who contributed to
loss, fact that different theories of liability have
been asserted does not foreclose parties’ right of
contribution inter se or prevent parties from
obtaining verdict credit for settlements made
with plaintiff by one or more of those jointly
responsible. Code, 55–7–13.

6 Cases that cite this headnote

[6]

Contribution
Defenses
Party in civil action who has made good faith
settlement with plaintiff before judicial
determination of liability is relieved from any
liability for contribution. Code, 55–7–13.

20 Cases that cite this headnote

[10]

14 Cases that cite this headnote

[7]

Interest
Contract and sales matters
Interest
Torts; wrongful death
School board which entered into construction
contract was entitled to prejudgment interest on
damage award for losses whether action was
based on breach of contract or on tort. Code,
56–6–27.

Damages
Reparation by wrongdoer
Defendants in civil action against whom verdict
is rendered are entitled to have verdict reduced
by amount of any good-faith settlements
previously made with plaintiff by other jointly
liable parties.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

19 Cases that cite this headnote
[11]

[8]

Damages
Nature and theory of compensation

Whether motion for mistrial should be sustained
or overruled is matter which rests within trial
court’s discretion, and action of trial court in
ruling on such motion will not be cause for
reversal on appeal unless it clearly appears that
such discretion has been abused.

School board which suffered single, indivisible
loss attributable to combined actions of multiple
defendants in designing and constructing school
building was entitled to only one compensatory
damages award.

13 Cases that cite this headnote

3 Cases that cite this headnote

[9]

Contribution
Common Interest or Liability
Damages

Appeal and Error
Conduct of trial or hearing in general
Trial
Discretion of court

[12]

Trial
Comments on Evidence or Witnesses
Comments by counsel that he believed in his

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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client’s case, that witness for opposing party had
been unfriendly, and that one opposing witness
had been “winking at the ladies on the jury”
while counsel’s back was turned, while
improper, did not mandate mistrial.

23 Cases that cite this headnote

[16]

[13]

2 Cases that cite this headnote

Evidence
Knowledge, experience, and skill in general

Appeal and Error
Rulings on admissibility of evidence in
general

Witness who had not been educated as structural
engineer, but had many years experience in
construction business and was familiar with
methods used in disputed construction, could be
allowed to testify as expert on structural matters.
Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 702, 28 U.S.C.A.

Rulings on admissibility of evidence are largely
within trial court’s sound discretion and should
not be disturbed unless there has been abuse of
discretion.
5 Cases that cite this headnote

[14]

3 Cases that cite this headnote

[17]

In litigation involving multiple defendants, court
would not require settling defendant’s expert
witnesses to testify for remaining defendant
after other defendant settled before trial, absent
formal agreement as to shared use of witnesses.

Evidence
Matters involving scientific or other special
knowledge in general
If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist trier of fact to understand
evidence or determine fact in issue, witness
qualified as expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in
form of opinion or otherwise. Fed.Rules
Evid.Rule 702, 28 U.S.C.A.

4 Cases that cite this headnote

[18]

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[15]

Witnesses
Nature and grounds of exclusion in general
In order to bar witness’ testimony under Dead
Man’s Act, testimony must relate to personal
transaction with person now deceased or insane,
witness must be party to suit or interested in
event or outcome, and testimony must be against
representatives, heirs at law, or beneficiaries of
deceased or insane person. Code, 57–3–1.

Appeal and Error
Competency of witness
Evidence
Determination of question of competency
Whether witness is qualified to state opinion is
matter which rests within discretion of trial court
and its ruling on that point will not be disturbed
unless it clearly appears that discretion has been
abused.

Witnesses
Persons Who May Be Required to Appear
and Testify

Cases that cite this headnote

[19]

Witnesses

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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390 S.E.2d 796, 59 Ed. Law Rep. 1179

Principal of agent deceased or incompetent
Allowing testimony from construction company
witnesses as to conversations had with
superintendent at time construction was planned
was not error, even though superintendent had
died prior to trial, where suit was not against
superintendent’s representative, but rather
against principal for whom superintendent had
acted as agent.
Cases that cite this headnote

[ 20 ]

Evidence
Statements by agents since deceased
Testimony of construction company’s witnesses
concerning
conversations
with
school
superintendent who had died before trial was
admissible as statement made by agent or
employee within scope of agency or
employment during existence of relationship.
Rules of Evid., Rule 801(d)(2)(D).
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[ 21 ]

Evidence
Agents or Employees
Statements made by agent or employee within
scope of his agency or employment and during
existence of agency or employment relationship
are not hearsay and are admissible against
principal or employer who is party to litigation.
Rules of Evid., Rule 801(d)(2)(D).
3 Cases that cite this headnote

[2 2 ]

Appeal and Error
Examination and rulings as to competency of
witnesses
Exclusion of statement of school superintendent
who had died prior to trial was not reversible

error where construction company failed to
show relevance of evidence or how exclusion
was prejudicial to its case. Rules of Evid., Rule
801(d)(2)(D).
Cases that cite this headnote

Appeal and Error
Prejudicial Effect
If evidence is excluded and action of court in
excluding it is relied upon in appellate court, it
must appear on record that rejected evidence
was or would have been relevant, material and
important in order for its rejection to be
available as ground of error.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

**799 *600 Syllabus by the Court

1. “The doctrine of contribution has its roots in equitable
principles. The right to contribution arises when persons
having a common obligation, either in contract or tort, are
sued on that obligation and one party is forced to pay
more than his pro tanto share of the obligation.” Syllabus
Point 4, in part, Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Prods., Inc.,
169 W.Va. 440, 288 S.E.2d 511 (1982).
2. A defendant in a civil action has a right in advance of
judgment to join a joint tortfeasor based on a cause of
action for contribution. This is termed an “inchoate right
to contribution” in order to distinguish it from the
statutory right of contribution after a joint judgment
conferred by W.Va.Code, 55-7-13 (1923).
3. “This jurisdiction is committed to the concept of joint
and several liability among joint tortfeasors. A plaintiff
may elect to sue any or all of those responsible for his
injuries and collect his damages from whomever is able to
pay, irrespective of their percentage of fault. Our adoption
of a modified rule for contributory negligence in Bradley
v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d
879 (1979), did not change our adherence to joint and
several liability.” Syllabus Point 2, Sitzes v. Anchor Motor

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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Freight, Inc., 169 W.Va. 698, 289 S.E.2d 679 (1982).
4. Our right of contribution before judgment is derivative
in the sense that it may be brought by a joint tortfeasor on
any theory of liability that could have been asserted by the
injured plaintiff. However, it is clear that the amount of
recovery in a third-party action based on contribution is
controlled by the amount recovered by the plaintiff in the
main action.
5. “ ‘Where a payment is made, and release obtained, by
one joint tort-feasor, the other joint tort-feasors shall be
given credit for the amount of such payment in the
satisfaction of the wrong.’ Point 2, Syllabus, Hardin v.
The New York Central Railroad Company, 145 W.Va.
676 [116 S.E.2d 697 (1960) ].” Syllabus Point 1, Tennant
v. Craig, 156 W.Va. 632, 195 S.E.2d 727 (1973).

not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Louk, W.Va., 301 S.E.2d 596, 599
(1983).’ Syllabus Point 2, State v. Peyatt, 173 W.Va. 317,
315 S.E.2d 574 (1983).” Syllabus Point 7, State v. Miller,
175 W.Va. 616, 336 S.E.2d 910 (1985).
11. “ ‘If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to **800 *601 determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.’ W.Va.R.Evid. 702.”
Syllabus Point 3, Ventura v. Winegardner, 178 W.Va. 82,
357 S.E.2d 764 (1987).

6. A party in a civil action who has made a good faith
settlement with the plaintiff prior to a judicial
determination of liability is relieved from any liability for
contribution.

12. “ ‘Whether a witness is qualified to state an opinion is
a matter which rests within the discretion of the trial court
and its ruling on that point will not ordinarily be disturbed
unless it clearly appears that its discretion has been
abused.’ Point 5, syllabus, Overton v. Fields, 145 W.Va.
797 [117 S.E.2d 598 (1960) ].” Syllabus Point 4, Hall v.
Nello Teer Co., 157 W.Va. 582, 203 S.E.2d 145 (1974).

7. Defendants in a civil action against whom a verdict is
rendered are entitled to have the verdict reduced by the
amount of any good faith settlements previously made
with the plaintiff by other jointly liable parties. Those
defendants against whom the verdict is rendered are
jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for payment of
the remainder of the verdict. Where the relative fault of
the nonsettling defendants has been determined, they may
seek contribution among themselves after judgment if
forced to pay more than their allocated share of the
verdict.

13. “To summarize the basic operation of the Dead Man’s
Act, W.Va.Code, 57–3–1, a concurrence of three general
conditions must be met in order to bar the witness’s
testimony. First, the testimony must relate to a personal
transaction with a deceased or insane person. Second, the
witness must be a party to the suit or interested in its
event or outcome. Third, the testimony must be against
the deceased’s personal representative, heir at law, or
beneficiaries or the assignee or committee of an insane
person.” Syllabus Point 10, Moore v. Goode, 180 W.Va.
78, 375 S.E.2d 549 (1988).

8. Where there is a single indivisible loss arising from the
actions of multiple parties who have contributed to the
loss, the fact that different theories of liability have been
asserted against them does not foreclose their right of
contribution inter se or prevent them from obtaining a
verdict credit for settlements made with the plaintiff by
one or more of those jointly responsible.

14. Statements made by an agent or employee within the
scope of his agency or employment and during the
existence of the agency or employment relationship are
not hearsay and are admissible against a principal or
employer who is a party to litigation. W.Va.R.Evid.
801(d)(2)(D).

9. “Whether a motion for a mistrial should be sustained or
overruled is a matter which rests within the trial court’s
discretion and the action of the trial court in ruling on
such a motion will not be cause for reversal on appeal
unless it clearly appears that such discretion has been
abused.” Syllabus Point 4, Moore, Kelly & Reddish, Inc.
v. Shannondale, Inc., 152 W.Va. 549, 165 S.E.2d 113
(1968).
10. “ ‘ “Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are
largely within a trial court’s sound discretion and should

15. “When evidence is excluded and the action of the
court in excluding it is relied upon in the appellate court,
it must appear on the record that the evidence rejected
was or would have been relevant, material and important
to make its rejection available as a ground of error.”
Syllabus Point 5, Maxwell v. Kent, 49 W.Va. 542, 39 S.E.
174 (1901).
Attorneys and Law Firms
Daniel R. Schuda, Steptoe & Johnson, Charleston, for
Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc.
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Stephen R. Crislip, William J. Powell, Jackson & Kelly,
Charleston, for the Bd. of Educ. of McDowell County.
Opinion
MILLER, Justice:
In this appeal, we address the validity of the dismissal of a
civil defendant’s claim for contribution against a joint
wrongdoer who has settled with the plaintiff. We also
address the right of the nonsettling defendant to have the
verdict reduced to reflect such settlements. We conclude
that the Circuit Court of Kanawha County properly
dismissed the contribution claims of the defendant below,
Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc. (ZMM), but erred in
refusing to grant a verdict credit for settlements between
the plaintiff below, the Board of Education of McDowell
County (Board), and other defendants.
In January, 1975, the Board entered into a contract with
ZMM, an architectural and engineering firm located in
Charleston, Kanawha County, to design and supervise the
construction of Mount View High School near Welch,
McDowell County. At the recommendation of ZMM, the
Board subsequently hired, by separate contracts, the H.C.
Nutting Company (Nutting) to do soil testing at the
proposed school site and the Corte Company, Inc. (Corte),
a general contractor, to perform most of the construction.
Cracks were found in the building almost as soon as the
school opened in September 1978, and more appeared as
time went on. In January 1982, a steel beam supporting a
classroom fell. In July 1983, the south wall of the
gymnasium suffered a structural failure during a
windstorm.

“

On February 22, 1984, the Board filed an action for
damages in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County,
alleging that ZMM had been negligent and had breached
its contracts with the Board by failing properly to design
and supervise the construction of the building. ZMM
denied the allegations and subsequently filed a third-party
complaint alleging that any damages suffered by the
Board were due to the negligence of Nutting and Corte.
The Board was then **801 *602 granted leave to file an
alternative complaint against Nutting and Corte, charging
each with breach of contract and with negligence.
In April 1987, the Board settled with Corte for $600,000.
Corte obtained a release from liability and was dismissed
from the litigation. The trial court also dismissed with
prejudice ZMM’s cross-claims1 against Corte on the
ground that the settlement and release barred any further
proceedings against Corte arising from the same
transaction. The Board proceeded to trial against Nutting
and ZMM several weeks later. In the course of trial,
however, the Board settled with Nutting for $30,000, and
Nutting was dismissed from the action. The trial judge
also dismissed ZMM’s cross-claims against Nutting.
The case was submitted to the jury, and, on May 21,
1987, a verdict was returned awarding the Board
$1,000,000 in compensatory damages. Interrogatories
subsequently submitted to the jury indicated that the
verdict was predicated on findings of both negligence and
breach of contract. The jury allocated the negligence
involved as follows:

5% McDowell County Board of Education

15% Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc.
75% Corte Company, Inc.
0% H.C. Nutting Company
5% Others”

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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No punitive damages were awarded.
Following the verdict, ZMM sought to have the Nutting
and Corte settlements deducted from the verdict. The
Board, however, elected to have judgment rendered on the
contract claim. The trial court refused to grant ZMM a
credit for the Nutting and Corte settlements and, by order
dated October 15, 1988, entered judgment against ZMM
for the full $1,000,000.

I.

A. The Right o f Contribution

[1] ZMM first argues that the trial court’s dismissal of its
cross-claims against Corte and Nutting impermissibly cut
off its right to contribution. The right of contribution
arises from liability for a joint wrong committed by two
or more parties against the plaintiff. We explained the
doctrine of contribution in Syllabus Point 4, in part, of
Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Prods., Inc., 169 W.Va. 440,
288 S.E.2d 511 (1982), as follows:
“The doctrine of contribution has
its roots in equitable principles. The
right to contribution arises when
persons
having
a
common
obligation, either in contract or tort,
are sued on that obligation and one
party is forced to pay more than his
pro tanto share of the obligation.”
See Estate o f Bayliss v. Lee, 173 W.Va. 299, 315 S.E.2d
406 (1984).
[2] In Haynes v. City o f Nitro, 161 W.Va. 230, 240 S.E.2d
544 (1977), we traced our prior cases in this area and
concluded that a defendant in a negligence action has a
right in advance of judgment to join a joint tortfeasor
based on a cause of action for contribution. We termed
this an “inchoate right to contribution” in order to
distinguish it from the statutory right of contribution after
a joint judgment conferred by W.Va.Code, 55-7-13
(1923).2 161 W.Va. at 234, 240 S.E.2d at 547.
[3] In Sydenstricker, 169 W.Va. at 452, 288 S.E.2d at 518,
we reaffirmed that this inchoate right of contribution “ ‘is

designed to moderate the inequity which existed in our
law that enabled the plaintiff to cast **802 *603 the entire
responsibility for an accident on one of several joint
tortfeasors by deciding to sue only him.’ ” Quoting
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332, 354,
256 S.E.2d 879, 886 (1979). This right of the plaintiff to
sue one or more joint tortfeasors is a companion principle
of the doctrine of joint and several liability, which permits
a plaintiff to recover the entire judgment from any joint
judgment debtor. As we explained in Syllabus Point 2 of
Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 169 W.Va. 698, 289
S.E.2d 679 (1982):
“This jurisdiction is committed to
the concept of joint and several
liability among joint tortfeasors. A
plaintiff may elect to sue any or all
of those responsible for his injuries
and collect his damages from
whomever is able to pay,
irrespective of their percentage of
fault. Our adoption of a modified
rule for contributory negligence in
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co.,
163 W.Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879
(1979), did not change our
adherence to joint and several
liability.”
[4] In Sydenstricker, 169 W.Va. at 452, 288 S.E.2d at 518,
we explained the scope of our inchoate right of
contribution as follows:
“Our right of contribution before
judgment is derivative in the sense
that it may be brought by a joint
tortfeasor on any theory of liability
that could have been asserted by
the injured plaintiff. However, it is
clear that the amount of recovery in
a third-party action based on
contribution is controlled by the
amount recovered by the plaintiff
in the main action.”
Thus, the right of inchoate contribution is not confined
only to cases of joint negligence. Instead, it arises under
any theory of liability which results in a common
obligation to the plaintiff. Where, as here, the plaintiff
seeks damages for a breach of contractual obligations, the
named defendant is entitled to assert claims for
contribution against other parties liable to the plaintiff for

W
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the same injury even though the defendant was not a party
to the contract between the plaintiff and the other parties.3
See 18 Am.Jur.2d Contribution § 10 (1985). The
touchstone of the right of inchoate contribution is this
inquiry: Did the party against whom contribution is
sought breach a duty to the plaintiff which caused or
contributed to the plaintiff’s damages?
The fundamental purpose of inchoate contribution is to
enable all parties who have contributed to the plaintiff’s
injuries to be brought into one suit. Not only is judicial
economy served, but such a procedure also furthers one of
the primary goals of any system of justice—to avoid
piecemeal litigation which cultivates a multiplicity of
suits and often results in disparate and unjust verdicts. See
Bowman v. Barnes, 168 W.Va. 111, 282 S.E.2d 613
(1981). Moreover, as we have already indicated, joinder
of contribution claims serves to ensure that those who
have contributed to the plaintiff’s damages share in that
responsibility. We have also provided a method of
apportioning the damages among the defendants
according to fault in negligence cases.4 Finally, while the
right of contribution is designed to promote equality
among defendants, it is not automatic **803 *604 and
must be properly invoked to be preserved. See Sitzes v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 169 W.Va. at 713, 289
S.E.2d at 688.

Consolidated Coal Company v. Eary, 115 W.Va. 46
[174 S.E. 573 (1934) ].”
This practice is premised on the principle that a plaintiff is
entitled to one, but only one, complete satisfaction for his
injury. Thornton v. Charleston Area Medical Center, 158
W.Va. 504, 213 S.E.2d 102 (1975); Cox v. Turner, 157
W.Va. 802, 207 S.E.2d 152 (1974); Tennant v. Craig,
supra; New River & Pocahontas Consol. Coal Co. v.
Eary, supra; Bloss v. Plymale, 3 W.Va. 393 (1869).
These cases implicitly stand for the proposition that one
who settles with the plaintiff prior to verdict is discharged
from any liability for contribution.5 This is the approach
taken by both the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, 1955, (UCATA)6 and the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act (UCFA).7
Such a rule furthers the strong public policy favoring
out-of-court resolution of disputes, which we stated in
Syllabus Point 1, in part, of Sanders v. Roselawn
Memorial Gardens, 152 W.Va. 91, 159 S.E.2d 784
(1968): “The law favors and encourages the resolution of
controversies by contracts of compromise and settlement
rather than by litigation[.]” See State ex rel. Vapor Corp.
v. Narick, 173 W.Va. 770, 320 S.E.2d 345 (1984); Floyd
v. Watson, 163 W.Va. 65, 254 S.E.2d 687 (1979); Janney
v. Virginian Ry. Co., 119 W.Va. 249, 193 S.E. 187
(1937). As the California Court of Appeals stated in
Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236,
132 Cal.Rptr. 843, 846 (1976):

B. Termination o f Contribution Rights by Settlement

[5] Having spoken generally of the right to contribution,
we must now discuss the law surrounding the termination
of such a right when a joint wrongdoer settles with the
plaintiff. Although we have never discussed this issue at
length, we have developed, independently of any
assertion of contribution, a practice of allowing the
defendant against whom a verdict is rendered to reduce
the damages to reflect any partial settlement the plaintiff
has obtained from a joint tortfeasor. As we stated in
Syllabus Points 1 and 2 of Tennant v. Craig, 156 W.Va.
632, 195 S.E.2d 727 (1973):
“ 1. ‘Where a payment is made, and release obtained, by
one joint tort-feasor, the other joint tort-feasors shall be
given credit for the amount of such payment in the
satisfaction of the wrong. ’ Point 2, Syllabus, Hardin v.
The New York Central Railroad Company, 145 W.Va.
676 [116 S.E.2d 697 (1960) ].
“2. Partial satisfaction of the injured person by one
joint tortfeasor is a satisfaction, pro tanto, as to all.’
Point 5, Syllabus, New River & Pocahontas

**804 *605 “Few things would be
better calculated to frustrate this
policy,
and
to
discourage
settlement of disputed tort claims,
than knowledge that such a
settlement lacked finality and
would but lead to further litigation
with one’s joint tortfeasors, and
perhaps further liability.”

“No defendant wants to settle when he remains open to
contribution in an uncertain amount, to be determined on
the basis of a judgment against another in a suit to which
he will not be a party.” Unif. Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, 1955, § 4(b), comment, 12 U.L.A. at 99.
See Rakowski v. Lucente, 104 Ill.2d 317, 84 Ill.Dec. 654,
472 N.E.2d 791 (1984).
From a practical standpoint, the reduction of the verdict to
reflect partial settlements counterbalances the loss of the
right of contribution, since the remaining defendants, who
would otherwise have been entitled to such right, obtain

W
estlaw
N
ext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

8

Board of Educ. of McDowell County v. Zando, Martin

182 W.Va. 597 (1990)

390 S.E.2d 796, 59 Ed. Law Rep. 1179

the benefit of the settlement. See Dunn v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 645 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.1981); Poupore v. Suguin,
82 Misc.2d 1, 367 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1975). Verdict
reduction also allocates liability to some extent among
those jointly responsible for the plaintiff’s injury. The
settling defendant is, in effect, paying a share of liability
on the verdict. At the same time, the use of the verdict
credit ensures against double recovery by the plaintiff
See Luth v. Rogers & Babler Constr. Co., 507 P.2d 761
(Alaska 1973); Lafayette v. Los Angeles County, 162
Cal.App.3d 547, 208 Cal.Rptr. 668 (1984); Utter v. South
Brookhaven Obstetric & Gynecological Assocs., P.C.,
135 A.D.2d 811, 522 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1987). See generally
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 885(3) comment f
(1979).
These considerations have led most jurisdictions
recognizing a right of contribution to conclude that a
nonsettling defendant’s right of contribution from a joint
wrongdoer is extinguished by the plaintiff’s settlement
with and release of such wrongdoer prior to verdict. See,
e.g., Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1967);
American Motorcycle A ss’n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.3d
578, 146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899 (1978); State ex rel
Deere & Co. v. District Court, 224 Mont. 384, 730 P.2d
396 (1986); Theobald v. Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 208 A.2d
129 (1965); Charles v. Giant Eagle Mkts., 513 Pa. 474,
522 A.2d 1 (1987); Kirby Bldg. Sys. v. Mineral
Explorations Co., 704 P.2d 1266 (Wyo. 1985). We believe
this approach is consistent with our principles regarding
settlements and allocation of liability.
Some jurisdictions have recognized a limited exception to
the finality of such settlements where the agreement is
collusive in nature by refusing to cut off the nonsettling
defendants’ right to contribution unless the settlement has
been made in “good faith.” See Stifle v. Marathon Oil Co.,
684 F.Supp. 552 (S.D.I11.1988), rev’d on other grounds,
876 F.2d 552 (7th Cir.1989) (applying Illinois law);
Torres v. State, 67 A.D.2d 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1979).
The determination of whether a settlement was made in
good faith does not necessarily turn on whether the
amount of the settlement accurately reflects the jury’s
ultimate apportionment of liability. The Appellate Court
of Illinois recently stated in Jachera v. Blake-Lamb
Funeral Homes, Inc., 189 Ill.App.3d 281, 288, 136
I11.Dec. 790, 795, 545 N.E.2d 314, 319 (1989):
“Since
damages
are
often
speculative and liability uncertain,
the amount of a settlement
legitimately might be far different
from a damage award which results
from full litigation. ( [O ’Connor v.

Pinto
Trucking
Serv.,149
Ill.App.3d 911, 103 I11.Dec. 242,
501 N.E.2d 263 (1986) ] ). An
ensuing jury verdict is not
necessarily an accurate measure of
good faith in a settlement made
prior to trial; at the time of the
settlement, it is an unknown factor,
so that any analysis based on the
subsequent
verdict necessarily
relies on hindsight. ( [Lowe v.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 124
Ill.App.3d 80, 79 I11.Dec. 238, 463
N.E.2d 792 (1 9 8 4 )]) ”
Accord Noyes v. Raymond, 28 Mass.App. 186, 548
N.E.2d 196 (1990). As we implicitly recognized in the
context of “Mary Carter” agreements,8 the chief
consideration is **805 *606 whether the settlement
arrangement substantially impaired the remaining
defendants from receiving a fair trial. State ex rel. Vapor
Corp. v. Narick, 173 W.Va. at 773, 320 S.E.2d at 348. See
Grillis v. Monongahela Power Co., 176 W.Va. 662, 346
S.E.2d 812 (1986).
[6] The good faith test carries its own safeguards. It is
highly unlikely that a plaintiff will make a minimal
settlement with a defendant who has the financial ability
to pay and whose liability is substantial. We, therefore
conclude that a party in a civil action who has made a
good faith settlement with the plaintiff poor to a judicial
determination of liability is relieved from any liability for
contribution. In this case, there is no suggestion that the
settlements were not entered into in good faith.
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court
committed reversible error in dismissing with prejudice
ZMM’s cross-claims against Corte and Nutting for
contribution.

C. Calculation o f Verdict Credit
We confirm our traditional practice of granting a
nonsettling defendant a pro tanto, or dollar-for-dollar,
credit for partial settlements against any verdict ultimately
rendered for the plaintiff. See Tennant v. Craig, supra;
Butler v. Sm ith’s Transfer Corp., 147 W.Va. 402, 128
S.E.2d 32 (1962). In Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co.,
163 W.Va. at 345, 256 S.E.2d at 886, we stated: “Our
comparative negligence rule does not change the right of
a joint tortfeasor to obtain a pro tanto credit on the
plaintiffs judgment for monies obtained by the plaintiff
in a settlement with another joint tortfeasor.” (Citations
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omitted). The pro tanto verdict reduction method has also
been approved in cases decided after our adoption of
comparative negligence. See Reager v. Anderson, 179
W.Va. 691, 703, 371 S.E.2d 619, 632 (1988); Groves v.
Compton, 167 W.Va. 873, 280 S.E.2d 708 (1981).
Our practice with regard to verdict reduction basically
comports with Section 4 of the UCATA, which states that
a prior settlement by one joint tortfeasor “reduces the
claim against the others to the extent of any amount
stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount
of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater.”9
12 U.L.A. at 98. Jurisdictions adhering to this approach
assert that it (1) encourages the plaintiff to settle by
guaranteeing that the portion of the verdict not paid by the
settling defendant will be chargeable to the defendant
against whom the verdict is returned and (2), at the same
time, clearly furthers the strong public policy against the
plaintiff recovering more than one complete satisfaction.
Tommy’s Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 754 P.2d 243
(Alaska 1988); American Motorcycle A ss’n v. Superior
Court, supra; Department o f Tramp. v. Webb, 409 So.2d
1061 (Fla.App.1981), modified on other grounds, 438
So.2d 780 (Fla.1983); Nobriga v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 67 Haw. 157, 683 P.2d 389 (1984); Mayhew v.
Berrien County Road Comm’n, 414 Mich. 399, 326
N.W.2d 366 (1982); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11
(Mo.1983); State ex rel. Deere & Co. v. District Court,
224 Mont. at 397, 730 P.2d at 405; Kirby Bldg. Sys. v.
Mineral Explorations Co., 704 P.2d at 1277.
We recognize that this model for verdict reduction does
not take into account the settling party’s actual degree of
fault.10 **806 *607 However, the importance and
accuracy of the jury’s allocation of liability is necessarily
undermined by the fact that the settling party, who is out
of the case, is not present to defend himself.
[7] We, therefore, conclude that the defendants in a civil
action against whom a verdict is rendered are entitled to
have the verdict reduced by the amount of any good faith
settlements previously made with the plaintiff by other
jointly liable parties. Those defendants against whom the
verdict is rendered are jointly and severally liable to the
plaintiff for payment of the remainder of the verdict.
Where the relative fault of the nonsettling defendants has
been determined, they may seek contribution among
themselves after judgment if forced to pay more than their
allocated share of the verdict.11

D. ZM M’s Entitlement to Verdict Credit

The Board’s action against ZMM was based on two
theories, i.e., breach of its architectural and engineering
contract to design the building and to supervise the
construction and negligence in supervising the work.12
The same damages were proved under both theories. The
jury was instructed on both theories13 and returned
interrogatories which supported both theories. The Board,
after the verdict, elected to accept the verdict on the
contract theory. Presumably, the Board believed that
ZMM could not obtain the benefit of the Corte and
Nutting settlements in the contract action because Corte
and Nutting were not parties to the Board’s contract with
ZMM and vice versa. The trial court apparently adopted
this view and held that ZMM was not entitled to a set off
against the verdict reflecting the prior settlements.
**807 *608 We have already recognized that the right of
inchoate contribution exists in both tort and contract
cases. Our definition of the right of contribution in
Sydenstricker makes no distinction among theories of
recovery, but focuses on the common liability of the
defendants for plaintiff’s injuries. If those injuries arise
from the combined actions of the defendants, they are
jointly liable to the plaintiff and may seek inchoate
contribution among themselves regardless of the theories
of recovery asserted against them individually.

The right of contribution was not designed to provide a
windfall for the plaintiff by permitting him to achieve a
double recovery for the same injury. Our general law in
this area is in line with the general law of damages
elsewhere and is set out in Syllabus Point 7 of Harless v.
First N at’l Bank in Fairmont, 169 W.Va. 673, 289 S.E.2d
692 (1982):
“It is generally recognized that
there can be only one recovery of
damages for one wrong or injury.
Double recovery of damages is not
permitted; the law does not permit
a double satisfaction for a single
injury. A plaintiff may not recover
damages twice for the same injury
simply because he has two legal
theories.”
See also Sewell v. Gregory, 179 W.Va. 585, 371 S.E.2d
82 (1988); Wiggins v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 178
W.Va. 63, 357 S.E.2d 745 (1987); Flannery v. United
States, 171 W.Va. 27, 297 S.E.2d 433, 34 A.L.R.4th 281
(1982).
This rule of damages is independent of the right of
contribution. In Harless, the plaintiff sought recovery for
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mental anguish and emotional distress as a result of a
retaliatory discharge by his employer. He also had a
second theory of recovery—the tort of outrageous
conduct. The trial court permitted both theories to go to
the jury, and the jury awarded separate amounts on both
theories. We held that because both theories involved
essentially the same items of damages, a duplicate
recovery could not be made.
Other jurisdictions have recognized that a joint obligation
may arise in both contract and tort, but give rise to a
single damage recovery.14 In Town o f Winnsboro v.
Barnard & Burk, Inc., 294 So.2d 867 (La.App.), writ
refused, 295 So.2d 445 (La.1974), for example, an
engineering firm and a testing laboratory tried to escape
common liability for defects in the construction of a city
street system on the ground that they had entered into
separate contracts with the plaintiff city. While conceding
that the defendants were not joint obligors, the court held:
“It matters not that the obligation of the defendants to
repair the damages and bear the loss arose from
separate breaches of separate contracts to do separate
things. The jurisprudence recognizes that solidary
obligations may result even though the parties are
bound under separate contracts and even though one
party may be bound under contract and the other
through some other basis of law.” 294 So.2d at 886.
Where such joint obligation for damages is found, a credit
is allowed for any settlement prior to verdict, as illustrated
by Kassman v. American Univ., 178 U.S.App.D.C. 263,
546 F.2d 1029 (1976). There, the Court of Appeals noted
that the idea of a credit is premised on the principle that
“[t]he office of compensatory damages is to make the
plaintiff whole, but certainly not more than whole,” and
went on to say:
“There is nothing in logic or precedent which requires
limitation of the underlying principle to situations
involving joint tortfeasors or to those involving
unintentional torts; on the contrary, there is the
soundest of reasons to indulge its operation wherever
more than one is responsible for a single injury. Where
there has been only one injury, the law confers only
one recovery, irrespective of the multiplicity of parties
whom or theories which the plaintiff pursues.” **808
*609 178 U.S.App.D.C. at 267-68, 546 F.2d at
1033-34. (Footnotes omitted).
The court in Kassman found that regardless of the
different theories and parties pursued by the plaintiff,
“there was but one loss” and that “if the amount paid in
settlement reimbursed Kassman for part of the loss
established by the verdict, the judgment on that verdict
should have been credited with the payment on

settlement.” 546 F.2d at 1035. See Reliable Tire Distribs.,
Inc. v. Kelly Springfield Tire Co., 607 F.Supp. 361
(E.D.Pa.1985); J.F. Equip., Inc. v. Owatonna Mfg. Co.,
Inc., 143 Ill.App.3d 208, 98 Ill.Dec. 394, 494 N.E.2d 516
(1986); Laurendeau v. Kewaunee Scientific Equip. Corp.,
17 Mass.App. 113, 456 N.E.2d 767 (1983), review
denied, 390 Mass. 1106, 459 N.E.2d 824 (1984); Great
Northern Packaging, Inc. v. General Tire & Rubber Co.,
154 Mich.App. 777, 399 N.W.2d 408 (1986); Ross v.
Holton, 640 S.W.2d 166 (Mo.App.1982); TSC Indus., Inc.
v. Tomlin, 743 S.W.2d 169 (Tenn.App.1987). See also
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A(2) (1979).
The same result was reached in a factual pattern closely
analogous to the one here. In Young M en ’s Christian
Ass ’n v. Midland Architects, Inc., 174 Ill.App.3d 966, 124
Ill.Dec. 468, 529 N.E.2d 288 (1988), the plaintiff brought
suit for breach of contract and breach of warranties
against the architects, the general contractor, and the
manufacturer of a roof system installed on the plaintiff’s
building. Prior to trial, the contractor and manufacturer
settled and were dismissed from the action. The case
proceeded to trial against the architects on a breach of
contract theory and resulted in a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff. The architects then sought to have the verdict
reduced by the amount of the pretrial settlements.
In ruling that the trial court erred in its manner of
reducing the verdict, the Illinois appellate court relied on
cases involving joint tortfeasors and stated:
“This is a case where the actions of all the defendants
(the architects, the general contractor, and the roofing
manufacturer) caused a single, indivisible injury to
plaintiff as a result of the construction and installation
of a defective roof.

“The law is well settled that, where there is a single and
indivisible injury, the damages are inseparable and any
amounts received from any of the defendants must be
deducted from the total damages sustained. (Weaver v.
Bolton (1965), 61 Ill.App.2d 98, 209 N.E.2d 5.)
Applicable to the case at bar is the holding in Eberle v.
Brenner (1987), 153 Ill.App.3d 700, 702 [106 Ill.Dec.
144, 146, 505 N.E.2d 691, 693], where the court said:
‘An injured person is entitled to one full
compensation for his injuries, and a double recovery
for the same injury is against public policy.
[Citation.] Thus, a plaintiff who has recovered for his
damages should have no basis to complain because a
defendant benefited from a setoff. ’ ”
174 Ill.App.3d at 970, 124 Ill.Dec. at 471, 529 N.E.2d
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at 291.
See also Morley v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1989)
(applying Maryland law); Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 846
F.2d 482 (8th Cir. 1988); Raben-Pastal v. City o f Coconut
Creek, 545 So.2d 885 (Fla.App. 1989); Reeves v. Dixie
Brick, Inc., 403 So.2d 792 (La.App. 1981); Doundoulakis
v. Town o f Hempstead, 42 N.Y.2d 440, 398 N.Y.S.2d 401,
368 N.E.2d 24 (1977); South Union, Ltd. v. George
Parker & Assocs., 29 Ohio App.3d 197, 29 O.B.R. 241,
504 N.E.2d 1131 (1985); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
[8] We believe that under the foregoing legal principles, a
verdict reduction reflecting the settlements was required
here. The Board suffered a single, indivisible loss
attributable to the combined actions of the multiple
defendants in designing and constructing the high school.
The defendants therefore shared a common liability for
the damages suffered by the Board. The evidence and
measure of compensatory damages was the same under
both theories of liability. In essence, the Board merely
asserted alternative grounds for the same **809 *610
relief. It is, therefore, entitled to only one compensatory
damage award.

v. City o f Huntington, 166 W.Va. 581, 596, 276 S.E.2d
539, 547 (1981), for example, we commented that
W.Va.Code, 56-6-27 (1923),16 embodied the common
law principle that in contract claims, interest was awarded
as part of the compensatory damages “where the principal
is certain or can be rendered certain by some reasonable
calculation.” See Bischoff v. Francesa, 133 W.Va. 474, 56
S.E.2d 865 (1949); Cresap v. Brown, 82 W.Va. 467, 96
S.E. 66 (1918). In Bond, however, we were concerned
primarily with the award of interest in a tort action in the
absence of an authorizing statute. A cursory reading of
W.Va.Code, 56-6-27, clearly demonstrates that an award
of interest in a contract action is not limited to cases in
which the amount in question is undisputed. Interest is
allowable “in any action founded on contract.” As we
indicated in Syllabus Point 1 of Corte Co., Inc. v. County
Comm’n o f McDowell County, 171 W.Va. 405 , 299
S.E.2d 16 (1982): “Pursuant to W.Va.Code, 56-6-27
[1931], a county commission may be liable, in an action
founded on contract, for interest on the principal due, or
any part thereof, at the time of trial, after allowing all
proper credits, payments and sets off.” Such awards are
intended to compensate the plaintiff for the losses he
could have avoided or money he could have earned if the
contract obligation had been timely performed.

[9] Under these circumstances, where there is a single
indivisible loss arising from the actions of multiple parties
who have contributed to the loss, the fact that different
theories of liability have been asserted against them does
not foreclose their right of contribution inter se or prevent
them from obtaining a verdict credit for settlements made
with the plaintiff by one or more of those jointly
responsible. Accordingly, we conclude that ZMM was, in
fact, entitled to reduction of the verdict to reflect prior
payments by Corte and Nutting in satisfaction of the
Board’s loss.15

Here, the jury found the Board’s loss to be one million
dollars. ZMM does not dispute that an award of
prejudgment interest would have been proper on a tort
judgment. In Arcuri v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 176 W.Va.
211, 219, 342 S.E.2d 177, 185 (1986), we held that the
plaintiffs, who had sued their fire and hazard insurers in
both contract and tort for delay in payment of insurance
proceeds, were entitled to interest on the proceeds of the
policies “whether the action against the insurers is for
breach of contract or for the tort of bad **810 *611 faith
delay in payment.” We believe the Board is entitled to no
less.

II.

On remand, the trial court should recall the rate of interest
spelled out in Syllabus Point 7 of Bell v. Inland Mut. Ins.
Co., 175 W.Va. 165 , 332 S.E.2d 127, cert, denied sub
nom. Camden Fire Ins. A s s n v. Justice, 474 U.S. 936,
106 S.Ct. 299, 88 L.Ed.2d 277 (1985):

[10] On cross-assignment of error, the Board contends that
the trial court erred in refusing to grant its post-judgment
motion for prejudgment interest on the verdict. The trial
court granted the Board post-judgment interest on the
$1,000,000 verdict from the verdict date, but held that
since the Board had elected to have judgment entered on
the breach of contract theory, it was not entitled to
prejudgment interest.
Admittedly, there is some confusion in our cases with
regard to prejudgment interest in contract cases. In Bond

“Prejudgment interest accruing on
amounts as provided by law prior
to July 5, 1981 [W.Va.Code,
56-6-27 and -29 [1931]] is to be
calculated at a maximum annual
rate
of
six
percent
under
W. Va. Code, 47-6-5(a) [1974], and
thereafter, at a maximum annual
rate of ten percent in accordance
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with the provisions of W.Va.Code,
56-6-31 [1981].”
Weimer-Godwin v. Board o f Educ. o f Upshur County, 179
W.Va. 423, 428, 369 S.E.2d 726, 731 (1988).
Prejudgment interest should be calculated from the date
on which the cause of action accrued. See Syllabus Point
2, Grove v. Myers, 181 W.Va.342, 382 S.E.2d 536 (1989).
Although from the record before us, it is difficult to
pinpoint the precise date when the cause of action arose, it
would appear that the major damage had occurred at least
by July, 1983. Prejudgment interest should be awarded on
the entire $1,000,000 verdict from the date of the cause of
action.17 Because the Board received the Corte and
Nutting settlements less than one month before the jury
verdict, there is no necessity to adjust the prejudgment
interest for the settlement amounts. Finally, the principal
on which the award of post-judgment interest will be
calculated should be arrived at by subtracting the dollar
amount of all settlements from the $1,000,000 verdict
plus prejudgment interest.

a matter which rests within the trial
court’s discretion and the action of
the trial court in ruling on such a
motion will not be cause for
reversal on appeal unless it clearly
appears that such discretion has
been abused.”
We have also held on several occasions that improper
personal remarks of counsel do not always require
reversal of a judgment. See Jenrett v. Smith, supra;
Leftwich v. Wesco Corp., 146 W.Va. 196, 119 S.E.2d 401
(1961), overruled on other grounds, Bradley v.
Appalachian Power Co., supra.
[12] *612 Reviewing the record as a whole, we cannot say
that counsel’s improper comments **811 were such as to
mandate the granting of a mistrial. Accordingly, we find
no abuse of discretion by the trial court which would
warrant reversal of the judgment for refusal to grant a
mistrial.

IV.
III.

ZMM next contends that the trial court erred in not
granting its motion for a mistrial. The motion, made after
the jury had retired to deliberate, was based on allegedly
improper comments made by counsel for the Board in
closing arguments18 indicating that the attorney “believed
in” his client’s case, that witnesses for ZMM had been
unfriendly to the Board’s witnesses, and that one ZMM
witness had been “winking at the ladies on the jury” while
counsel’s back was turned.
[11] In Syllabus Point 2 of Jenrett v. Smith, 173 W.Va.
325, 315 S.E.2d 583 (1983), we stated:
“ ‘Though wide latitude is accorded counsel in
arguments before a jury, such arguments may not be
founded on facts not before the jury, or inferences
which must arise from facts not before the jury.’ Syl.
pt. 3, Crum v. Ward, 146 W.Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18
(1961).”
Certainly, the comments of the Board’s attorney stated
matters not in evidence. In Syllabus Point 4 of Moore,
Kelly & Reddish, Inc. v. Shannondale, Inc., 152 W.Va.
549, 165 S.E.2d 113 (1968), we recognized:
“Whether a motion for a mistrial
should be sustained or overruled is

[13] ZMM also raises several assignments of evidentiary
error. We are guided in our inquiry by the well-settled
rule stated in Syllabus Point 7 of State v. Miller, 175
W.Va. 616, 336 S.E.2d 910 (1985):
“ ‘ “Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are largely
within a trial court’s sound discretion and should not be
disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion.”
State v. Louk, 171 W.Va. 639, 301 S.E.2d 596, 599
(1983).’ Syllabus Point 2, State v. Peyatt, 173 W.Va.
317, 315 S.E.2d 574 (1983).”
See West Virginia D ep’t o f Highways v. Mountain, Inc.,
167 W.Va. 202, 279 S.E.2d 192 (1981); Casto v. Martin,
159 W.Va. 761, 230 S.E.2d 722 (1976).

A.

ZMM first contends that the trial court erred in allowing
J.E. Caffrey, a consulting engineer, to testify as an expert
witness on matters of structural engineering and design.
Mr. Caffrey had been educated as a mining engineer, but
had over twenty-five years experience supervising various
kinds of engineers and construction. Mr. Caffrey stated
that his experience had made him familiar with the
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construction methods used in building the high school.
The court qualified him to testify as an expert as to
structural matters.
[14] [15] In Syllabus Point 3 of Ventura v. Winegardner, 178
W.Va. 82, 357 S.E.2d 764 (1987), we stated:
“ ‘If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.’ W.Va.R.Evid. 702.”
See West Virginia D ep’t o f Highways v. Thompson, 180
W.Va. 114, 375 S.E.2d 585 (1988). In Ventura, we
recognized that Rule 702 “liberally allows a witness to
testify as an expert[.]” 178 W.Va. at 86, 357 S.E.2d at
768. Federal court decisions interpreting Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which is identical to our rule,
hold that the witness may be qualified as an expert by any
one of the means listed, i.e., knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education. Friendship Heights Assocs. v.
Vlastimil Koubek, A.I.A., 785 F.2d 1154 (4th Cir.1986);
Garrett v. Desa Indus., Inc., 705 F.2d 721 (4th Cir.1983);
Dychalo v. Copperloy Corp., 78 F.R.D. 146 (E.D.Pa.),
a ff’d, 588 F.2d 820 (3d Cir.1978). See generally 3 J.
Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence 702[04]
(1988); F. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence fo r West
Virginia Lawyers § 7.1(B) at 419-20 (2d ed. 1986).
Adoption of W.Va.R.Evid. 702 did not affect the
well-settled rule of our prior law which was stated in
Syllabus Point 4 of Hall v. Nello Teer Co., 157 W.Va.
582, 203 S.E.2d 145 (1974):
“ ‘Whether a witness is qualified to state an opinion is a
matter which rests within the discretion of the trial
court and its ruling on that point will not ordinarily be
disturbed unless it clearly appears that its discretion has
been abused.’ Point 5, syllabus, Overton v. Fields, 145
W.Va. 797 [117 S.E.2d 598 (1960) ].”
See State v. M.M., 163 W.Va. 235, 256 S.E.2d 549
(1979); Byrd v. Virginian Ry. Co., 123 W.Va. 47, 13
S.E.2d 273 (1941). See generally 3 Weinstein & Berger,
supra.
[16] The evidence here demonstrated that although Mr.
Caffrey had not been educated as a structural engineer, he
had many years experience in the construction business
and was familiar with the methods used in this instance.
In view of this evidence, we are unwilling to say that the
trial court abused its discretion in allowing Mr. Caffrey to
testify as an expert on structural matters.

**812 *613 B.
[17] ZMM next contends that the trial court erred in not
allowing it to present the testimony of certain witnesses
on the issue of damages. These witnesses were originally
secured by Corte, who had taken the primary pretrial
responsibility for presentation of evidence regarding
damages. As part of its settlement with the Board,
however, Corte agreed not to “make available to the
remaining parties in the civil action ... any expert
witnesses named by it in connection with said civil
action.”
When ZMM attempted to call the Corte witnesses at trial,
the trial court ruled that they were “expert witnesses”
within the meaning of the settlement agreement and
refused to make them available to testify for ZMM. The
court did grant ZMM a recess to attempt to obtain an
expert of its own, but when trial resumed five days later,
ZMM asserted that it had been unable to locate any
witnesses who could offer the same testimony.19
This is not the first time that we have had a claim of this
nature. In Riggle v. Allied Chem. Corp., 180 W.Va. 561,
378 S.E.2d 282 (1989), one of the defendants settled with
the plaintiffs during the first day of trial. This left the
remaining defendant without the benefit of the settling
defendant’s experts. We rejected the nonsettling
defendant’s claim of error, stating:
“Appellant had two possible courses of action to
protect itself against a settlement between plaintiffs and
Allied. Given the substantial evidence that appellant
was at least partially at fault and the existence of the
indemnity provision in appellant’s contract with Allied,
appellant would have been well advised to settle the
case itself. Alternatively, if appellant wanted to fight
plaintiffs’ claim, it could have prepared its own case
rather than relying on Allied’s experts. Appellant chose
neither course of action and has only itself to blame for
the result.” 180 W.Va. at 569, 378 S.E.2d at 290.
It is obvious to any sophisticated trial lawyer that in
litigation involving multiple defendants there is the
likelihood that settlements will occur before trial. To rely
on another party defendant’s witnesses without some
formal agreement as to shared use is to invite the
consequences that arose in Riggle and in the present case.
The end result is that no error can be claimed.
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C.

Finally, ZMM contends that the trial court erred in not
allowing ZMM’s witnesses to testify as to their
conversations with John Drosick, Superintendent of
McDowell County Schools at the time the construction
was being planned. Mr. Drosick had died prior to trial.
When Mr. Zando attempted to testify as to Mr. Drosick’s
statements to him concerning the site of the high school,
counsel for the Board objected on grounds that the
testimony was hearsay and violated W.Va.Code, 57-3-1
(1937),20 also known as the Dead Man’s Statute. The
circuit court sustained the objection.
[18] ZMM contends that the trial court erred in excluding
this testimony. We agree that W.Va.Code, 57-3-1, does
not prevent the admission of the testimony in question. In
Syllabus Point 10 of Moore v. Goode, 180 W.Va. 78, 375
S.E.2d 549 (1988), we outlined its general operation:
“To summarize the basic operation
of
the
Dead
Man’s
Act,
W.Va.Code, 57-3-1, a concurrence
of three general conditions must be
met in order to bar the witness’s
**813 *614 testimony. First, the
testimony must relate to a personal
transaction with a deceased or
insane person. Second, the witness
must be a party to the suit or
interested in its event or outcome.
Third, the testimony must be
against the deceased’s personal
representative, heir at law, or
beneficiaries or the assignee or
committee of an insane person.”

Cross v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 182 W.Va. 320,
387 S.E.2d 556 (1989); Keatley v. Hanna Chevrolet Co.,
121 W.Va. 669, 6 S.E.2d 1 (1939).
[20] [21] Finally, such evidence was not inadmissible as
hearsay. Both Rule 801(d)(2)(D) of the West Virginia
Rules of Evidence21 and our prior law recognize that
statements made by an agent or employee within the
scope of his agency or employment and during the
existence of the agency or employment relationship are
not hearsay and are admissible against a principal or
employer who is a party to the litigation. See Coates v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 W.Va. 455, 57 S.E.2d 265
(1949); Cleckley, supra § 8.5(E) at 481-82.
[22] [23] Although we conclude that the trial court erred in
excluding the evidence of Mr. Drosick’s statement, ZMM
fails to demonstrate the relevance of this evidence or how
the exclusion of it at trial was prejudicial to its case. As
the Court stated in Syllabus Point 5 of Maxwell v. Kent,
49 W.Va. 542, 39 S.E. 174 (1901):
“When evidence is excluded and
the action of the court in excluding
it is relied upon in the appellate
court, it must appear on the record
that the evidence rejected was or
would have been relevant, material
and important to make its rejection
available as a ground of error.”
See Papenhaus v. Combs, 170 W.Va. 211, 292 S.E.2d 621
(1982); Crawford v. Roeder, 169 W.Va. 158, 286 S.E.2d
273 (1982). In view of ZMM’s failure to make such a
showing, we cannot say that the exclusion of this
evidence was reversible error.

It is apparent that the third condition is not met in this
case. This suit was not against Mr. Drosick’s personal
representative.
V.

[19] Moreover, we have traditionally held that a witness
can testify about the statements of a deceased agent when
the suit is against the principal. A rather similar situation
existed in Board o f Educ. o f Elk Dist. v. Harvey, 70
W.Va. 480, 74 S.E. 507 (1912), where the plaintiff, who
had sued the school board over the ownership of a school
building, testified to a conversation he had had with a
member of the school board who subsequently died. We
held in Syllabus Point 1 that this testimony did not
transgress the Dead Man’s Act: “A party to a suit is
competent to testify in his own behalf, against a board of
education in relation to a personal transaction, between
himself and a deceased member of such board.” See also

For all the reasons stated above, we find no error
warranting reversal of the jury’s verdict, but we do
conclude that the trial court erred in entering judgment
against the defendant for the full amount of the verdict.
We also agree that the Board is entitled to prejudgment
interest. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the
Circuit Court of Kanawha County and remand the case to
that court for entry of judgment in accordance with the
principles enunciated herein.
Affirmed, in part, Reversed, in part, and Remanded.
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Footnotes
1

As we earlier stated, ZMM initially brought Corte and Nutting into the litigation by third-party complaint. See W.Va.R.Civ.P. 14.
When the Board subsequently amended its complaint to name Corte and Nutting as defendants, ZMM, in its answer, filed
cross-claims against them on the same grounds. See W.Va.R.Civ.P. 13(g). The law discussed herein is equally applicable to both
third-party complaints and cross-claims.

2

W.Va.Code, 55-7-13, provides: “Where a judgment is rendered in an action ex delicto against several persons jointly, and
satisfaction o f such judgment is made by any one or more o f such persons, the others shall be liable to contribution to the same
extent as if the judgment were upon an action ex contractu.”

3

The concept of contribution is not foreign to those whose joint obligations arise by contract. W.Va.Code, 55-7-13, suggests that a
right of contribution after a joint judgment was recognized at common law in contract actions. For the text of W.Va.Code,
55-7-13, see note 2, supra. There is no question that this was the prevailing rule at common law. E.g., Estate o f Bayliss v. Lee,
supra; Cost v. MacGregor, 124 W.Va. 204, 19 S.E.2d 599, 140 A.L.R. 882 (1942); Gooch v. Gooch, 70 W.Va. 38, 73 S.E. 56
(1911). See generally 18 Am.Jur.2d Contribution § 32 (1985).
It also appears that an inchoate right of contribution could be asserted in equity on a joint contract obligation. 18 Am.Jur.2d
Contribution § 86 (1985). Undoubtedly, the earlier unwillingness of courts to permit such a claim at law arose from the rigidity
o f the common law forms o f pleading. With the merger o f law and equity into one form o f civil action, such procedural
impediments no longer exist. See W.Va.R.Civ.P. 2.

4

After discussing the question at some length, we concluded in Syllabus Point 3 of Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., supra: “As
between joint tortfeasors, a right of comparative contribution exists inter se based upon their relative degrees of primary fault or
negligence.”

5

This result is statutorily mandated in medical malpractice cases. W.Va.Code, 55-7B-9(c) (1986), provides, in pertinent part: “No
right of contribution exists against any defendant who entered into a good faith settlement with the plaintiff prior to the jury’s
report of its findings to the court or the court’s findings as to the total dollar amount awarded as to damages.”

6

Section 4 o f the UCATA provides:
“When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one o f two or more persons
liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death:
“(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so
provide; but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent o f any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in
the amount o f the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and
“(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.” 12 U.L.A. at 98
(1975).

7

Section 6 o f the UCFA provides:
“A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable discharges that person
from all liability for contribution, but it does not discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides.
However, the claim of the releasing person against other persons is reduced by the amount of the released person’s equitable
share of the obligation, determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 2.” 12 U.L.A. at 52 (Supp. 1989).

8

In such a settlement, the settling defendant agrees to help the plaintiff under the following terms:
“(1) The agreeing defendant(s) must remain in the action in the posture of defendant(s); (2) The agreement must be kept
secret; (3) The agreeing defendant(s) guarantee to the plaintiff a certain monetary recovery regardless of the outcome of the
action; and (4) The agreeing defendant(s)’ liability is decreased in direct proportion to the increase in the nonagreeing
defendant(s)’ liability.” Reager v. Anderson, 179 W.Va. 691, 703, 371 S.E.2d 619, 629 (1988). (Footnote omitted).

9

For the complete text of Section 4 o f the UCATA, see note 6, supra.

10

Section 2 of the UCFA provides for reduction of the verdict by the percentage of negligence the jury, in allocating fault among all
of the responsible parties, attributed to the settlor. Jurisdictions adhering to this model do not require the settlement to be in “good
faith.” See Gomes v. Brodhurst, supra; Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.1984).
The UCFA model has drawbacks, however. If the amount of the settlement is less than the settling party’s pro rata share of the
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verdict, the plaintiff absorbs the loss. He cannot collect the difference from the remaining defendants, and they cannot be
required to pay more than their individual allocate shares. This procedure essentially destroys the concept of joint and several
liability. Dobson v. Camden, 705 F.2d 759 (5th Cir.1983); American Motorcycle A ss’n v. Superior Court, supra; Glidden v.
German, 360 N.W.2d 716 (Iowa 1984); State ex rel. Deere & Co. v. District Court, supra. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff
obtains an amount in settlement greater than the percentage of damages attributable to the settling party, he may keep the
difference as a “windfall.” The other parties must still pay their allocate shares of the verdict. This permits the plaintiff a
recovery in excess of the jury verdict. See Wadle v. Jones, 312 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1981); Kirby Bldg. Sys. v. Mineral
Explorations Co., supra.
The perceived equities or inequities between these models, as well as other statutory variations, is a subject of ongoing academic
debate. For a West Virginia sampling, see J. Stoneking, Beyond Bradley: A Critique o f Comparative Contribution in West
Virginia and Proposals fo r Legislative Reform, 89 W.Va.L.Rev. 167, 184-87 (1986); J. Lewin, Comparative Negligence in West
Virginia: Beyond Bradley to Pure Comparative Fault, 89 W.Va.L.Rev. 1039, 1045-51 (1987). See generally Reager v.
Anderson, 179 W.Va. at 703 n. 9, 371 S.E.2d at 631 n. 9.
11

In Reager, we recognized that a settling defendant who remains in the case is susceptible to contribution claims where his
settlement was less than his allocate share of joint liability. 179 W.Va. at 704, 371 S.E.2d at 632. In such a case, the settling
defendant becomes bound by the joint judgment under W.Va.Code, 55-7-13. For the text of W.Va.Code, 55-7-13, see note 2,
supra.

12

In Prosser & Keeton, The Law o f Torts § 92 at 655 (5th ed. 1984), this rather telling observation is made:
“The distinction between tort and contract liability, as between parties to a contract, has become an
increasingly difficult distinction to make. It would not be possible to reconcile the results of all cases.
The availability of both kinds of liability for precisely the same kind of harm has brought about
confusion and unnecessary complexity. It is to be hoped that eventually the availability of both
theories—tort and contract—for the same kind of loss with different requirements both for the
claimant’s prima facie case and the defendant’s affirmative defenses will be reduced in order to
simplify the law and reduce the costs of litigation.”

13

The instructions advised the jury that the proper measure of compensatory damages under either theory was “the cost of repairing
the defects proximately caused by the architect/engineer’s negligence, if any, and/or breach of contract, if any[,]” plus “all other
expenses stemming from the injury in accordance with the law, including the loss of use of the gym during the repair.” The jury
was also instructed that “damages for breach of contract are intended to put the non-breaching party in as good a position as it was
as if the promises contained in the contract were kept.” Although the issue of punitive damages was submitted to the jury, none
were awarded.

14

In Syllabus Point 1, in part, of Gamble v. Main, 171 W.Va. 369, 300 S.E.2d 110 (1983), we recognized that inherent in a
construction contract is the implied warranty that it will be “constructed by the builder in a workmanlike manner.”

15

The Board contends the jury has already performed this verdict reduction function. At trial, however, the jury was not advised of
the amounts of the Corte and Nutting settlements, only of their existence and that Corte and Nutting were no longer parties to the
case. The jury was instructed to return a verdict which would fairly compensate the Board for its damages if they believed ZMM
was liable. The Board produced evidence of damages of between $1.5 and $1.9 million. However, ZMM developed evidence that
the expert responsible for these estimates relied on specifications provided by the Board rather than on an independent assessment
of the damage. There was also evidence that the repair work could have been accomplished at a lesser cost. Under these
circumstances, we cannot accept the Board’s factual argument that the jury deducted the settlements, the amounts of which were
unknown to it, before rendering the verdict of $1,000,000.

16

W.Va.Code, 56-6-27, provides:
“The jury, in any action founded on contract, may allow interest on the principal due, or any part
thereof, and in all cases they shall find the aggregate of principal and interest due at the time of the trial,
after allowing all proper credits, payments and sets-off; and judgment shall be entered for such
aggregate with interest from the date of the verdict.”

17

The Board’s election to accept the jury verdict on the contract theory, as earlier indicated, does not preclude the settlement offsets.
It does, however, preclude reduction of the verdict to reflect the 5 percent contributory negligence the jury allocated to the Board in
the negligence action.

18

ZMM also alleges that improper remarks were made by the Board’s attorney in his opening statement. No objection was made at
the time of the alleged impropriety, however, nor was the issue raised at the time of the motion for a mistrial. ZMM may not,
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therefore, assert the matter now. Ritz v. Kingdon, 139 W.Va. 189, 79 S.E.2d 123 (1953); Yuncke v. Welker, 128 W.Va. 299, 36
S.E.2d 410 (1945).
19

It does not appear that ZMM attempted to subpoena Corte’s witnesses in order to challenge the validity of the settlement contract
language as to unavailability.

20

W.Va.Code, 57-3-1, provides, in pertinent part:
“No party to any action, suit or proceeding, nor any person interested in the event thereof, nor any
person from, through or under whom any such party or interested person derives any interest or title by
assignment or otherwise, shall be examined as a witness in regard to any personal transaction or
communication between such witness and a person at the time of such examination, deceased, insane or
lunatic, against the executor, administrator, heir at law, next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee or
survivor of such person, or the assignee or committee of such insane person or lunatic.”

21

W.Va.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) provides, in pertinent part:
“(d) Statements Which are not Hearsay.—A statement is not hearsay if—
“(2) Admission by Party-Opponent.—The statement is offered against a party and is ... (D) a statement by his agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship[.]”
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
D. North Dakota,
Northeastern Division.
ESTATE OF Cody Alan HALAMA, By and through
its Administrator, Scott Rodney Halama, and Scott
Rodney Halam, Individually, Plaintiffs,
v.
Murray BARKMAN, Individually, and d /b /a
Barkman Transport, and Ralph William Eslinger,
Defendants.
Cory D. Knust, Individually and Cory D. Knust, as
Administrator of the Estate of Heather Ann Knust,
Deceased, Plaintiffs,
v.
Ralph Eslinger, Murray Barkman, d /b /a Barkman
Transport, and Dwight Barkman, Defendants.
Civil Nos. 3 :06cv53, 2:06cv 63. | Aug. 8, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Fredd J. Haas, Fredd J. Haas Law Offices PC, Jason M.
Casini, Robert L. Fanter, Whitfield & Eddy PLC, Des
Moines, IA, Thomas V. Omdahl, Omdahl Law Office,
Grand Forks, ND, M. Daniel Vogel, Vogel Law Firm,
Fargo, ND, for Plaintiffs.
Michael T. Rengel, Pemberton Sorlie Rufer & Kershner
PLLP, Fergus Falls, MN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
KAREN K. KLEIN, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 The following order memorializes the court’s rulings
on the discovery motions addressed during the hearing on
July 13, 2007.

Deposition o f Knust Experts
The parties to this consolidated action engaged in
settlement discussions on June 4, 2007. Plaintiff Knust’s

case settled, plaintiff Halama’s did not. As part of the
settlement, plaintiff Knust and defendants agreed that
Knust’s experts cannot be used by plaintiff Halama in his
case against the defendants. Plaintiff Halama moved to
take the deposition of Knust’s experts William Frank and
Dr. Stanley Sangdahl, arguing first that the rules do no
allow defendants to “lock up” the opinions of expert
witnesses, and secondly that Halama reserved the right to
call expert witnesses disclosed by other parties in the
litigation in his Rule 26(A)(2) Disclosures and Answers to
Interrogatories.
Defendants oppose Halama’s motion, asserting that
Knust’s experts are not qualified to testify as experts, and
that defendants “placed value on excluding any use of
Knust’s
experts
by
anyone
else,
including
Halama.”Defendants ’ Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Halama’s Motion to Allow Testimony o f Knust
Experts and Other Discovery Issues, at 2 (Doc. # 120).
Plaintiff Knust also weighed in on the issue, asserting that
Halama declined the opportunity to jointly retain expert
witnesses and share in the cost and should not now be
permitted to “utilize work product and opinions
developed in connection with the prosecution of separate
claims....”Plaintiff Cory K nust’s Response to Plaintiff
Scott Halama’s Motion fo r Order Allowing Depositions of
Plaintiff Knust’s Expert Witnesses, at 2 (Doc. # 123).
The court conditionally denied plaintiff Halama’s request,
finding that Halama is not entitled to receive benefit from
Knust’s experts given his refusal to participant in the
concomitant costs, and further that the subject matter of
the experts duplicates, to some extent, those Halama is
prepared to offer. The court’s ruling is not changed by its
review of Scott, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W .2d 556
(Tex.1990), cited by Halama during the discovery
conference. Rather, the court finds persuasive the
reasoning in Wolt v. Sherwood, A Div. o f Harsco Corp.,
828 F.Supp. 1562 (D.Utah 1993), wherein the court
rejected the public policy considerations raised in Scott,
Inc. in favor of the rationale espoused by the West
Virginia Supreme Court in Board o f Education v. Zando,
Martin & Milstead, 182 W.Va. 597, 390 S.E.2d 796
(1990):
The West Virginia Supreme Court found the settlement
agreement acceptable and rejected the architect’s claim.
The court stated that defendants in a multi-party case
should retain their own experts, and not rely upon other
defendants. The court noted:
“[i]t is obvious to any sophisticated trial lawyer that
in litigation involving multiple defendants there is a
likelihood that settlement will occur before trial. To
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rely on another party defendant’s witnesses without
some formal agreement as to the shared use is to
invite the consequences that arose ... in the present
case.”
*2 Wolt v. Sherwood, A Division o f Harsco Corp., 828
F.Supp. 1562, 1567 (C.D. UT 1993)(quoting Board o f
Educ. v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc., 182 W.Va. 597,
390 S.E.2d 796, 812 (1990)). Therefore, Plaintiff
Halama’s Motion for Extension of Court Deadlines
Concerning Discovery and Order Allowing Depositions
of Knust Experts (Doc. # 117) is DENIED.

nevertheless permitted limited discovery of his military
medical records for impeachment purposes. Plaintiff
Halama now seeks to obtain mental health records for
treatment Eslinger obtained in Des Moines, Iowa.
Counsel argued defendant Eslinger’s qualification to be a
truck driver is at issue, as well as the truthfulness of his
statements on his CDL application. Plaintiff’s request is
DENIED based on the marginal relevancy of defendant
Eslinger’s mental condition, the significant issue of
privilege, and the existence of other testimony.

Cell Phone Records/Deposition
Employment Records
Although defendant Eslinger contends his employment
records are not relevant to this proceeding, his counsel has
continued to produce them upon receipt. The court will
not order additional time for the production of
employment records without specific information
concerning the need for such time. However, if highly
relevant
information
develops
from
incoming
employment records, plaintiff Halama may request
appropriate relief.

Mental Health Records

Plaintiff Halama requests leave to take the deposition of
defendants’ cell phone provider. Apparently defendant
Eslinger testified that he left his cell phone with his wife
in January 2006. Counsel’s review of the phone records
indicate the phone was being used on the day of the
accident. Plaintiff wants to depose a cell phone company
representative to determine the truthfulness of defendant
Eslinger’s statements, specifically whether or not he had
the phone and where he was when it was used. Defendant
objected, arguing plaintiff had the records as early as
October 2006. Plaintiff’s motion to take the telephone
deposition of a representative of the cell phone company
is GRANTED.
IT IS ORDERED.

Reiterating that the court has never stated the mental
condition of defendant Eslinger is relevant, the court
End of Document
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broad discretion of district court. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 16(b), 28 U.S.C.A.

196 F.Supp.2d 1023
United States District Court,
E.D. California.

Cases that cite this headnote
FMC CORPORATION, Plaintiff,
v.
VENDO COMPANY, et al., Defendants.
And Related Third-Party Claims

[3]

No. CIV.F-00-5295 OWW LJO. | April 17, 2002.
In
contribution
action
under
Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) and state law, defendants filed third party
complaints seeking contribution from railroad. On
railroad’s motion for summary judgment and defendants’
motion to quash railroad’s proposed subpoenas of
plaintiff’s experts, the District Court, Wanger, J., held
that: (1) defendants could not maintain third party
contribution action against railroad to recover costs paid
pursuant to settlement agreement with plaintiff; (2)
defendants could seek contribution from railroad for costs
they incurred in response to state or federal administrative
agency directives; and (3) railroad was not entitled to
depose or call as witnesses at trial experts designated by
plaintiff.
Motions granted in part, and denied in part.

West Headnotes (11)
[1]

Federal Civil Procedure
Pretrial Order
Carelessness is not basis for permitting
modification
of
scheduling
conference.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 16(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
Cases that cite this headnote

[2]

Federal Civil Procedure
Pretrial Order

Environmental Law
Joint and several liability; divisibility
Single harm may be divisible among several
potentially responsible parties (PRP), for
purposes of determining contribution liability
under CERCLA, if it is possible to discern
degree to which different parties contribute to
damage.
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, § 113(f), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(f).
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[4]

Environmental Law
Contribution and indemnity; allocation of
liability
Owner’s action against potentially responsible
parties (PRPs) under CERCLA to recover for
response costs incurred in remediating
contamination of site was contribution action,
not direct cost recovery action, and thus settling
PRPs could not maintain third party contribution
action
against
non-settling
PRP
for
reimbursement of payments made to owner in
settlement of its claims against them, even if
owner’s claims against non-settling PRP were
divisible from its own responsibility for
contamination such that it could have brought
direct cost recovery action against non-settling
PRP, absent evidence that owner acted in
collusion with non-settling PRP to maximize
settling PRPs’ liability; settling PRPs were
liable only for their fair and several shares of
site liability. Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, §§107(a), 113(f), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9607(a),
9613(f).

Decision to modify scheduling order is within
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Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Substance
Account Act (HSAA) to seek contribution from
other potentially responsible party (PRP) for
costs they incurred in response to state or federal
administrative agency directives, even if PRP
was not liable to defendants for original
plaintiff’s claims relating to its response costs.
West’s Ann.Cal.Health & Safety Code §
25363(e).

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[5]

Environmental Law
Contribution and indemnity; allocation of
liability
Defendants in CERCLA contribution action
were entitled to seek contribution from other
potentially responsible party (PRP) for costs
they incurred in response to state or federal
administrative agency directives, even if PRP
was not liable to defendants for original
plaintiff’s claims under CERCLA relating to its
response costs, where PRP was potentially liable
to defendants for plaintiffs’ state law claims for
wich defendant could be held jointly and
severally liable, and claims were inextricably
intertwined.
Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, § 113(f), (g)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(f),
(g)(2); Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 14(a), 28
U.S.C.A.

3 Cases that cite this headnote

[8]

Environmental Law
Federal preemption
States
Environment; nuclear projects
CERCLA did not preempt settling potentially
responsible parties’ (PRPs) state-law causes of
action against non-settling PRP concerning
cleanup of hazardous materials. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, § 302(d), 42 U.S.C.A. §
9652(d).

3 Cases that cite this headnote
Cases that cite this headnote
[6]

Federal Civil Procedure
Liability of third party in general

[9]

Impleader may be appropriate where third-party
defendant is potentially liable to third-party
plaintiff for damages to extent necessary to put
third-party plaintiff in position he would have
been in absent alleged wrongdoing by
third-party defendant. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
14(a), 28 U.S.C.A.

Exceptional circumstances sufficient to justify
opposing party’s discovery of non-testifying
expert’s facts and opinions may exist where (1)
object or condition at issue is destroyed or has
deteriorated after non-testifying expert observes
it but before moving party’s expert has
opportunity to observe it; or (2) there are no
other available experts in same field or subject
area. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(b)(4)(B), 28
U.S.C.A.

Cases that cite this headnote

[7]

17 Cases that cite this headnote

Environmental Law
Contribution and indemnity; allocation of
liability
Under California law, defendants in hazardous
waste contribution action were entitled under

Federal Civil Procedure
Persons subject

[ 10 ]

Federal Civil Procedure

W
estlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

2

FMC Corp. v. Vendo Co., 196 F.Supp.2d 1023 (2002)
54 ERC 1711, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,642

Persons Whose Depositions May Be Taken
Witnesses
Persons Who May Be Required to Appear
and Testify
Non-settling potentially responsible party (PRP)
in CERCLA contribution action was not entitled
to depose or call as witnesses at trial experts
retained and designated by plaintiff before
plaintiff and settling PRPs agreed to dismiss
claims against each other in settlement of their
dispute, despite non-settling PRP’s contention
that it had justifiably relied on plaintiff’s
designation of experts, where settlement
agreement prohibited plaintiff from giving
non-settling PRP access to its expert reports, and
non-settling PRP did not cross-designate experts
prior to settlement, or provide evidence showing
cost of any studies it sought to use or that such
tests could not be replicated by its own experts.
Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule
26(b)(4)(B),
28
U.S.C.A.;
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, § 101 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq.
10 Cases that cite this headnote

[11]

Federal Civil Procedure
Pretrial Order
Non-settling potentially responsible party (PRP)
in CERCLA contribution action was not entitled
to modification of scheduling order to extend
time to engage experts in connection with
settling PRPs’ claims against it, even though
settlement of claims with plaintiff precluded
non-settling PRP from using testimony and
reports prepared by plaintiff’s experts, where
non-settling PRP waited over one year after
claims were asserted against it by settling PRPs
to file claims against them in separate action,
failed to co-designate experts with plaintiff, and
chose not to participate in settlement.
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 101
et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq.; Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 16(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
5 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
*1025 James Arthur Bruen, Farella Braun and Martel, San
Francisco, CA, Stephen Roy Cornwell, Cornwell and
Sample, Fresno, CA, for FMC Corp.
Stephen Terry Holzer, Parker Milliken Clark OHara and
Samuelian, Los Angeles, CA, Mark E. Elliott, Pillsbury
Madison and Sutro, Los Angeles, CA, for Vendo Co.
Chrisptopher J. McNevin, Mark E. Elliott, Pillsbury
Madison and Sutro, Los Angeles, CA, for Vendorlator
Mfg. Co.
Stephen Terry Holzer, P arker Milliken Clark OHara and
Samuelian, Los Angeles, CA, Mark Fall, Jones Day
Reavis and Pogue, Los Angeles, CA, Kevin P.
Holewinski, Pro Hac Vice, Curt Vazquez, Pro Hac Vice,
Jones Day Reavis and Pogue, Pittsburgh, PA, for Weir
Floway Inc.
John F Barg, Barg Coffin Lewis and Trapp LLP, San
Francisco, CA, for Burlington Northern Santa Fe R. Co.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE:
BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE
RAILWAY COMPANY’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc.194); THE VENDO
COMPANY’S MOTION TO QUASH BURLINGTON
NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY
COMPANY’S PROPOSED SUBPOENAS OF FMC
CORPORATION’S EXPERTS (Doc.199); BNSF’S
APPLICATION TO MODIFY THE SCHEDULING
ORDER
WANGER, District Judge.
Before the court is third-party defendant Burlington
Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company’s (“BNSF”)
motion for *1026 summary judgment and the Vendo
Company’s motion to quash BNSF’s proposed subpoenas
of Plaintiff FMC Corporation’s experts. See Docs.194,
199, filed March 6, 2002. Also before the court is BNSF’s
application to modify the scheduling order, lodged
February 12, 2002, and originally heard on shortened time
on February 20, 2002. Oral argument was heard April 8,
2002.
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I. BACKGROUND
BNSF contends trichloroethene (“TCE”) and chromium
contamination emanated from a site at 2924 South
Railroad
Avenue
in
Fresno,
California
(the
“Vendo/Floway site,” or the “Floway site”), now owned
by Floway, and migrated into groundwater underlying
BNSF’s property at East Church Avenue and East Avenue
(the “BNSF site,” or the “Calwa Ice House site”).1
Plaintiff FMC Corporation (“FMC”) is the owner of
property at 2501 South Sunland Avenue in Fresno (the
“FMC site”). The FMC site, the Floway site, and the
BNSF site are clustered together along the “Railroad
Avenue Corridor.”
On February 23, 2000, FMC filed a Complaint against
Weir Floway (“Floway”) and two companies that,
according to BNSF, conducted operations at the Floway
site: Vendo Company (“Vendo”) and Vendorlator
Manufacturing
Company
(“VMC”).2 See Doc.1,
Complaint. FMC filed a First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”) on May 19, 2000. See Doc.8. FMC alleges
groundwater, which FMC is being required by state
administrative agencies to remediate, is contaminated
with TCE and chromium as a result of operations at the
Floway site. See FAC. FMC seeks contribution under
section 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),
42 U.S.C. § 9613; injunctive relief under section
7002(a)(1)(B) of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (the “RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. section
7002(a)(1)(B); declaratory relief under section 113(g)(2)
of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. section 9613(g)(2); contribution
under
the
Carpenter-Presley-Tanner
Hazardous
Substance Account Act (“HSAA”), California Health and
Safety Code § 25363; and indemnity, contribution,
declaratory relief, and damages (under theories of
continuing nuisance and trespass) under California state
law. See id.
On October 11, 2000, Vendo and VMC filed a third-party
complaint against BNSF. See Doc.37. On October 13,
2000, Floway filed a third-party complaint against BNSF.
See Doc.38. Vendo and VMC’s third-party complaint
alleges chromium was and continues to be released into
the soil and groundwater from the BNSF Calwa Ice
House site. See Doc.37 at 26. Vendo and VMC allege
BNSF and other third-party defendants released and
disposed of wastes containing TCE and/or chromium at
their respective sites which migrated to groundwater
under the FMC site. See id. at
62-64. Vendo and VMC
seek contribution under section 113(f) of CERCLA, 42

U.S.C. section 9613(f), and declaratory relief for an
equitable allocation of past, present, and future response
costs under section 113(g)(2) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
section 9613(g)(2). See Doc.37.
Floway’s third-party complaint alleges TCE and
chromium were used in operations *1027 at the BNSF
site, that there were releases of TCE and chromium from
the BNSF site into groundwater, and that BNSF is
responsible for all or some of the TCE and chromium
groundwater contamination at issue in FMC’s claim
against Weir Floway. See Doc.38. Floway seeks
contribution under section 113(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
section 9613(f), declaratory relief under section 113(g)(2)
of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. section 9613(g)(2), contribution
and apportionment under HSAA § 25363, and declaratory
relief under state law. See id. BNSF answered these
third-party complaints on December 1, 2000. See,
Docs.79-80.
On November 13, 2001, BNSF filed a separate suit
against Floway, Vendo, and VMC. See Burlington
Northern v. Vendo, CIV F 01-6434 OWW LJO
(E.D.Cal.) (the “RCRA action,” or “BNSF action”),
Doc.1, complaint. On December 17, 2001, BNSF filed a
first amended complaint. See Burlington, CIV F 01-6434,
Doc.14. BNSF alleges the TCE and chromium
contamination in the groundwater beneath the Railroad
Avenue Corridor resulted from operations at the
Vendo/Floway site. See id. at
1. BNSF alleges the
California Department of Toxic Substances and Control
(“DTSC”) issued an Imminent and Substantial
Endangerment Order (the “ISE Order”) on October 19,
1999, requiring Vendo, VMC, and Floway to investigate
and remediate soil contamination on the Vendo/Floway
site; to investigate the extent of the groundwater plumes
emanating from the Vendo/Floway site; and to take
remedial measures to clean them up. See id. BNSF alleges
Vendo, VMC, and Floway failed to comply with the ISE
Order and continued to release chromium and TCE from
the Vendo/Floway site which ultimately contaminates
groundwater beneath the BNSF site and beyond. See id.
BNSF alleges it has incurred costs and will incur
additional costs relating to the TCE and chromium
contamination caused by Floway, Vendo, and VMC, and
that the contamination has diminished the value of its
property. See id. BNSF asserts claims for injunctive relief
under sections 7002(a)(1)(A) and (B) of the RCRA, 42
U.S.C. sections 6972(a)(1)(A) and (B); to enforce the
terms of the ISE Order against Vendo, VMC, and Floway;
to enjoin them from continuing to endanger health and the
environment; and to order them to remediate the
Vendo/Floway and BNSF sites. See id. at
24-39.
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BNSF seeks damages under state law claims for nuisance
and trespass. See id. at 40-53.3
On January 24, 2002, Vendo/VMC and Floway answered
BNSF’s FAC. See BNSF action, Docs.22-23. Floway
asserted an affirmative defense that BNSF’s claims are
barred because they are compulsory counterclaims to the
third-party claims against BNSF in the FMC action. See
BNSF action, Doc.22 at p. 9:18-19.
On February 8, 2002, counsel for Vendo faxed a letter to
BNSF informing BNSF that FMC had reached a
settlement with Weir, Vendo, and VMC. See Doc.186 at
2, Exh. A. The letter indicated the settling “parties intend
to take certain of the depositions noticed by them off
calendar.” Id. at Exh. A. According to the letter, Vendo
and Floway intend to proceed with their third-party claims
and/or defenses against BNSF in this case and the related
cases, Burlington Northern v. Vendo, CIV F 01-6434, and
Zacky Farms, v. FMC Corp., The Vendo Co., Vendorlator
Mfg. Co., & Weir Floway, Inc., CIV F 01-5380 OWW
DLB. See id. Vendo indicated its intent to proceed with
certain depositions *1028 as currently noticed related to
those claims and defenses. See id.
On February 11, 2002, BNSF requested that Vendo and
Floway stipulate to an extension of the pretrial and trial
dates in this case. See Doc.186 at 3, Exh. B. Later in the
day, BNSF asked Vendo and Floway to stipulate to a
scheduling conference on February 15, 2002. See id. at
4, Exh. B. Vendo and Floway declined to so stipulate. On
February 12, 2002, BNSF applied to modify the
scheduling order in the FMC case. See Doc.185. Vendo
and Floway filed oppositions on February 19, 2002. See
Doc.190. As amended, the scheduling order specified
March 6, 2002, as the deadline for completing fact and
expert discovery. See Doc.179, filed December 12, 2001.
This date was effectively vacated pending resolution of
the instant motions. Trial is currently set for May 29,
2002. See id.
On March 21, 2002, partial judgment pursuant to Fed.R.
Civ.P. 54(b) was entered as to FMC’s claims against
Vendo/Floway pursuant to the terms of a confidential
settlement agreement. See Doc.211. According to the
judgment, Vendo/Floway are jointly and severally to pay
$3,750,000 to FMC within thirty days of the entry of
judgment and perform work required by DTSC. See
Doc.211. Other terms of the settlement agreement are set
forth in a “Deal Point Memorandum,” submitted as part of
a telephonic hearing on February 15, 2002, in which the
parties formally recited their settlement for the record. See
Doc.197, Exh. B; Doc.192. Pursuant to the terms of the
Deal Point Memorandum, Vendo/Floway agrees to

investigate, remediate, and achieve hydraulic control of
offsite groundwater contaminants other than nitrates, west
of the eastern boundary of the BNSF railroad right-of-way
and south of the northern edge of East Woodward
Avenue. See id. FMC agrees to investigate, remediate,
and achieve hydraulic control of offsite groundwater
contaminants other than nitrates, east of the eastern
boundary of the BNSF railroad right-of-way and south of
the northern edge of East Woodward Avenue. See id.
Vendo/Floway agree to pay two-thirds of the amount
necessary to settle the Zacky Farms action, including a
compromised amount of Zacky’s net replacement water
costs, and investigate and remediate the Zacky parcel. See
id. FMC agrees to pay the remaining one-third of these
costs, unless Vendo/Floway recovers from BNSF, in
which case FMC’s share drops to one-quarter of these
costs. See id. FMC agrees not to assist BNSF in its
prosecution or defense of the claims between BNSF and
Vendo/Floway, “such as by providing BNSF with FMC’s
attorney work product, expert work product or by waiving
any conflict between BNSF and an FMC expert.”
Doc.197, Exh. D.4

II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed.R. Civ.P.
56(c); see California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th
Cir.1998). The evidence must be viewed in *1029 light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Lopez v.
Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc).
The moving party bears the initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct.
2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party fails to
meet this burden, “the nonmoving party has no obligation
to produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would
have the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d
1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir.2000). However, if the
nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the
moving party must only show “that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Once the moving party has met its burden of proof, the
nonmoving party must produce evidence on which a
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reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor viewing the
record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden the
law places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v.
Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir.1995). The
nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its allegations
without any significant probative evidence tending to
support the complaint. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir.2000). Instead,
the nonmoving party, through affidavits or other
admissible evidence, “must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.
Civ.P 56(e).
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry
of summary judgment, after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to the party’s case, and on which
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such
a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as to any
material fact,” since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
party’s case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Evidence submitted in support of, or in opposition to, a
motion for summary judgment must be admissible under
the standard articulated in 56(e). Properly authenticated
documents can be used in a motion for summary
judgment if appropriately authenticated by affidavit or
declaration. See Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner &
Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550-51 (9th Cir.1989). Supporting
and opposing affidavits must be made on personal
knowledge, set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify
to the matters stated therein. See Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(e).
“Questions of statutory construction and legislative
history present legal questions which are properly
resolved by summary judgment.” T H Agric. & Nutrition
Co. v. Aceto Chem. Inc., 884 F.Supp. 357, 359
(E.D.Cal.1995) (citations omitted).

B. Summary Adjudication
Summary adjudication may be appropriate on clearly
defined, distinct issues. See Robi v. Five Platters, Inc.,
918 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir.1990). Fed.R. Civ.P. 56 allows a
party to move for summary judgment on any part of a
claim. See Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(a)-(d). The purpose of
summary adjudication is to salvage some results from the
ju dicial effort involved in evaluating a summary judgment

motion and to frame narrow triable issues if the court
finds that the order would be helpful with the progress of
litigation. See Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(d); National Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. L.E. Myers Co. Group, 937 F.Supp. 276, 284
(S.D.N.Y.1996). An order under *1030 Rule 56(d)
narrows the issues and enables the parties to recognize
more fully their rights, yet it permits the court to retain
full power to completely adjudicate all aspects of the case
when the proper time arrives. See 10B Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure (3d ed.1998), § 2737 at
316-18. Summary adjudication may be used to dispose of
affirmative defenses. See “Z ” v. Worley, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9476 (disposing of affirmative defense to battery
claim on summary adjudication); Sterling Bank v. Sterling
Bank & Trust, 928 F.Supp. 1014 (1996).
The procedure under Rule 56(d) is designed to be
ancillary to a summary judgment motion. Unlike Rule
56(c), which allows for interlocutory judgment on a
question of liability, Rule 56(d) does not authorize the
entry of a judgment on part of a claim or the granting of
partial relief. See Wright & Miller, § 2737 at 316-18.
This aspect of the rule has been confused due to courts’
frequently referring to Rule 56(d) orders as “partial
summary judgment” rather than summary adjudication.
See Wright & Miller, § 2737 at 322-24. The obligation
imposed on the court by Rule 56(d) to specify the
uncontroverted material facts is technically compulsory.
See Woods v. Mertes, 9 F.R.D. 318, 320 (D.Del.1949).
However, if the court determines that identifying
indisputable facts through partial summary adjudication
would not materially expedite the adjudicative process, it
may decline to do so. See Wright & Miller, § 2737 at
318-19.

C. Pretrial Schedule
[1] [2] Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
authorizes the district court to control and expedite
pretrial discovery through a scheduling order. The
standard for permitting modification of a scheduling
conference order pursuant to Rule 16 is “good cause.”
Fed.R. Civ.P. 16(b) (“A schedule shall not be modified
except upon a showing of good cause and by leave of the
district judge....”). Rule
16(b)’s “good cause”
requirement, like that for Rule 56(f) relief, considers the
diligence of the party seeking relief. The court may also
modify the pretrial schedule “if it cannot reasonably be
met despite the diligence of the party seeking the
extension.” Fed.R. Civ.P. 16 advisory committee’s notes
(1983 amendment); Harrison Beverage Co. v. Dribeck
Importers, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 463, 469 (D.N.J.1990);
Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 132 F.R.D. 213, 217
(N.D.Ind.1990). Carelessness is not a basis for granting
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relief. Cf. Engleson v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 972
F.2d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir.1992) (carelessness not a ground
for relief under Rule 60(b)); Martella v. Marine Cooks &
Stewards Union, 448 F.2d 729, 730 (9th Cir.1971)
(same). “Although the existence or degree of prejudice to
the party opposing the modification might supply
additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the
inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking
modification.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc.,
975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.1992). If a party was not
diligent, the inquiry should end. See id.; Geiserman v.
MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 790-92 (5th Cir.1990)
(upholding decision to exclude expert witnesses based on
party’s failure to designate experts until two weeks after
the expiration of the discovery deadline because
explanations for delay were “weak, at best”). The decision
to modify a scheduling order is within the broad
discretion of the district court. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 607
(quoting Miller v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 364, 369
(9th Cir.1985)); Geiserman, 893 F.2d at 790.

III. A N A L YSIS
A. B N SF ’s Motion fo r Summary Judgment
BNSF moves for summary judgment on the ground that
Vendo/Floway as *1031 CERCLA section 113 defendants
are liable only for their fair-and-several shares of liability
to FMC (the PRP-Plaintiff), and as such they cannot
bring third-party claims for section 113 contribution. See
Doc.195 at p. 1:7-20. BNSF argues Floway’s state law
claims for contribution, apportionment and declaratory
relief must be dismissed because 1) liability under HSAA
is co-extensive with liability under CERCLA, and since
Floway’s CERCLA section 113 claims against BNSF are
barred, its HSAA claim is barred; 2) if Floway cannot
recover under CERCLA the response costs it has agreed
to pay FMC, it should not be allowed to recover those
same costs under an alternate state law theory. See
Doc.195 at pp. 1-2.

(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility
at which such hazardous substances were disposed
of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or
otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or
arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal
or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or
possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any
hazardous substances for transport to disposal or
treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a
release, or a threatened release which causes the
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance, shall be liable for—
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action
incurred by the United States Government or a
State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred
by any other person consistent with the national
contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss
of natural resources, including the reasonable
costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss
resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health
effects study carried out under section 104(i) [42
U.S.C. § 9604(i) ].
42 U.S.C. § 9607.
When remediation of a contaminated site involves
multiple parties, claims for contribution may arise.

1. Liability o f CERCLA § 113(f) Defendants
CERCLA provides for the liability of potentially
responsible parties (“PRPs”) for cleanup costs associated
with contamination by hazardous substances. Title 42
U.S.C. section 9607 provides:
... Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law,
and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection
(b) of this section—

Any person may seek contribution
from any other person who is liable
or potentially liable under section
107(a) [42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) ],
during or following any civil action
under section 106 [42 U.S.C. §
9606] or under section 107(a). Such
claims shall be brought in
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accordance with this section and
the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and shall be governed
by Federal law. In resolving
contribution claims, the court may
allocate response costs among
liable parties using such equitable
factors as the court *1032
determines
are
appropriate.
Nothing in this subsection shall
diminish the right of any person to
bring an action for contribution in
the absence of a civil action under
section 106 or section 107.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
Section 107(a) creates the right of contribution, the
“contours and mechanics” of which are specified in
section 113(f). See The Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont
Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301-02 (9th Cir.1997)
(section 107 creates the claims of contribution, i.e.,
liability, among PRPs and section 113 qualifies the nature
of the claim, i.e., how to apportion liability among PRPs).
In Pinal Creek, the Ninth Circuit held that “under
CERCLA, a PRP does not have a claim for the recovery
of the totality of its cleanup costs against other PRPs, and
a PRP cannot assert a claim against other PRPs for joint
and several liability.” Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1306.
Rather, “a PRP is limited to a contribution claim governed
by the joint operation of §§ 107 and 113.” Id.
In City o f Merced v. R.A. Fields, 997 F.Supp. 1326
(E.D.Cal.1998), the City of Merced discovered its
groundwater was contaminated with tetrachloroethylene
(“PCE”). See City o f Merced, 997 F.Supp. at 1329. The
City sued Merced Laundry under CERCLA and state law.
See id. The City as a PRP could maintain a CERCLA
action only for contribution under section 113. See id.
Merced Laundry filed third-party complaints for
contribution under CERCLA and state law against several
parties. See id. The court dismissed Merced Laundry’s
claims for contribution against the third parties as to
amounts the City spent responding to site contamination.
See City o f Merced, 997 F.Supp. at 1332. Merced
Laundry as a contribution defendant was liable for no
more than its fair-and-several share of liability to the City
under section 113, it could not maintain its own
contribution actions against third parties. See id.
City o f Merced illustrates its holding with examples.
Example 3 provides:
To

forestall

a

suit

by

the

Government, PRP X voluntarily
begins cleanup of Site and incurs
costs greater than X ’s equitable
share. X, being a PRP, brings a
contribution action against Y and
Z. Y and Z, being contribution
defendants, are not liable to X for
more than their fair-and-several
share of the cleanup costs. Y and Z
therefore cannot bring contribution
actions against A, B, or C.
However,
because
X is a
contribution plaintiff, and not a
contribution defendant, X can.
City o f Merced, 997 F.Supp. at 1333. This example is
overbroad. It analyzes X ’s right to recover contribution
against PRPs. Although Y and Z may not bring
contribution actions against A, B, or C for X ’s cleanup
costs, Y and Z may bring third-party contribution actions
against A, B, or C for Y and Z ’s cleanup costs that were
caused by A, B, and C. The example derives from a
statement in City o f Merced at page 1332: “Therefore, as
a matter of logic, contribution defendants, as well as the
parties brought in by the contribution defendants, who can
by definition owe to contribution plaintiffs no more than
their fair-and-several share of cleanup liability, cannot
themselves maintain contribution actions of their own.”
City o f Merced, 997 F.Supp. at 1332. This “logic” ignores
the PRP contribution defendant who not only is liable to a
contribution plaintiff for cleanup costs incurred by that
plaintiff and caused by the contribution defendant, but
who also itself incurs cleanup costs as a result of
contamination caused by another PRP or PRPs over and
above the several share of liability owed to the original
contribution plaintiff.
*1033 The overbreadth of the purported rule that
“contribution defendants, as well as parties brought in by
contribution defendants, cannot maintain contribution
actions of their own,” is demonstrated by the result in City
o f Merced, where Merced Laundry was nonetheless
permitted to sue other parties for contribution for costs in
excess of Merced Laundry’s equitable share for which
other PRPs were alleged to be responsible. The necessary,
but unstated qualification to the “rule” of City o f Merced
is that “contribution defendants, or those joined by them,
are only barred from asserting a contribution action for
the costs incurred by any other PRP, when those costs are
not incurred by such contribution defendant.” The
statement has no application to non CERCLA based state
law claims.
The implication at page 1332 of City o f Merced that a
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contribution action is maintained solely under CERCLA §
113 is squarely rejected by Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1305
n. 7 (“We also note that the Pinal Group’s argument is
based on the incorrect premise that a contribution action
is not brought under § 107 .... As we have concluded
above, a PRP’s contribution action finds implicit
recognition in § 107; § 113 merely regulates its
implementation.”). An interpretation barring contribution
actions thwarts CERCLA’s intended equitable allocation
among all responsible PRPs.
BNSF argues that FMC is in the position of “X” in
Example 3; Vendo/VMC and Floway are “Y” and “Z”;
and BNSF is “A” (or “B” or “C”). See Doc.195 at p. 8.
FMC sues Vendo/Floway for contribution under
CERCLA section 113. See FAC at
1, 170. FMC has
not sued BNSF. BNSF argues that since Vendo/Floway
are liable to FMC only for their fair-and-several portion
of liability, they, as “contribution defendants” like “Y”
and “Z” in Example 3, may not bring a contribution claim
of their own. See Doc. 195 at p. 8.
Vendo/Floway argue that because they were potentially
jointly and severally liable to FMC for response costs
relating to chromium and TCE contamination, they cannot
be considered “contribution defendants” in the same
position as “Y” and “Z”. See Doc.212 at p. 6. Pinal Creek
notes the Seventh Circuit exception to the general rule
that a PRP is limited to a contribution action for “PRPs
who have not polluted the site in any way.” See Pinal
Creek, 118 F.3d at 1303 n. 5 (citing Rumpke o f Indiana,
Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235, 1241 (7th
Cir.1997) (“landowners who allege that they did not
pollute the site in any way may sue for their direct
response costs under § 107(a)”)). The Ninth Circuit
explicitly declined to address the issue of whether it
recognizes such an exception. See Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d
at 1303 n. 5.
Vendo/Floway argue FMC falls within the Rumpke
exception with respect to TCE and chromium, see
Doc.212 at p. 6, because FMC seeks § 107(a) contribution
for 100% of its response costs to clean up TCE and
chromium for which it claims no responsibility. See
Doc.212 at p. 7:11-24. The Rumpke exception allows a
PRP to maintain a direct cost recovery section 107(a)
action only if a landowner alleges it “did not pollute the
site in any way.” Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1241 (emphasis
added). FMC has entered into a settlement under which it
agrees to share cleanup costs of contaminants (excluding
nitrates), including TCE and chromium. FMC has not
alleged it did not pollute the site in any way. Unlike the
purported innocent landowner in Rumpke, the government
has ordered FMC to perform remediation at the Railroad

Corridor Site, and other PRPs have brought cost recovery
actions against FMC. See, e.g., Zacky Farms, v. *1034
FMC Corp. et al., CIV F 01-5380 OWW DLB.
[3] Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761 (7th
Cir. 1994), the case from which the Rumpke exception was
derived, suggests that if the harm to a contaminated site is
divisible, a non-innocent PRP may be able to bring a
direct cost recovery claim under section 107(a) under
certain circumstances. See Akzo, 30 F.3d at 765. Separate
and distinct subterranean plumes of groundwater
contamination provide a basis to divide CERCLA liability
for a site. See United States v. Broderick Investment Co.,
862
F.Supp.
272,
277
(D.Colo.1994).
Here,
Vendo/Floway allege the contamination from BNSF
“potentially has commingled with the plume of pesticide
contamination in groundwater beneath and downgradient
of the FMC site.” Doc.37 at
64; Doc.38 at
26
(“Third-Party Complainant ... alleges ... releases and
disposal of wastes [by Third-Party Defendants]
containing TCE and/or chromium and other hazardous
substances have migrated/may continue to migrate
through groundwater to locations where such substances
have commingled with the plume of pesticide and other
contamination in groundwater beneath and downgradient
of the FMC Site”). A “single harm” may be divisible if it
is possible to discern the degree to which different parties
contribute to the damage. See Broderick Investment, 862
F.Supp. at 277. Single harms may be “treated as divisible
in terms of degree,” based on the relative quantities of
waste discharged. Matter o f Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d 889,
895-96 (5th Cir.1993); Hercules, 247 F.3d at 718. This
sort of divisibility may be provable even where wastes
have become cross-contaminated and commingled, for
“comingling is not synonymous with indivisible harm.”
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711,
722 (2nd Cir.1993) (“Alcan II ”); see also Bell, 3 F.3d at
903. Proving divisibility is a “very difficult proposition,”
Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 934 n.
4 (8th Cir.1995), and the Restatement cautions against
making an “arbitrary apportionment for its own sake.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. to subsection
(2) (1965), quoted in Bell, 3 F.3d at 896.; see also United
States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530,
1535 (10th Cir.1995) (noting that “the courts have been
reluctant to apportion costs”).
[4] Whether or not FMC’s TCE and chromium claims may
be somehow divisible from its own responsibility for
contamination of the Railroad Corridor Site, FMC’s
election as a PRP to sue under CERCLA section 113 for
contribution prevents FMC’s suit against Vendo/Floway
from being for direct cost recovery under section 107(a).
See FAC at
1, 170. Vendo/Floway’s contribution
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action is entirely permissible under Pinal Creek, if the
recovery sought against other PRPs is not for response
costs incurred by FMC. Whether FMC could have sued
for direct cost recovery under section 107(a) is not
relevant. The fact FMC sues under sections 107 and 113
for contribution means that Vendo/Floway are liable only
for their fair-and-several shares of site liability. Even if
Vendo/Floway settled for an amount they believe is more
than their fair share, FMC’s action is not a direct
cost-recovery action under CERCLA § 107(a) as to
Vendo/Floway. See Doc.212 at p. 8.
Vendo/Floway correctly argue that applying the holding
of City o f Merced to this case in the manner suggested by
BNSF thwarts CERCLA’s underlying policy objectives.
See Doc.212 at p. 9. Prohibiting Vendo/Floway from
maintaining contribution claims for FMC’s response costs
discourages settlement between FMC and Vendo/Floway
and derogates CERCLA’s policies of encouraging
settlement and promoting prompt and effective cleanup of
*1035 contaminated sites. See id. Pinal Creek rejects the
argument that limiting PRPs to contribution claims
undermines CERCLA’s policy of promoting rapid and
voluntary environmental responses to hazardous waste
threats. See Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1304 (“We reject
this argument because it is based on policy considerations
which we cannot consider in light of controlling text,
structure, and logic of CERCLA and of our own
precedent in [In re ] Dant & Russell,” Inc., 951 F.2d 246,
249 (9th Cir. 1991)). The court noted that rapid, voluntary
responses by private parties may be taken into account
under section 113(f) when equitably apportioning liability
and that other economic incentives exist for private
parties to initiate cleanup prior to government
intervention. See Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1304-05.
Allowing a PRP such as FMC to hold other PRPs jointly
and severally liable for their response costs would
effectively immunize the plaintiff PRP from liability for
orphan shares (those shares attributable to PRPs who are
either insolvent or unavailable). See Pinal Creek, 118
F.3d at 1303. Such a rule reduces a plaintiff PRP’s
incentive to sue all PRPs and “would undermine the
ability of courts to allocate costs between all PRPs ‘using
such equitable factors as the court determines are
appropriate.’ ” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1)).
There is no evidence FMC has acted in collusion with
BNSF to maximize Vendo/Floway’s liability. To the
contrary, according to the Deal Point Memorandum
containing the essential terms of the settlement between
FMC and Vendo/Floway, FMC agrees not to assist BNSF
in its prosecution or defense of the claims between BNSF
and Vendo/Floway, “such as by providing BNSF with
FMC’s attorney work product, expert work product or by

waiving any conflict between BNSF and an FMC expert.”
Doc.197, Exh. D. There is no evidence of fraud or
coercion in the settlement or FMC’s decision not to sue
BNSF. Although FMC had an incentive to sue BNSF if
BNSF contributed to the contamination FMC was
remediating, as Vendo/Floway note, “FMC refused to
acknowledge BNSF’s [alleged] contribution to the
chromium contamination.” Doc.212.
Any policy considerations which favor allowing
Vendo/Floway to recover in contribution against BNSF
for FMC’s response costs are outweighed by the
objectives of avoiding multiple, unnecessary lawsuits,
maintaining incentives for PRP plaintiffs to sue as many
PRPs as possible (thereby avoiding substantial liability
for remaining shares), and the overall concern with the
speedy and effective cleanup of contaminated sites. See
THAN, 884 F.Supp. at 361 (“All that the Kramer opinion
actually accomplishes is another round of litigation— as
defendant PRPs counterclaim against the plaintiff PRP to
effectuate their recovery. Such an approach guarantees
inefficiency, potential duplication, and prolongation of the
litigation process in a CERCLA case.”) (citing United
States v. Kramer, 757 F.Supp. 397, 416-17 (D.N.J.1991)).
To the extent Vendo/Floway make claims for contribution
for its liability to FMC for FMC’s response costs, those
claims are barred. Because Vendo/Floway are liable to
FMC only for their fair-and-several shares of liability,
they may not maintain an action under CERCLA for
contribution to recover for liability they incur for FMC’s
response costs, even if above their fair shares. BNSF’s
motion for summary judgment as to Vendo/Floway’s
claims for contribution under CERCLA as to FMC’s
response costs is GRANTED.

2. Viability o f Contribution Claims by § 113(f)
Defendants fo r “First Instance” Costs
Vendo/Floway are not necessarily precluded from
maintaining §§ 107 and 113 *1036 contribution claims
against BNSF or other PRPs because of their status as
contribution defendants, for response costs they incurred
and they allege were caused by other PRPs. Despite its
contrary language, City o f Merced recognizes that
contribution defendants who incur costs in response to
state or federal administrative agency directives are
potentially jointly and severally liable for those costs. See
City o f Merced, 997 F.Supp. at 1333. In City o f Merced,
Merced Laundry was permitted to maintain an action for
costs it incurred responding to an Environmental
Protection Agency directive to clean up the site, see id.,
and a contribution action to recover such so-called
“administrative response” costs. See id. Vendo/Floway
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argue they seek and are entitled to the “first instance”
costs5 they have incurred relating to characterizing the
TCE and chromium contamination, installing and
reporting results from off-property monitoring wells,
investigating BNSF’s property, and evaluating the use of
Zacky Farms’ property to establish hydraulic control over
the contamination plume. See Doc.212 at p. 10. BNSF
argues Vendo/Floway are precluded from recovering first
instance costs because Vendo/Floway do not assert such a
claim in their third-party complaints and Rule 14(a)
requires dismissal of third-party claims not derivatively
based on a plaintiff’s original claim. See Doc.217 at pp.
8-9.

a. Third-Party Complaints
In their third-party complaint against BNSF and other
third-party defendants, Vendo and VMC allege in their
first claim, “To the extent that Complainants are found
liable in any action or administrative proceeding for any
past, present or future response costs, damages, or other
fees and expenses arising from the release or disposal of
hazardous substances ... onto or under the Vendo/Floway
Site, the FMC site, or such other location of migration of
such alleged hazardous substances, then Complainants are
entitled to contributions from [third-party defendants],
based upon equitable factors as the court determines are
appropriate pursuant to CERCLA § 113(f) (42 U.S.C. §
9613(f)).” Doc.37 at
77. Vendo and VMC seek
“contribution for the equitable allocation of [third-party
defendants] to any past, present, or future response costs,
damages or other expenses incurred by, or assessed
against, Complainants as a result of the release or disposal
of hazardous substances ... onto or under the
Vendo/Floway Site, the Calwa Ice House Site, the Valley
Foundry Site and the CMS Site.” See id. at 85. In their
second claim, Vendo and VMC allege third-party
defendants “are liable for some or all response costs,
damages or other fees and expenses incurred by
Complainants, if any, and that [third-party defendants] are
obligated to reimburse Complainants for such response
costs, damages, or other fees and expenses.” See id. at
80. Vendo and VMC seek a judicial determination of the
relative liability of Vendo/VMC and third-party
defendants under CERCLA section 113(g)(2). See id. at
79, 83, 86. Floway’s third-party complaint’s first two
claims are nearly identical. See Doc.38 at 28-39, p. 11.
*1037 [5] While Vendo, VMC, and Floway’s first claim
against BNSF seeks reimbursement for liability it may
incur for FMC’s response costs, it explicitly seeks
contribution for “any past, present, or future response
costs, damages or other expenses incurred by” Vendo,
VMC, and Floway. See Doc.37 at
85; Doc.38 at p.

11:4-7. Vendo/Floway also explicitly seek in their second
claim a judicial determination of the relative liability of
Vendo/Floway and BNSF under CERCLA section
113(g)(2). See Doc.37 at
79, 83, 86; Doc.38 at
35,
36, 39, p. 11:8-12. These claims include claims for first
instance costs separate and apart from FMC’s response
costs. The fact that Vendo/Floway did not mention the
1999 ISE Order or the term “first instance costs” in their
third-party complaint does not prevent these allegations
from being sufficient to give notice that contribution is
sought for such costs. Cf. Doc.217 at p. 7:11-16. The
motion for summary judgment is denied as to first
instance costs, including ISE compliance costs, caused by
BNSF or other PRPs

b. Rule 14(a)
BNSF argues Vendo/Floway’s claims for first instance
costs are independent and unrelated to the FMC action
and settlement and must be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.
Civ.P. 14(a). Rule 14(a) provides, in relevant part:
At any time after commencement
of the action a defending party, as a
third-party plaintiff, may cause a
summons and complaint to be
served upon a person not a party to
the action who is or may be liable
to the third-party plaintiff for all or
part of the plaintiff’s claim against
the third-party plaintiff.
Fed.R. Civ.P. 14(a).
Vendo/Floway are entitled to bring third-party claims
against BNSF if BNSF “is or may be liable to [FMC] for
all or part of the [FMC’s] claim against [Vendo/Floway].”
Fed.R. Civ.P. 14(a). A “third-party claim may be asserted
only when the third party’s liability is in some way
dependent on the outcome of the main claim and the third
party’s liability is secondary or derivative.” United States
v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 452 (9th
Cir.1983) (affirming a trial court’s dismissal of
defendant’s third-party complaint against federal agents
for violation of defendant’s constitutional rights in a
forfeiture action by the United States).
Even if BNSF may not be liable to Vendo/Floway for
FMC’s claims under CERCLA section 113 relating to
FMC’s response costs, BNSF can be liable to
Vendo/Floway for FMC’s RCRA and state law claims for
which Vendo/Floway may be held jointly and severally
liable, if BNSF was the cause. See FAC (seeking
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injunctive relief under section 7002(a)(1)(B) of the
RCRA, and indemnity, contribution, declaratory relief,
and damages under California law). The bar against
contribution defendants’ claims for contribution for a
contribution complainant’s response costs does not apply
to FMC’s non-CERCLA claims. Vendo/Floway may
maintain state law claims against BNSF for contribution
to recover the costs FMC seeks under state law, which
were caused by BNSF. Only Floway asserts a claim under
state law for contribution. See Doc.38. BNSF is
potentially liable under Floway’s state law declaratory
relief contribution and indemnity claim for at least some
of the costs FMC seeks against Floway, Floway’s state
law declaratory relief claim is properly brought under
Rule 14(a). Some of Floway’s state law declaratory relief
claim is, at least in part, derivative of FMC’s state law
claims for continuing nuisance and trespass against
Floway. See Doc.217 at p. 9:7-8. By BNSF’s alleged
releases from its real property which contributed to a
single plume, the claims are inextricably intertwined. To
its state law claim *1038 brought in compliance with Rule
14(a), Floway may join “as many claims, legal, equitable,
or maritime, as the party has against” BNSF. Fed.R.
Civ.P. 18(a); see also Banks v. City o f Emeryville, 109
F.R.D. 535, 540 (N.D.Cal.1985) (third-party claim may
be based on a different theory of liability than the main
action).
[6] Vendo/VMC assert only CERCLA claims. See Doc.37.
The distinction between FMC’s response costs and
Vendo/Floway’s first instance costs, which determines the
viability of Vendo/Floway’s CERCLA 113 claims, does
not disqualify the claims under Rule 14(a). That
Vendo/Floway’s claims for first instance costs are
“independent,” in a CERCLA section 113 sense, from
their claims related to FMC’s costs, does not mean they
are “independent” and therefore not derivative of FMC’s
claims in a Rule 14(a) sense. In Kemper Prime Indus.
Partners v. Montgomery Watson Amer., Inc., 2000 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 11450, 2000 WL 876222 (N.D.Ill.2000),
plaintiff Kemper sued Montgomery Watson Americas
(“MWA”), alleging negligent misrepresentation in an
environmental assessment of industrial property MWA
performed for Kemper. See Kemper, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11450 at *2, 2000 WL 876222 at *1. MWA
impleaded third-party defendant Prime Group, alleging,
inter alia, CERCLA claims. See id. at *6, 2000 WL
876222 at *2-3. In denying Prime Group’s motion to
dismiss on the grounds it was improperly impleaded
under Rule 14(a), the court stated that “MWA set forth a
number of facts in its complaint, which allege that the
Prime Entities’ own negligence, in not immediately
cleaning up the property and in performing improper
trenching operations, exacerbated the contamination at the

Site. On this basis, secondary liability could be
established.” Id. at *11-12, 2000 WL 876222at *4.
Impleader may be appropriate where a third-party
defendant is potentially liable to the third-party plaintiff
for damages to the extent necessary to put the third-party
plaintiff in the position he would have been in absent the
alleged wrongdoing by the third-party defendant. See id.
at *11, 2000 WL 876222 at *4 (citing Leaseway v.
Carlton, 568 F.Supp. 1041 (N.D.Ill.1983)).
“The decision to allow a third-party defendant to be
impleaded under rule 14 is entrusted to the sound
discretion of the trial court.” Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d at
452. “Rule 14(a) was designed to permit the liberal
joinder of parties so that judicial energy could be
conserved and consistency of results guaranteed.” New
York v. Solvent Chem. Co., 179 F.R.D. 90, 93
(W.D.N.Y.1998)
(citations omitted); Lehman v.
Revolution Portfolio L.L.C., 166 F.3d 389, 393 (1st
Cir.1999) (“whether a third-party defendant may be
impleaded under Rule 14 continues to be a question
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court”)
(citation omitted). Joinder under Rule 14(a) should be
“freely granted to promote ... efficiency unless to do so
would prejudice the plaintiff, unduly complicate the trial,
or would foster an obviously unmeritorious claim.”
Solvent Chem., 179 F.R.D. at 93 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff FMC is no longer a party. It is not prejudiced by
the presence of BNSF in the case. Rule 14(a) does not
require dismissal of a third-party complaint where
discovery is not complete. Joint-trial is favored by “the
efficiency of considering all claims involving the subject
site in a single lawsuit, and the moving party would not
suffer any prejudice in its ability to defend against the
claim in the present action that it would not also suffer as
a defendant in a separate action.” Solvent Chem., 179
F.R.D. at 93-94. Permitting Vendo/Floway’s third-party
complaint to go forward will not cause undue delay since
the claims between Vendo/Floway and BNSF are the only
claims remaining in the action. None of the reasons why
Rule 14(a) prohibits *1039 joinder of non-derivative
claims is present here. Requiring a duplicitous separate
lawsuit to address inextricably related claims over
contiguous CERCLA sites, would unnecessarily multiply
the litigation and waste judicial and party resources.
Vendo/Floway allege BNSF is a joint tortfeasor
responsible for the TCE and chromium contamination
which forms the basis of FMC’s claims against
Vendo/Floway. While FMC’s failure to name BNSF as a
defendant may have certain consequences under
CERCLA, those consequences do not prevent Rule 14(a),
impleaded of BNSF on the theory that BNSF is liable for
at least some of the TCE and chromium contamination for
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which Vendo/Floway have incurred costs. As a practical
matter, the claims of FMC and Vendo/Floway in this
action, and BNSF’s claims in the related action,
Burlington Northern v. Vendo, CIV F 01-6434 OWW
LJO, are so interrelated that the interests of justice and
efficiency favor consolidation of the claims into a single
action. The BNSF case arose out of contamination and the
need for CERCLA remediation of related sites in the
Railroad Corridor. In a separate decision, the BNSF
claims have been consolidated with the FMC action.
BNSF’s claims are compulsory counterclaims to
Vendo/Floway’s third-party claims asserted against BNSF
in the FMC case. These compulsory counterclaims have
been consolidated with the FMC action. The limitations in
Rule 14(a) regarding what claims may be asserted against
third-party defendants are designed to promote judicial
efficiency by resolving independent disputes in a single
lawsuit. The decision on Vendo/Floway’s motion to
dismiss, stay, or consolidate in the BNSF action held that
“the essential facts of the various claims are so logically
connected that considerations of judicial economy and
fairness dictate that all the issues be resolved in one
lawsuit.” Hydranautics, 70 F.3d at 536 (citations
omitted). These same factors prevent dismissal of
Vendo/Floway’s claims against BNSF based on Rule
14(a). See Doc.146 (order denying BNSF’s severance
motion on the grounds of fairness and judicial economy).
Vendo/Floway’s third-party complaint for contribution
from BNSF under CERCLA sections 107 and 113(f) for
first instance costs, which BNSF caused to be incurred,
are properly asserted. BNSF’s motion for summary
judgment as to Vendo/Floway’s CERCLA claims for
contribution for first instance response costs is DENIED.

3. Floway’s HSAA Claims
BNSF argues Floway’s HSAA claims are barred because
liability under the HSAA is coextensive with liability
under CERCLA, and BNSF cannot be liable to Floway
under CERCLA. See Doc.195. Floway argues that, while
the HSAA incorporates CERCLA’s description of
responsible parties and available defenses, HSAA does
not incorporate the entire body of federal common law
CERCLA jurisprudence including any interpretation of
City o f Merced that bars contribution defendants from
asserting their own contribution claims under HSAA
against other PRPs. See Doc.212 at p. 12:1-12.
In THAN, 884 F.Supp. at 363, this court stated: “Liability
under CHSAA requires a finding of liability under
CERCLA.” THAN, 884 F.Supp. at 363 (citing Cal. Health
& Safety Code § 25323.5(a)). Floway’s HSAA
contribution claim against BNSF (and FMC’s HSAA

contribution claim against Vendo/Floway) is asserted
under Cal. Health & Safety Code section 25363. See
Doc.38; FAC. Section 25363 provides, in relevant part:
... any party found liable for any
costs or expenditures recoverable
under this chapter who establishes
by a preponderance of the evidence
that only a *1040 portion of those
costs
or
expenditures
are
attributable to that party’s actions,
shall be required to pay only for
that portion.
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25363(a).
Section 25363(e) provides, in relevant part:
Any person who has incurred
removal or remedial action costs in
accordance with this chapter or the
federal act may seek contribution
or indemnity from any person who
is liable pursuant to this chapter...
An action to enforce a claim may
be brought as a cross-complaint by
any defendant in an action brought
pursuant to Section 25360 or this
section, or in a separate action after
the person seeking contribution or
indemnity has paid removal or
remedial action costs in accordance
with this chapter or the federal
act.... In resolving claims for
contribution or indemnity, the court
may allocate costs among liable
parties using those equitable factors
which are appropriate.
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25363(e).
[7] Section 25363(e) expressly authorizes a contribution
cross complaint in a pending HSAA suit, or separate
lawsuit for contribution after payment of costs for
removal or remedial actions under either HSAA or
CERCLA. Contribution defendants may sue other PRPs,
including a contribution plaintiff for first instance costs.
Section 25363(a) recognizes the same principal of several
liability for response costs under the HSAA; contribution
defendants are not liable for more than each party’s
fair-and-several share of response costs, despite the
exposure of a PRP to joint and several liability as a
CERCLA 107 direct cost recovery defendant. However,
just as Vendo/Floway’s CERCLA claims for its own first
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instance response costs are properly asserted under
CERCLA, Floway’s claim for first instance costs under
HSAA may be asserted against BNSF under § 25363(e)
and any other PRPs who may be liable under the HSAA.
The state law follows the federal. BNSF’s motion for
summary judgment as to Floway’s claim for contribution
under HSAA as to FMC’s response costs for which
Floway has not expended costs is GRANTED. BNSF’s
motion for summary judgment as to Floway’s HSAA
claim for contribution for Floway’s own first instance
response costs is DENIED.

4. Floway’s State Law Declaratory Relief Claim
BNSF argues Floway’s state law claim for declaratory
relief should be dismissed because 1) Floway should not
be able to obtain contribution under a state law theory if
such a claim is barred under a federal law CERCLA
theory; and 2) the court should decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims
in the absence of any viable federal claims. See Doc. 195
at pp. 12:10—p. 15:2.
[8] Floway correctly notes that BNSF’s first argument was
explicitly rejected in the decision in City o f Merced,
which held “that while liability for the CERCLA claims is
several, liability of all parties to the [PRP plaintiff] under
state-law theories is joint and several.... CERCLA does
not preempt state-law causes of action that concern
cleanup of hazardous materials.” City o f Merced, 997
F.Supp. at 1336 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d)). BNSF
argues City o f Merced does not apply on this point
because here FMC, unlike the PRP City of Merced, is no
longer a party due to its settlement with Vendo/Floway.
See Doc.217 at p. 10:17-25. BNSF argues that here
“Floway asks this Court to rule upon FMC’s
now-theoretical continuing nuisance and continuing
trespass damages and then declare BNSF liable for some
of those theoretical damages.” Id. FMC’s claims against
Vendo *1041 /Floway for continuing nuisance and
trespass are asserted in its FAC; they are not “theoretical”
simply because FMC and Vendo/Floway settled. Any
injury to real property of a claimant from the release and
entry of contaminants past, present, and future may be
addressed under these state legal theories. Any
complexity that may arise in apportioning liability due to
the FMC settlement agreement’s lack of specificity as to
how liability is apportioned under the settlement, has no
effect on the basic principle that CERCLA does not
preempt state law claims related to environmental
cleanup.
As to BSNF’s supplemental jurisdiction argument,
Floway retains viable CERCLA contribution claims

relating to its first instance costs; the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims is
required under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. BNSF’s motion for
summary judgment as to Floway’s state law claim for
declaratory relief is DENIED.

B. Vendo/Floway’s Motion to Quash BNSF’s Proposed
Subpoenas o f Plaintiff FMC’s Experts
1. Vendo/Floway’s Position
Vendo/Floway argue BNSF should be prohibited from
deposing and calling as witnesses at trial, experts retained
and designated by FMC before FMC and Vendo/Floway
agreed to dismiss the claims against each other in
settlement of their dispute. See Docs.199, 201; Doc.199,
Exh. A (the “Settlement”). The Settlement provides that
FMC shall not make expert work product available to
BNSF, and FMC has agreed in conjunction with the
Settlement to withdraw its expert designations in this
case. See Doc.199, Exh. A at 15; Doc.199, Elliott Decl.
at
3. Vendo/Floway argue BNSF chose to designate
only two experts in this case even though they had ample
opportunity over a nine-month period to retain and
prepare whatever experts they needed. See Doc.219 at p.
2:1-3. Vendo/Floway maintain BNSF took a calculated
risk by relying on FMC’s experts’ availability at trial
without obtaining an agreement from FMC to
cross-designate and share the cost of the experts. See
Doc.199 at p. 2. Vendo/Floway argue BNSF cannot
demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances required
under Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B) to justify an order
allowing it to utilize FMC’s experts’ work in
contravention of the Settlement and at the expense of
delaying trial in this case. See Doc.199 at p. 2:24.
Vendo/Floway contend the parties entered into no written
stipulation pursuant to Rule 29 regarding the taking of
depositions. See Doc.187 at p. 5:1-9. BNSF chose not to
participate in the ultimate settlement between FMC,
Vendo, VMC, and Floway. Vendo/Floway speculate
“BNSF expected that the settling parties’ momentum and
desire to resolve all claims would enable BNSF to settle at
a bargain price. BNSF’s ‘lowball’ strategy failed and did
not reach a settlement.” Doc.187 at p. 6:7-10.
Vendo/Floway argue BNSF created the situation in which
it finds itself. See id. at p. 6:11-18.
... BNSF has been a party in this
case for fifteen months. During this
time, while FMC designated eleven
experts, Vendo and Floway jointly
designated nine experts, and
Floway designated four additional
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experts, BNSF took a calculated
risk and designated only two
experts, perhaps hoping to ride
FMC’s coattails against Vendo and
Floway. Having refused to settle on
fair terms with the other parties,
BNSF now seeks to roll back the
clock and start fresh with a six to
seven month delay and a new roster
of experts.
Id.
Floway contends BNSF should have jointly designated
experts with FMC as is customarily done in such cases.
Floway’s *1042 Opp. at p. 3. Floway maintains that in the
absence of any agreement with FMC, BNSF has no right
to “parasitically” benefit from FMC’s efforts. See id.
Floway observes BNSF has not made any affirmative
claims in this litigation, so it needs only to prepare for its
defense. See id. at p. 4. This is overly simplistic because
the origin and paths of contaminant releases cannot be
analyzed without expert testimony and the causes of and
need for remediation consistent with the NCP must be
established.

2. BNSF’s Position
BNSF contends Rule 26(b)(4)(B), the “extraordinary
circumstances” test, does not apply here since FMC has
already designated their experts and the experts have
exchanged reports and opinions. See Doc.204 at p.
1:13-22. BNSF argues it lies within the sound discretion
of the court to permit BNSF to depose FMC’s experts
based on a balancing of the probative value of the
testimony and the prejudice to the other party under
Fed.R. Evid. 403. See id. According to BNSF, the
probative value of the experts’ testimony is high, while
Vendo/Floway will suffer minimal prejudice because they
have already prepared to defend against FMC’s experts
and they are not the party whose experts BNSF seeks to
depose. See id. at p. 2. BNSF maintains it will be severely
prejudiced if it is not allowed to use FMC’s experts. See
id. BNSF contends the Settlement itself contains no
provision requiring FMC to withdraw its experts or make
them unavailable for BNSF to use, so the Settlement
Agreement would not be breached by allowing BNSF to
depose or subpoena for trial FMC’s experts. See Doc.204
at p. 2:3-9. BNSF argues it did not have sufficient time,
given the voluminous and complex nature of the material
at issue and the late date at which it entered the litigation,
to designate and prepare on its own all of the experts it
needs for this case. See Doc.204 at p. 3. BNSF maintains
it justifiably relied on being able to use FMC’s experts at

trial. See id. at p. 5. BNSF contends it had no reason to
believe FMC would settle out of the case before February
8, 2002. See id. FMC at oral argument stated it continues
to work with its experts and does not wish for them to
provide work product or services for BNSF.

3. Appropriate Standard
Vendo/Floway argue Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B), regarding
discovery of non-testifying expert witnesses, applies to
this situation. See Doc.199 at p. 3. Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
provides that:
A party may ... discover facts
known or opinions held by an
expert who has been retained or
specially employed by another
party in anticipation of litigation or
preparation for trial and who is not
expected to be called as a witness
at trial, only as provided in Rule
35(b)6 or *1043 upon a showing of
exceptional circumstances under
which it is impracticable for the
party seeking discovery to obtain
facts or opinions on the same
subject by other means.
Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B). Under the Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
standard, BNSF must make a showing that “extraordinary
circumstances” exist which justify its deposing FMC’s
experts.
BNSF argues experts whose identities and opinions have
been disclosed pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2) may be deposed
or subpoenaed for trial by an opposing party within the
sound discretion of the court. See Doc.204 at p. 1. In
deciding whether to allow such a deposition or subpoena,
the probative value of the testimony is weighed against
the prejudice to the opposing party under Fed.R. Evid.
403. See id. For convenience, this standard is referred to
as the “balancing standard.”
Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(A) requires a party to disclose to
other parties the identity of any person who may testify as
an expert witness at trial. See Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(A).
Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(A) provides: “A party may depose
any person who has been identified as an expert whose
opinions may be presented at trial.” Fed.R. Civ.P.
26(b)(4)(A).
BNSF argues the analysis in House v. Combined Ins. Co.
o f Amer., 168 F.R.D. 236 (N.D.Iowa 1996), applies. See
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Doc.204 at p. 5. House addressed “the vexing and
surprisingly little explored question of whether one party
should be able to depose or call at trial an expert
designated by an opposing party who was expected to be
called at trial, but whom the designating party has
announced it will not call at trial.” House, 168 F.R.D. at
238. In House, plaintiff sued for employment
discrimination based on quid pro quo sexual harassment,
seeking, inter alia, damages for emotional distress. See id.
Defendant employer designated a psychologist, Dr.
Taylor, as an expert to rebut testimony of plaintiff’s
expert (a social worker, not a psychologist) regarding
plaintiff’s emotional suffering. See id. After Dr. Taylor
examined plaintiff and prepared a report, plaintiff noticed
Dr. Taylor’s deposition and moved to compel production
of his report. See id. Defendant moved to quash Dr.
Taylor’s deposition and for a protective order precluding
any discovery from Dr. Taylor on the ground that
defendant had decided not to call Dr. Taylor as a witness
at trial. See id. Although defendant had not formally
withdrawn its designation of him as an expert, Dr. Taylor
was included in defendant’s witness list in the final
pretrial order. See id. The magistrate judge assigned to the
case ruled that plaintiff was entitled to Dr. Taylor’s report
pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 35(b) but not entitled to depose
Dr. Taylor because no exceptional circumstances pursuant
to Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B) had been shown. See House,
168 F.R.D. at 238-39. Defendant filed a motion in limine
to bar Dr. Taylor’s testimony at trial. See House, 168
F.R.D. at 239.
The court identified four interests weighing against
allowing an opposing party to depose or call at trial a
consultant, non-testifying expert witness: 1) desire to
allow counsel to obtain necessary expert advice without
fear that every expert consultation may yield grist for the
adversary’s mill; 2) unfairness of allowing an *1044
opposing party to reap benefits from another party’s effort
and expense; 3) fear of discouraging experts from serving
as consultants if their testimony could be compelled; and
4) the substantial risk of prejudice stemming from the fact
of the prior retention of an expert by an opposing party.
See House, 168 F.R.D. at 241 (citations omitted).
House analyzed the “exceptional circumstances,”
“balancing,” and “entitlement” standards. Under the latter
standard, a party required to submit to an expert
examination should be “entitled” to the examining
expert’s report and a deposition of the expert for use at
trial. See House, 168 F.R.D. at 244. H ouse distinguished
between experts who will testify at trial pursuant to
Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(A) from consultant experts who
are not designated to testify at trial. See House, 168
F.R.D. at 245.

... Parties should be encouraged to consult experts to
formulate their own cases, to discard those experts for
any reason, and to place them beyond the reach of an
opposing party, if they have never indicated an
intention to use the expert at trial. Such a
consulted-but-never-designated expert might properly
be considered to fall under the work product doctrine
that protects matters prepared in anticipation of
litigation. For this reason also, the ability of an
opposing party to call a never-designated expert at trial
should depend upon a showing of “extraordinary
circumstances.”
However, once an expert is designated, the expert is
recognized as presenting part of the common body of
discoverable, and generally admissible, information
and testimony available to all parties. The practical
effect of a Rule 26 designation of an expert is to make
an expert available for deposition by the opposing
party, and such a deposition preserves the testimony of
the expert, should the expert later become unavailable,
or provides a basis for impeachment, should the
expert’s opinion offered at trial differ. Thus, Rule 26
designation waives the “free consultation” privilege a
party enjoys as to its non-testifying experts. The court
therefore concludes that designation of an expert as
expected to be called at trial, pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P.
26(b)(4)(A), even if that designation is subsequently
withdrawn, takes the opposing party’s demand to
depose and use the expert at trial out of the
“exceptional circumstances” category of Rule
26(b)(4)(B).
House, 168 F.R.D. at 245 (citations omitted).
The court also relied on the nature and circumstances of
the expert testimony sought. See House, 168 F.R.D. at
246 (“designation, and submission to a medical
examination by the designated expert, create the kind of
reliance on the availability of the expert that the court in
Rubel found lacking where an expert had been consulted,
but never designated”) (citation omitted). Although House
noted that Rule 35 did not “entitle” a party to depose or
use at trial another party’s examining expert, the expert
was a psychologist who had conducted a Rule 35 mental
examination of the plaintiff and was subject to the trial
testimony provisions of that Rule. See House, 168 F.R.D.
at 246 (“What, then, is the proper standard for [plaintiff]
House’s access to and use at trial of Dr. Taylor, where
both a Rule 26(b)(4)(A) designation has occurred, albeit a
designation subsequently withdrawn, and a Rule 35
medical examination has occurred?”).
The court found that the circumstances warranted the
application of a discretionary “balancing” standard. See
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House, 168 F.R.D. at 246. Balancing favored deposition
and use of the expert at trial based *1045 on: 1) plaintiff’s
interest in presenting relevant, probative information to
the jury, non-cumulative of plaintiff’s social worker
expert who would not present psychological expert
testimony; 2) the court’s interest in proper resolution of
the issues; and 3) plaintiff’s reasonable reliance on being
able to use Dr. Taylor’s testimony because she was asked
to consent to examination only after Dr. Taylor was
designated. See House, 168 F.R.D. at 247. The defendant
had not taken the necessary steps to prepare its expert
testimony before the designation deadline. See House,
168 F.R.D. at 248 (“The court finds little interest in
relieving a party of the consequences of an expert
designation made simply to meet a court-ordered
deadline, when Rule 26 provides every protection for
finding and using an expert to prepare for trial prior to
designation of the expert as expected to testify at trial.”).
The potential for prejudice to defendant from revealing to
the jury Dr. Taylor was originally hired by defendant
could be reduced or eliminated by excluding evidence as
to how Dr. Taylor became involved in the case. See id.
Plaintiff was allowed to depose Dr. Taylor. See id.; see
also Agron v. Trustees o f Columbia Univ., 176 F.R.D. 445
(S.D.N.Y.1997) (finding Rule 26(b)(4)(B) inapplicable
where plaintiff voluntarily permitted discovery of its
expert’s opinions and finding the balance favored
allowing defendant to use plaintiff’s withdrawn expert at
trial).
Vendo/Floway contend House has no applicability to
cases not involving Rule 35 personal medical or
psychological examinations, involving expert reports
discoverable under Rule 35(b). See Doc.219 at p. 2.
Vendo/Floway observe that the House reasoning was
rejected in Lehan v. Ambassador Programs, Inc., 190
F.R.D. 670 (E.D.Wash.2000). See Doc.219 at p. 2. In
Lehan, defendant informed the court it did not intend to
call an expert, who had performed a Rule 35 examination
and was listed on defendant’s pretrial witness list. See
Lehan, 190 F.R.D. at 671. Lehan denied plaintiff use of
defendant’s expert, explicitly rejected the balancing
standard adopted in House, and instead applied the
exceptional circumstances standard. See Lehan, 190
F.R.D. at 672.
In Ross v. Burlington N.R. Co., 136 F.R.D. 638
(N.D.Ill.1991), plaintiff designated his expert and
revealed the subject matter of the expert’s testimony.
After plaintiff withdrew his designation, defendant sought
to depose the expert. See Ross, 136 F.R.D. at 638. Ross
found that the “plaintiff has the prerogative of changing
his mind” regarding the designation of experts. See Ross,
136 F.R.D. at 639. “Since plaintiff changed his mind

before any expert testimony was given in this case, the
witness never actually acted as a testifying expert
witness.” Id. The Ross court was not confronted with “a
situation where facts or opinions were disclosed” and
applied the exceptional circumstances standard in denying
defendant’s request to depose plaintiff’s de-designated
expert. Id. (citing Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891
(10th Cir.1984) (affirming trial court’s exclusion of
testimony of expert originally
designated and
subsequently withdrawn by plaintiff because defendants
failed to show exceptional circumstances)).
In Dayton-Phoenix Group, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
1997 WL 1764760 (S.D.Ohio 1997), defendant
designated an expert to testify about equipment and
machinery. After defendant decided not to call the expert
as a witness, plaintiff sought to subpoena him. See
Dayton-Phoenix,
1997
WL
1764760
at
*1.
Dayton-Phoenix considered the differing results in House
and Ross and adopted R oss’s exceptional circumstances
approach. See id. The court reasoned: 1) the Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 26(b)(4)(B) limit discovery to
“trial witnesses,” the expert would not be a trial witness;
2) the primary purpose of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is to allow a
party to *1046 prepare adequately for cross-examination
at trial, a purpose not applicable where the witness would
not actually be called at trial; and 3) Rule 26(b)(4)(B)’s
purpose of promoting fairness by preventing access to
another party’s diligent trial preparation is furthered by
denying such access. See id.
In Wolt v. Sherwood, 828 F.Supp. 1562, 1568 (D.Utah
1993), the court held that Rule 26(b)(4)(B) “is designed to
promote fairness by precluding unreasonable access to an
opposing party’s diligent trial preparation.” The court in
Wolt applied the exceptional circumstances standard in
holding that non-settling defendants could not use experts
retained by a settling defendant where the settlement
agreement prevented such use. See Wolt, 828 F.Supp. at
1567-68 (“Nonsettling parties are not prejudiced because
the ‘expertise’ will be made available, in spite of a
settlement, if the nonsettling parties can show
‘exceptional circumstances’ under Fed.R. Civ.P.
26(b)(4)(B).”). The court noted that “exceptional
circumstances might exist where the settling party’s
expert has unique expertise which may not be readily
available to other non-settling parties, or where the
settling party’s expert participated in tests which cannot
be replicated by new experts.” Wolt, 828 F.Supp. at 1568
n. 18.
Unlike House, the experts here have not performed a
personal medical examination pursuant to Rule 35, nor
scientific tests that are unavailable or unduplicatable.
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FMC and Vendo/Floway have agreed not to permit BNSF
to use FMC’s experts. The totality of the circumstances
justifies application of the “exceptional circumstances”
standard to Vendo/Floway’s motion to quash.

4. Applying the Exceptional Circumstances Standard

As in Wolt, there is no showing that FMC’s experts have
unique expertise, otherwise unavailable to BNSF, or that
they “participated in tests which cannot be replicated by
new experts.” Wolt, 828 F.Supp. at 1568 n. 18. In In re
Shell Oil Refinery, 132 F.R.D. 437 (E.D.La.1990), Shell
submitted expert reports in compliance with a
court-ordered deadline for experts testifying at trial. See
Shell, 132 F.R.D. at 439. Shell’s later decision not to call
some of the authors of the reports as experts at trial was
“permissible” and transformed those witnesses into
“non-testifying experts,” within the meaning of Rule
26(b)(4)(B), whose testimony could be used by another
party
only upon a showing
of
“exceptional
circumstances.” See Shell, 132 F.R.D. at 440-42. A
showing that over $300,000 was required to replicate
those tests was insufficient to demonstrate “exceptional
circumstances” where “plaintiffs can obtain the
substantial equivalent by having their own experts
conduct tests.” Shell, 132 F.R.D. at 443. BNSF provides
no evidence showing the cost of any studies it seeks to
use or that such tests cannot be replicated by its own
experts.
[9] Under Rule 26(b)(4)(B), a party “carries a heavy
burden in demonstrating the existence of exceptional
circumstances.” Spearman Indus, v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co.,
128 F.Supp.2d
1148, 1151
(N.D.I11.2001)
(citation
omitted).
Exceptional
circumstances may exist where 1) the object or condition
at issue is destroyed or has deteriorated after the
non-testifying expert observes it but before the moving
party’s expert has an opportunity to observe it; or 2) there
are no other available experts in the same field or subject
area. See Spearman, 128 F.Supp.2d at 1152. BNSF makes
no showing the plume of contamination has deteriorated
or is inaccessible to further study by other available
experts in the field.
*1047 [10] BNSF does not show exceptional circumstances
exist to warrant an order allowing it use FMC’s experts.

5. Applying the Balancing Standard

Assuming, arguendo, the balancing standard applies to
this case, BNSF’s showing is still inadequate to permit it
access to FMC’s experts.

“The claimed importance of expert testimony underscores
the need for [BNSF] to have timely designated [its] expert
witness so that [opposing counsel] could prepare for trial.
The importance of such proposed testimony cannot
singularly override the enforcement of local rules and
scheduling orders.” Geiserman, 893 F.2d at 792 (footnote
omitted). BNSF created the situation in which it finds
itself by not cross-designating FMC’s experts to give
notice it intended to rely on FMC’s witnesses without a
formal agreement as to their shared use. See State ex rel.
W ard v. Hill, 200 W.Va. 270, 278, 489 S.E.2d 24 (1997)
(holding “that, absent a formal agreement among
defendants in a litigation proceeding involving multiple
defendants, the circuit court should not generally permit a
settling defendant’s expert witnesses to testify for the
remaining defendants,” especially where doing so would
violate the settlement agreement). BNSF has not been
diligent so as to entitle it to use FMC’s experts under
Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B)’s extraordinary circumstances
standard. To the contrary, BNSF shows an unjustifiable
lack of diligence. BNSF’s counsel are experienced and
competent in the field of environmental law. It is
indisputable that CERCLA litigation inevitably results in
a “battle of the experts.” It is inconceivable that BNSF’s
counsel could not have known of the need for experts to
defeat the opposing parties’ claims.
Rewarding BNSF by allowing it to use FMC’s experts
under these circumstances has the potential to discourage
settlement in contravention of public policy favoring
settlement and to upset the expectations of parties, the
court, and the policy of the law that encourages diligence
and discourages profit from the work product and industry
of the opponent. See Wolt, 828 F.Supp. at 1568. BNSF
observes that the Settlement does not contain an explicit
prohibition against BNSF’s using FMC’s experts without
assistance from FMC. However, FMC has made an
agreement apart from the settlement that it will withdraw
its experts. FMC has further work for its experts and does
not want them used by BNSF. The fact that FMC’s
agreement is not part of the Settlement Agreement does
not make it less enforceable or less important.
BNSF’s argument that it had inadequate time to prepare
and designate other experts rings hollow in light of the
fifteen months time it has had to prepare since it was
joined in the FMC case. BNSF had over nine months after
it was brought into this case to designate and prepare
experts. BNSF had previously engaged outside experts to
conduct a limited investigation into the site in 1995-96. It
was well aware of the issues when it was named as a
third-party
defendant,
allegedly
responsible
for
contributing to remediation costs at the FMC site.
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BNSF argues it justifiably relied upon being able to use
FMC’s experts at trial because it had no indication that
FMC would settle and be dismissed from the case. Yet,
BNSF was aware of and participated in the extensive
efforts to mediate the case. To the extent these efforts
took place after the expert designation deadline, BNSF
could have sought an agreement with FMC to share
FMC’s experts, but did not. Even before the expert
designation deadline, BNSF could have sought such an
agreement and should have known, especially as an
experienced party in environmental *1048 cleanup
litigation,7 that settlement was a likely possibility which
would leave it with only two designated experts.
BNSF has made no showing that the information and
opinions of FMC’s experts are unobtainable from other
experts in the field or that their studies are incapable of
being reproduced. There is a strong policy against
permitting a non-diligent party from free-riding off the
opponent’s industry and diligence. See Ager v. Jane C.
Stormont Hospital, 622 F.2d 496, 502 (10th Cir.1980)
(noting that “the structure of rule 26 was largely
developed around the doctrine of unfairness designed to
prevent a party from building his own case by means of
his opponent’s financial resources, superior diligence and
more aggressive preparation”); Shell, 132 F.R.D. at 443
(applying Rule 26(b)(4)(B)’s “intended purposes of
protecting trial strategy and preventing one party from
having a free ride at the expense of the other party”);
Wolt, 828 F.Supp. at 1568 (“The rule is designed to
promote fairness by precluding unreasonable access to an
opposing party’s diligent trial preparation.”).
Now that a new schedule is being implemented in this
case, due to the effective consolidation of this case with
the BNSF action, BNSF will have additional time to
retain, designate, and prepare experts regarding its claims
against Vendo/Floway. This additional time effectively
eliminates prejudice to BNSF caused by the unavailability
of FMC’s experts. Even under the balancing standard,
BNSF’s lack of diligence and the prejudice to FMC
outweighs the probative value of the testimony of FMC’s
experts.
Vendo’s motion to quash BNSF’s proposed subpoenas of
Plaintiff FMC’s experts is GRANTED.

C. BNSF’s Application to Modify the Scheduling Order
BNSF requests modification of the scheduling order
because Vendo and Floway’s “unilateral cancellation” of
as many as 24 depositions leaves insufficient time to
re-notice and take all of the previously scheduled

depositions by the discovery cut-off date. See Doc.185,
Application, p. 2:1-9. BNSF contends it will suffer
extreme prejudice unless it is permitted to engage its own
experts in areas previously covered by FMC’s experts.
See id. BNSF contends Vendo and Floway have rejected
BNSF’s proposal to consolidate BNSF’s RCRA action
with this case and extend the pretrial and trial schedule by
approximately six months despite a pending motion to
dismiss, stay or consolidate in the RCRA action by Vendo
and Floway.8See id. at *1049 p. 2:10-15.
Vendo, VMC, and Floway (together, “Vendo/Floway”)
oppose BNSF’s application and its characterization of the
events surrounding the settlement. See Doc.187, Vendo’s
Opp., filed February 13, 2002; Floway’s Opp.
Vendo/Floway contend they did not “unilaterally” take
depositions off calendar and that no additional time is
necessary to complete the depositions. See Doc. 187 at p.
2:2-7. The February 8, 2002, letter informing BNSF of
the settlement observed that BNSF had noticed no
depositions
and requested that BNSF
inform
Vendo/Floway of the identities of any percipient and
expert witnesses BNSF intends to depose. See Doc.186 at
Exh. A. Vendo/Floway kept on calendar the depositions
of BNSF’s experts and percipient witnesses. See Doc.187
at p. 2:16-19. Vendo/Floway contend other depositions
were taken off calendar “to save litigation costs and
because it appeared that BNSF would cho[o]se to take
only some of the depositions noticed by others and was
not prepared to proceed under the existing schedule.” See
id. at p. 3:1-4.
Vendo contends that during a telephone call with counsel
for Vendo on February 8, 2002, counsel for BNSF,
Deborah Miller, did not object to taking the depositions
off calendar. See id. at p. 3:10-18. Vendo maintains
BNSF changed its position on February 11, 2002,
requesting Vendo/Floway to stipulate to the consolidation
of Vendo/Floway’s third-party claims against BNSF in
the FMC action with Vendo/Floway’s related
counterclaims and defenses against BNSF in the RCRA
action. See id. at p. 3:22-27. According to Vendo, BNSF
requested the consolidated action be set for trial in
November or December 2002. See id. at pp. 3-4.
Vendo/Floway declined to so stipulate, responding that
they wished to proceed with their motion to dismiss in the
BNSF action on the grounds that BNSF’s claims should
have been made as compulsory counterclaims in the
original FMC action and were not timely filed. See id. at
p. 4:1-6.
BNSF’s application suggests it has designated experts for
its defense, but seeks more time to designate experts for
its claims against Vendo/Floway. See Application at p.
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4:3-5 (“... BNSF did not engage experts relating to
Vendo/Floway’s liability, but instead engaged experts to
testify specifically about the BNSF site, the location of a
former ice house.”).
[11] Vendo and VMC filed their third-party complaint
against BNSF on October 11, 2000. See Doc.37. Floway
filed its third-party complaint against BNSF on October
13, 2000. See Doc.38. As a third-party defendant, BNSF
was required to “make ... any counterclaims against the
third-party plaintiff [s] ... as provided in Rule 13.” Fed.R.
Civ.P. 14(a). BNSF filed no counterclaims. Instead,
BNSF filed answers to both Vendo/VMC’s third-party
complaint and Floway’s third-party complaint on
December 1, 2000. See Docs.79-80. It then waited over a
year after the third-party complaints were filed to file
claims in a new and separate action against Weir Floway,
Vendo, and VMC. See Burlington Northern v. Vendo,
CIV F 01-6434 OWW LJO, Doc.1, filed November 13,
2001. BNSF failed to co-designate experts with FMC.
BNSF chose not to participate in the settlement which it
claims resulted in the need to modify the scheduling
order. Diligence, not carelessness, is the basis for granting
relief under Rule 16(b). BNSF was not diligent.
BNSF’s contention that it will be prejudiced focuses on
the experts necessary to *1050 prove Vendo/Floway’s
liability, an issue that is now relevant to this action, which
as consolidated includes compulsory claims against
Vendo/Floway. The issue of modifying the case schedule
now involves more than BNSF’s diligence in complying
with the scheduling order in this case. However, in
determining that the claims in the BNSF should have been
alleged as compulsory counterclaims in the FMC action,
it is true BNSF bears some responsibility for failing to
timely allege its claims.
“ [D]elays are a particularly abhorrent feature of today’s
trial practice. They increase the cost of litigation, to the
detriment of the parties enmeshed in it; they are one factor
causing disrespect for lawyers and the judicial process;
and they fuel the increasing resort to means of
non-judicial dispute resolution. Adherence to reasonable
deadlines is critical to restoring integrity in court
proceedings.” Geiserman, 893 F.2d at 792. Although
BNSF fails to demonstrate good cause for modifying the
scheduling order in this case on the sole ground that it
needs more time to depose and prepare experts, which it
should have engaged and designated for its defense
against Vendo/Floway’s claims, in light of the
consolidation of the BNSF action with the FMC action,
some modification of the schedule is required. BNSF’s
offer to consolidate the BNSF and FMC actions for trial in
November or December of 2002 was rejected by

Vendo/Floway. See Doc.187 at pp. 3-4. Vendo/Floway
bear some responsibility for the scheduling dispute. All
parties were advised by the court at an earlier scheduling
conference that the addition of PRPs would affect the case
schedule. There is no reason BNSF cannot try its
compulsory counterclaims in the FMC action with a
minimum of delay. The contaminants, site, and parties are
the same. The effective consolidation of the cases was
precipitated by Vendo/Floway’s motion to dismiss, stay,
or consolidate in the BNSF action. They must reasonably
expect the outcome they requested in that action,
dismissal with leave to file compulsory counterclaims in
the FMC action, to have some effect on the deadlines in
this case. Vendo/Floway do not demonstrate how a delay
of a few months will prejudice them, while BNSF will be
greatly prejudiced if it is not allowed reasonable time to
prepare its case against Vendo/Floway.
Under the current schedule, the trial date is May 29, 2002.
Pursuant to the schedule announced and accepted by the
parties in open court on April 8, 2002, the new trial date is
October 29, 2002. The last day to file dispositive motions
is August 15, 2002, with a hearing date of September 16,
2002. The expert and overall discovery cut-off date is July
31, 2002. The last day to designate experts is May 20,
2002. The parties shall submit a joint amended schedule
consistent with this decision and conforming to the
requirements outlined by the court at oral argument and
with the Local Rules.

IV. CONCLUSION
1. BNSF’s motion for summary judgment as to
Vendo/Floway’s CERCLA claims for contribution as to
FMC’s response costs is GRANTED.
2. BNSF’s motion for summary judgment as to
Vendo/Floway’s CERCLA claims for contribution
for their own first instance response costs is
DENIED.
3. BNSF’s motion for summary judgment as to
Floway’s claim for contribution under HSAA as to
FMC’s response costs is GRANTED.
4. BNSF’s motion for summary judgment as to
Floway’s HSAA claim for contribution for its own
first instance response costs is DENIED.
5. BNSF’s motion for summary judgment as to
Floway’s state law claim for declaratory relief is
DENIED.
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*1051 6. Vendo’s motion to quash BNSF’s proposed
subpoenas of Plaintiff FMC’s experts is GRANTED.
7. BNSF’s application to modify the scheduling
order on the ground that it needs more time to depose
and prepare experts for its defense against
Vendo/Floway’s claims is DENIED.

and overall discovery cut-off date is July 31, 2002.
The last day to designate experts is May 20, 2002.
The parties shall submit a joint amended schedule
consistent with this decision and conforming to the
requirements outlined by the court at oral argument
and with the Local Rules.
SO ORDERED.

8. In light of the consolidation of the BNSF action
into the FMC action, some modification to the
schedule is required. Pursuant to the schedule
announced and accepted by both parties in open
court, the new trial date is October 29, 2002. The last
day to file dispositive motions is August 15, 2002,
with a hearing date September 16, 2002. The expert

Parallel Citations
54 ERC 1711, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,642

Footnotes
1

In Vendo and VMC’s third-party complaint, the BNSF site is alleged to be “located adjacent to East Church Avenue between
South Railroad Avenue and Sunland Street in Fresno, California at 2950 East Church Avenue, Fresno, California.” Doc.37 at 16.

2

Vendo, VMC, and Floway collectively are referred to variously as “Defendants,” “Third-Party Plaintiffs,” “Third-Party
Complainants,” and “Vendo/Floway.”

3

The paragraphs under BNSF’s fifth claim for relief are incorrectly numbered and should be numbered 49-53. See Burlington, CIV
F 01-6434, Doc.14.

4

The Settlement Agreement provides:
FMC agrees not to aid the prosecution of any pending claim against Defendants by BNSF, or the defense of any pending
claim filed by Defendants against BNSF, whether asserted in the FMC Action, Zacky Action, BNSF Action or a potential
DTSC action, or in future claims which may be asserted by or against BNSF arising out of the matters which are the subject of
this Settlement Agreement, such as by providing attorney work product, expert work product or by waiving conflicts between
a litigant and FMC experts, except to the extent required by legal process or order of the Court....
Doc.199, Exh. A at 15.

5

The decision in Pinal Creek defines “first instance costs” as costs incurred by a “working PRP,” a PRP that actually conducts
cleanup operations, as opposed to one that reimburses a third party for the cost of the latter’s cleanup efforts. See Pinal Creek, 118
F.3d at 1304 n. 6. The decision in City o f Merced defines “administrative response costs” as costs incurred by a party ordered to
respond to a hazardous waste site by a state or federal administrative agency. See City o f Merced, 997 F.Supp. at 1333. First
instance costs include administrative response costs and other costs of cleanup operations directly incurred.

6

Fed.R. Civ.P. 35(b) governs expert reports of physical and mental examinations of parties or persons under the legal control of a
party.
(1) If requested by the party against whom an order is made under Rule 35(a) or the person examined, the party causing the
examination to be made shall deliver to the requesting party a copy of the detailed written report of the examiner setting out
the examiner’s findings, including results of all tests made, diagnoses and conclusions, together with like reports of all earlier
examinations of the same condition. After delivery the party causing the examination shall be entitled upon request to receive
from the party against whom the order is made a like report of any examination, previously or thereafter made, of the same
condition, unless, in the case of a report of examination of a person not a party, the party shows that the party is unable to
obtain it. The court on motion may make an order against a party requiring delivery of a report on such terms as are just, and
if an examiner fails or refuses to make a report the court may exclude the examiner’s testimony if offered at trial.
(3) This subdivision applies to examinations made by agreement of the parties, unless the agreement expressly provides
otherwise. This subdivision does not preclude discovery of a report of an examiner or the taking of a deposition of the
examiner in accordance with the provisions of any other rule.
Fed.R. Civ.P. 35(b).

7

“[I]t is obvious to any sophisticated trial lawyer that in litigation involving multiple defendants there is a likelihood that settlement
will occur before trial. To rely on another party defendant’s witnesses without some formal agreement as to the shared use is to
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invite the consequences that arose ... in the present case.” Wolt, 828 F.Supp. at 1567 (citation omitted).
8

In the BNSF action, Vendo and VMC join Floway’s motion to dismiss or stay, or in the alternative, to consolidate with FMC v.
Vendo, CIV F 00-5295 OWW LJO. See Burlington Northern v. Vendo, CIV F 01-6434 OWW LJO, Doc.21, filed January 24,
2002 (motion); Doc.25, filed February 5, 2002 (joinder). The moving parties contend the underlying facts in BNSF’s claims
against them in the BNSF action are identical to Floway’s third-party claims against BNSF in the FMC action. See id. at p.
1:24-28. Floway argues BNSF’s claims should have been presented as compulsory counterclaims against Floway in the FMC
action and that BNSF’s separate RCRA action should be dismissed or stayed, or at least consolidated. See id. at p. 1:28-p.2:4.
Floway asserts it “will stipulate that BNSF can file its claims as counterclaims in the FMC action.” Id. at p. 5 n. 1. Oral argument
on the motion was heard March 4, 2002. See Doc.24, filed February 1, 2002; Doc.30. The parties were afforded an opportunity to
file supplemental papers. A further hearing on the motion was held April 8, 2002, at the same time as the motions in the FMC
action at issue here. A decision under separate cover grants the motion to consolidate for BNSF to assert its claims as compulsory
counterclaims in the FMC action. See BNSF action, Doc.35.

End of Document
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2007 WL 148764
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
D. New Hampshire.
Johnny L. BRADLEY, et al.
v.
COOPER TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, and Ford
Motor Company.
No. 0 7 -m c-o o 1-JM . | Jan. 11, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Johnny L. Bradley, pro se.

Plaintiffs’ counsel alleges that Monk, to avoid a sanctions
hearing, then proposed dates in early December. Still later
he withdrew the proffered December dates and, by letter
of November 17, 2006, offered a Shapley deposition on
January 5, 9, or 12, 2007. On November 29th plaintiffs’
counsel issued deposition notices for January 12th. On
December 15th Cooper Tire filed an amended expert
designation omitting Dr. Shapley as a testifying expert.
Cooper Tire, presumably through its counsel, informed
plaintiffs that Dr. Shapley would not be produced because
he was now a “consulting expert”. Plaintiffs then
subpoenaed Dr. Shapley for deposition on the 12th.
Cooper Tire, joined by Ford, move to quash the subpoena.
Plaintiffs’ counsel says he cross-designated Shapley but
no such designation appears on the designation of experts
he attached as an exhibit to his objection.

James C. Wheat, Wadleigh Starr & Peters, Manchester,
NH, for Cooper Tire & Rubber Company.
Discussion1

ORDER
JAMES R. MUIRHEAD, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 Defendant Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (“Cooper
Tire”) moves to quash plaintiffs’ subpoenas directed to
Dr. Christopher G. Shapley who, from August 15, 2006
until December 15, 2006, was a designated expert of
Cooper Tire.

Background
Dr. Shapley was designated by Cooper Tire on August
15th. Prior to that he had been deposed as a fact expert in
connection with a claim of spoilation of the tire in
question in the accident. He stated that he never saw the
tire. Also on August 15th a copy of his report was
produced. On August 16th he was offered up for a
deposition on September 29th. Plaintiffs accepted the
offer and noticed Shapley’s deposition for September 29.
By letter of September 22, 2006 Attorney Richard H.
Monk III of Bradley Arant Rose & White LLP, counsel to
Cooper Tire, reneged on his agreement to have Shapley
deposed on the 29th. In fact, neither Bradley Arant
lawyers nor Shapley appeared on September 29, 2006.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(H) permits a
party to depose “any person who has been identified as an
expert whose opinions may be presented at trial.” On the
other hand, a deposition of consulting expert is permitted
“only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of
exceptional circumstances.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B).
The purpose of Rule 26(b)(4)(A) is to permit for
preparation for cross-examination at trial. Shu-Tao Lin v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 48 n. 3 (2d
Cir.1984). The purpose of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is to preclude
“unreasonable access to an opposing party’s diligent trial
preparation.” Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891
(10th Cir.1984). In other words, Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is
intended to protect the attorney’s work product.
The principal question is whether Rule 26(b)(4)(A) or (B)
applies. On this question there is a split authority. A
leading treatise states:
Once a party has designated an
expert witness as someone who
will testify at trial, the later
withdrawal of that designation may
neither prevent the deposition of
that witness by the opposing party
nor the expert’s testimony at trial.
Furthermore, if a party is deemed
to have waived the privilege as to
documents provided to its named
expert, that party may not avoid
production of those documents
under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) by later
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changing the designation of that
expert
from
“testifying”
to
“non-testifying” expert.
*2 6 M oore’s Federal Practice § 26.80[1][a](3d ed.)
Professor Moore cites to House v. Combined Ins. Co. of
America, 168 F.R.D. 238 (N.D.Iowa 1996) and CP Kelco
U.S. Inc. v. Pharmacia Corp., 213 F.R.D. 176
(D.Del.2003). Other cases also support this view. See
Ferguson v. Michael Foods, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 408
(D.Minn.1999); Rubel v. Eli Lilly and Co., 160 F.R.D.
458, 460 (S.D.N.Y.1995).

The contrary line of authority provides that a party may
prohibit discovery from a consulting witness after his
designation as an expert is withdrawn. See Callaway Golf
Co. v. Dunlop Slazenger Group Americas, 2002 WL
1906628 (D.Del. Aug. 14, 2002) (collecting case law);
FMC Corp. v. Vendo Co., 196 F.Supp.2d 1023, 1041-047
(E.D.Cal.2002); Ross v. Burlington Northern R. Co, 136
F.R.D. 638, 638-39 (N.D.Ill.1991); Netjumper Software,
L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 2005 WL 3046271 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
10, 2005).

rationale for my decision to deny the motion to quash.
To suggest that Cooper Tire is or needs to consult with
Mr. Shapley confidentially at this time is a charade.
Shapley’s written opinion has been produced. He has
been deposed as a fact witness and has given a statement.
His opinion is offensive not defensive vis-a-vis Cooper
Tire; that is, he has opined that the Ford Ranger is
defective. He has no opinion on the tire. Cooper Tire is
not prejudiced in any way. Furthermore, the change in
designation at the last minute comes afer two
cancellations by Cooper Tire of agreed upon depositions.
Under the facts of this case I find the House analysis
persuasive. Fairness requires the deposition go forward
and there is no prejudice. Ford’s motion for joinder
(document no. 2) is granted.
Cooper Tire’s motion to reply (document no. 6) is
granted.
The Motion to Quash (document no. 1) is denied.2
SO ORDERED.

Understanding that I do not have time to write an
extensive opinion before counsel must board planes for
New Hampshire, I will nevertheless briefly set forth the
Footnotes
1

While Bradley Arant appears to have breached two “attorneys agreements” such agreements are enforceable under New Hampshire
law only as to attorneys practicing here. As a consequence, this motion cannot be decided on the basis of the enforcement of
attorneys’ agreements.

2

Nothing in this order is intended to indicate any view of the admissibility of Dr. Shapley’s testimony under Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1998) and its progeny.

End of Document
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118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580, 66 USLW 4060, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 282...

S.Ct. 6 5 7
Suprem e Court of th e U nited States
118

[1]

K enneth Lee BAKER and Steven R obert Baker, by
his next friend, Melissa THOMAS, Petitioners,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.
No.

96- 653.

| Argued Oct. 1 5 ,
13, 1998.

199 7.

Full faith and credit clause does not compel state
to substitute statutes of other states for its own
statutes dealing with subject matter concerning
which it is competent to legislate. U.S.C.A.
Const. Art. 4, § 1; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738.

| Decided Jan.

Administrator of estate of motorist, who was killed after
vehicle in which she was riding was involved in head-on
accident and fire, brought products liability action against
vehicle manufacturer, alleging that fuel pump was
defective. After manufacturer failed to comply with
court’s order to produce records of customer complaints
of similar accidents, sanction was imposed by the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri,
Joseph E. Stephens, Jr., Chief Judge, 159 F.R.D. 519,
under which manufacturer’s affirmative defenses were
stricken and it was established, for purposes of action,
that automobile had defective fuel pump and that pump
continued to operate after engine stopped. Following trial,
judgment was entered by the District Court on jury
verdict, awarding administrator $11.3 million in damages.
Manufacturer appealed. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 86 F.3d 811, reversed and
remanded. Writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme
Court, Justice Ginsburg, held that injunction barring
former employee from testifying as witness against car
manufacturer, which was entered by Michigan county
court pursuant to parties’ stipulation in employee’s
wrongful discharge action against manufacturer, did not
reach beyond controversy between employee and
manufacturer to control proceedings elsewhere, and thus,
employee could testify in Missouri products liability
action brought against manufacturer without offense to
full faith and credit clause.
Reversed and remanded.
Justice Scalia filed concurring opinion.
Justice Kennedy concurred and filed opinion in which
Justices O’Connor and Thomas j oined.

States
Full faith and credit in each state to the public
acts, records, etc. of other states

23 Cases that cite this headnote

[2]

Judgment
Adjudications operative in other states
Final judgment in one state, if rendered by court
with adjudicatory authority over subject matter
and persons governed by judgment, qualifies for
recognition throughout the land; in other words,
for claim and issue preclusion (res judicata)
purposes, judgment of rendering state gains
nationwide force. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 1;
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738.
98 Cases that cite this headnote

[3]

Judgment
Adjudications operative in other states
States
Full faith and credit in each state to the public
acts, records, etc. of other states
Court may be guided by forum state’s public
policy in determining law applicable to
controversy; however, there is no roving public
policy exception to full faith and credit due
judgments. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 1; 28
U.S.C.A. § 1738.
51 Cases that cite this headnote

West Headnotes (8)
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[4]

Judgment
Adjudications operative in other states
Full faith and credit clause is one of provisions
incorporated into Constitution by its framers for
purpose of transforming aggregation of
independent, sovereign states into nation;
however, there are no considerations of local
policy or law which could rightly be deemed to
impair force and effect which full faith and
credit clause and Act of Congress require to be
given to money judgment outside state of its
rendition. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 1; 28
U.S.C.A. § 1738.
66 Cases that cite this headnote

[5]

[6]

[7]

Injunction
Mode and Extent of Punishment
Sanctions for violations of injunction are
generally administered by court that issued
injunction.
24 Cases that cite this headnote

[8]

Judgment
Full Faith and Credit

There is no reason why preclusive effects of
adjudication on parties and those in privity with
them, i.e., claim preclusion and issue preclusion
(res judicata and collateral estoppel), should
differ depending solely upon type of relief
sought in civil action, whether relief is monetary
or equitable.

Injunction barring former employee from
testifying as witness against car manufacturer,
which was entered by Michigan county court
pursuant to parties’ stipulation in employee’s
wrongful discharge action against manufacturer,
did not reach beyond controversy between
employee
and manufacturer to control
proceedings elsewhere, and thus, employee
could testify in Missouri products liability action
brought against manufacturer in federal court
without offense to full faith and credit clause.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 1; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738.

44 Cases that cite this headnote

48 Cases that cite this headnote

Judgment
Nature and Extent of Relief Sought or
Granted

Judgment
Adjudications operative in other states
Judgment
Enforcement in other states
Full faith and credit does not mean that states
must adopt practices of other states regarding
time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing
judgments; enforcement measures do not travel
with sister state judgment as preclusive effects
do, but, rather, such measures remain subject to
even-handed control of forum law. U.S.C.A.
Const. Art. 4, § 1; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738.
46 Cases that cite this headnote

**658 Syllabus'
*222 For 15 of the years Ronald Elwell worked for

respondent General Motors Corporation (GM), he was
assigned to a group that studied the performance of GM
vehicles. Elwell’s studies and research concentrated on
vehicular fires, and he frequently aided GM lawyers
defending against product liability actions. The
Elwell-GM employment relationship soured in 1987, and
Elwell agreed to retire after serving as a consultant for
two years. Disagreement surfaced again when Elwell’s
retirement time neared and continued into 1991. That
year, plaintiffs in a Georgia product liability action
deposed Elwell. The Georgia case involved a GM pickup
truck fuel tank that burst into flames just after a collision.
Over GM’s objection, Elwell testified that the truck’s fuel
system was inferior to competing products. This
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testimony differed markedly from testimony Elwell had
given as GM’s in-house expert witness. A month later,
Elwell sued GM in a Michigan County Court, alleging
wrongful discharge and other tort and contract claims.
GM counterclaimed, contending that Elwell had breached
his fiduciary duty to GM. In settlement, GM paid Elwell
an undisclosed sum of money, and the parties stipulated to
the entry of a permanent injunction barring Elwell from
testifying as a witness in any litigation involving GM
without GM’s consent, but providing that the injunction
“shall not operate to interfere with the jurisdiction o f the
Court in ... Georgia [where the litigation involving the
fuel tank was still pending].” (Emphasis added.) In
addition, the parties entered into a separate settlement
agreement, which provided that GM would not institute
contempt or breach-of-contract proceedings against
Elwell for giving subpoenaed testimony in another court
or tribunal. Thereafter, the Bakers, petitioners here,
subpoenaed Elwell to testify in their product liability
action against GM, commenced in Missouri state court
and removed by GM to federal court, in which the Bakers
alleged that a faulty GM fuel pump caused the vehicle fire
that killed their mother. GM asserted that the Michigan
injunction barred Elwell’s testimony. After in camera
review of the Michigan injunction and the settlement
agreement, the District Court allowed the Bakers to
depose Elwell and to call him as a witness at trial, stating
alternative grounds for its ruling: (1) Michigan’s
injunction need not be enforced because blocking
Elwell’s testimony would violate Missouri’s *223 “public
policy,” which shielded from disclosure only privileged or
otherwise confidential information; (2) just as the
injunction could be modified in Michigan, so a court
elsewhere could modify the decree. Elwell testified for
the Bakers at trial, and they were awarded $11.3 million
in damages. The Eighth Circuit reversed, ruling, inter
alia, that Elwell’s testimony should not have been
admitted. Assuming, arguendo, the existence of a public
**659 policy exception to the full faith and credit
command, the court concluded that the District Court
erroneously relied on Missouri’s policy favoring
disclosure of relevant, nonprivileged information, for
Missouri has an “equally strong public policy in favor of
full faith and credit.” The court also determined that the
evidence was insufficient to show that the Michigan court
would modify the injunction barring Elwell’s testimony.

ignore obligations created under the laws or by the
judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them
integral parts of a single nation throughout which a
remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of
right, irrespective of the state of its origin.” Milwaukee
County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277, 56 S.Ct.
229, 234, 80 L.Ed. 220. As to judgments, the full faith
and credit obligation is exacting. A final judgment in one
State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority
over the subject matter and persons governed by the
judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land.
See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516
U.S. 367, 373, 116 S.Ct. 873, 877, 134 L.Ed.2d 6. A court
may be guided by the forum State’s “public policy” in
determining the law applicable to a controversy, see
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-424, 99 S.Ct. 1182,
1188-1190, 59 L.Ed.2d 416, but this Court’s decisions
support no roving “public policy exception” to the full
faith and credit due judgments, see, e.g., Estin v. Estin,
334 U.S. 541, 546, 68 S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 92 L.Ed. 1561. In
assuming the existence of a ubiquitous “public policy
exception” permitting one State to resist recognition of
another’s judgment, the District Court in the Bakers’
action misread this Court’s precedent. Further, the Court
has never placed equity decrees outside the full faith and
credit domain. Equity decrees for the payment of money
have long been considered equivalent to judgments at law
entitled to nationwide recognition. See, e.g., Barber v.
Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 65 S.Ct. 137, 89 L.Ed. 82. There is
no reason why the preclusive effects of an adjudication on
parties and those “in privity” with them, i.e., claim
preclusion and issue preclusion, should differ depending
solely upon the type of relief sought in a civil action. Cf.,
e.g., id., at 87, 65 S.Ct., at 141-142 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Full faith *224 and credit, however, does not
mean that enforcement measures must travel with the
sister state judgment as preclusive effects do; such
measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of
forum law. See McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 13
Pet. 312, 325, 10 L.Ed. 177. Orders commanding action
or inaction have been denied enforcement in a sister State
when they purported to accomplish an official act within
the exclusive province of that other State or interfered
with litigation over which the ordering State had no
authority. See, e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 3,
54 L.Ed. 65. Pp. 663-665.

Held: Elwell may testify in the Missouri action without
offense to the national full faith and credit command. Pp.
663-668.

(b) With these background principles in view, this Court
turns to the dimensions of the order GM relies upon to
stop Elwell’s testimony and asks: What matters did the
Michigan injunction legitimately conclude? Although the
Michigan order is claim preclusive between Elwell and
GM, Michigan’s judgment cannot reach beyond the
Elwell-GM controversy to control proceedings against

(a) The animating purpose of the Constitution’s Full Faith
and Credit Clause “was to alter the status of the several
states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to
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GM brought in other States, by other parties, asserting
claims the merits of which Michigan has not considered.
Michigan has no power over those parties, and no basis
for commanding them to become intervenors in the
Elwell-GM dispute. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755,
761-763, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 2184-2185, 104 L.Ed.2d 835.
Most essentially, although Michigan’s decree could
operate against Elwell to preclude him from volunteering
his testimony in another jurisdiction, a Michigan court
cannot, by entering the injunction to which Elwell and
GM stipulated, dictate to a court in another jurisdiction
that evidence relevant in the Bakers’ case— a controversy
to which Michigan is foreign—shall be inadmissible. This
conclusion creates no general exception to the full faith
and credit command, and surely does not permit a State to
refuse to honor a sister **660 state judgment based on the
forum’s choice of law or policy preferences. This Court
simply recognizes, however, that, just as the mechanisms
for enforcing a judgment do not travel with the judgment
itself for purposes of full faith and credit, and just as one
State’s judgment cannot automatically transfer title to
land in another State, similarly the Michigan decree
cannot determine evidentiary issues in a lawsuit brought
by parties who were not subject to the jurisdiction of the
Michigan court. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
710, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3108-3109, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039. The
language of the consent decree, excluding from its scope
the then-pending Georgia action, is informative. If the
Michigan order would have interfered with the Georgia
court’s jurisdiction, Michigan’s ban would, in the same
way, interfere with the jurisdiction of courts in other
States in similar cases. GM recognized the interference
potential of the consent decree by agreeing not to institute
contempt or breach-of-contract proceedings against
Elwell for giving subpoenaed testimony elsewhere. That
GM ruled out resort to the court that entered the *225
injunction is telling, for injunctions are ordinarily
enforced by the enjoining court, not by a surrogate
tribunal. Pp. 666-668.
86 F.3d 811 (C.A.8 1996), reversed and remanded.

Opinion
Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the authority of one State’s court to
order that a witness’ testimony shall not be heard in any
*226 court of the United States. In settlement of claims
and counterclaims precipitated by the discharge of Ronald
Elwell, a former General Motors Corporation (GM)
engineering analyst, GM paid Elwell an undisclosed sum
of money, and the parties agreed to a permanent
injunction. As stipulated by GM and Elwell and entered
by a Michigan County Court, the injunction prohibited
Elwell from “testifying, without the prior written consent
of [GM], ... as ... a witness of any kind ... in any litigation
already filed, or to be filed in the future, involving [GM]
as an owner, seller, manufacturer and/or designer ....” GM
separately agreed, however, that if Elwell were ordered to
testify by a court or other tribunal, such testimony would
not be actionable as a violation of the Michigan court’s
injunction or the GM-Elwell agreement.
After entry of the stipulated injunction in Michigan,
Elwell was subpoenaed to testify in a product liability
action commenced in Missouri by plaintiffs who were not
involved in the Michigan case. The question presented is
whether the national full faith and credit command bars
Elwell’s testimony in the Missouri case. We hold that
Elwell may testify in the Missouri action without offense
to the full faith and credit requirement.

I

Two lawsuits, initiated by different parties in different
States, gave rise to the full faith and credit issue before us.
One suit involved a severed employment relationship, the
other, a wrongful-death complaint. We describe each
controversy in turn.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS, SOUTER, and
BREYER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, post, p. 668. KENNEDY, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
O’CONNOR and THOMAS, JJ., joined, post, p. 668.

Attorneys and Law Firms
Laurence H. Tribe, Cambridge, MA, for petitioners.
Paul T. Cappuccio, Washington, DC, for respondent.

A
The Suit Between Elwell and General Motors
Ronald Elwell was a GM employee from 1959 until 1989.
For 15 of those years, beginning in 1971, Elwell was
assigned to the Engineering Analysis Group, which
studied the performance of GM vehicles, most
particularly **661 vehicles involved in product liability
litigation. Elwell’s studies and research concentrated on
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vehicular fires. He assisted in *227 improving the
performance of GM products by suggesting changes in
fuel line designs. During the course of his employment,
Elwell frequently aided GM lawyers engaged in
defending GM against product liability actions. Beginning
in 1987, the Elwell-GM employment relationship soured.
GM and Elwell first negotiated an agreement under which
Elwell would retire after serving as a GM consultant for
two years. When the time came for Elwell to retire,
however, disagreement again surfaced and continued into
1991.
In May 1991, plaintiffs in a product liability action
pending in Georgia deposed Elwell. The Georgia case
involved a GM pickup truck fuel tank that burst into
flames just after a collision. During the deposition, and
over the objection of counsel for GM, Elwell gave
testimony that differed markedly from testimony he had
given when serving as an in-house expert witness for GM.
Specifically, Elwell had several times defended the safety
and crashworthiness of the pickup’s fuel system. On
deposition in the Georgia action, however, Elwell testified
that the GM pickup truck fuel system was inferior in
comparison to competing products.
A month later, Elwell sued GM in a Michigan County
Court, alleging wrongful discharge and other tort and
contract claims. GM counterclaimed, contending that
Elwell had breached his fiduciary duty to GM by
disclosing privileged and confidential information and
misappropriating documents. In response to GM’s motion
for a preliminary injunction, and after a hearing, the
Michigan trial court, on November 22, 1991, enjoined
Elwell from
“consulting or discussing with or disclosing to any
person any of General Motors Corporation’s trade
secrets[,] confidential information or matters of
attorney-client work product relating in any manner to
the subject matter of any products liability litigation
whether already filed or [to be] filed in the future which
Ronald Elwell received, had knowledge of, or was
entrusted with during *228 his employments with
General Motors Corporation.” Elwell v. General
Motors Corp., No. 91-115946NZ (Wayne Cty.) (Order
Granting in Part, Denying in Part Injunctive Relief, pp.
1-2), App. 9-10.
In August 1992, GM and Elwell entered into a settlement
under which Elwell received an undisclosed sum of
money. The parties also stipulated to the entry of a
permanent injunction and jointly filed with the Michigan
court both the stipulation and the agreed-upon injunction.
The proposed permanent injunction contained two
proscriptions. The first substantially repeated the terms of

the preliminary injunction; the second comprehensively
enjoined Elwell from
“testifying, without the prior written consent of General
Motors Corporation, either upon deposition or at trial,
as an expert witness, or as a witness of any kind, and
from consulting with attorneys or their agents in any
litigation already filed, or to be filed in the future,
involving General Motors Corporation as an owner,
seller, manufacturer and/or designer of the product(s) in
issue.” Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint and
Granting Permanent Injunction (Wayne Cty., Aug. 26,
1992), p. 2, App. 30.
To this encompassing bar, the consent injunction made an
exception: “[This provision] shall not operate to interfere
with the jurisdiction o f the Court in ... Georgia [where the
litigation involving the fuel tank was still pending].” Ibid.
(emphasis added). No other noninterference provision
appears in the stipulated decree. On August 26, 1992,
with no further hearing, the Michigan court entered the
injunction precisely as tendered by the parties.1
Although the stipulated injunction contained an exception
only for the Georgia action then pending, Elwell and GM
included in their separate settlement agreement a more
general *229 limitation. If a court or other tribunal
ordered Elwell to testify, his testimony would “in no way”
support a GM **662 action for violation of the injunction
or the settlement agreement:
“ ‘It is agreed that [Elwell’s] appearance and testimony,
if any, at hearings on Motions to quash subpoena or at
deposition or trial or other official proceeding, if the
Court or other tribunal so orders, will in no way form a
basis for an action in violation of the Permanent
Injunction or this Agreement.’ ” Settlement Agreement,
p. 10, as quoted in 86 F.3d 811, 820, n. 11 (C.A.8
1996).
In the six years since the Elwell-GM settlement, Elwell
has testified against GM both in Georgia (pursuant to the
exception contained in the injunction) and in several other
jurisdictions in which Elwell has been subpoenaed to
testify.

B

The Suit Between the Bakers and General Motors
Having
described
the
Elwell-GM
employment
termination litigation, we next summarize the
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wrongful-death complaint underlying this case. The
decedent, Beverly Garner, was a front-seat passenger in a
1985 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer involved in a February 1990
Missouri highway accident. The Blazer’s engine caught
fire, and both driver and passenger died. In September
1991, Garner’s sons, Kenneth and Steven Baker,
commenced a wrongful-death product liability action
against GM in a Missouri state court. The Bakers alleged
that a faulty fuel pump in the 1985 Blazer caused the
engine fire that killed their mother. GM removed the case
to federal court on the basis of the parties’ diverse
citizenship. On the merits, GM asserted that the fuel
pump was neither faulty nor the cause of the fire, and that
collision impact injuries alone caused Garner’s death.
The Bakers sought both to depose Elwell and to call him
as a witness at trial. GM objected to Elwell’s appearance
as a deponent or trial witness on the ground that the
Michigan *230 injunction barred his testimony. In
response, the Bakers urged that the Michigan injunction
did not override a Missouri subpoena for Elwell’s
testimony. The Bakers further noted that, under the
Elwell-GM settlement agreement, Elwell could testify if a
court so ordered, and such testimony would not be
actionable as a violation of the Michigan injunction.
After in camera review of the Michigan injunction and
the settlement agreement, the Federal District Court in
Missouri allowed the Bakers to depose Elwell and to call
him as a witness at trial. Responding to GM’s objection,
the District Court stated alternative grounds for its ruling:
(1) Michigan’s injunction need not be enforced because
blocking Elwell’s testimony would violate Missouri’s
“public policy,” which shielded from disclosure only
privileged or otherwise confidential information; (2) just
as the injunction could be modified in Michigan, so a
court elsewhere could modify the decree.
At trial, Elwell testified in support of the Bakers’ claim
that the alleged defect in the fuel pump system
contributed to the postcollision fire. In addition, he
identified and described a
1973 internal GM
memorandum bearing on the risk of fuel-fed engine fires.
Following trial, the jury awarded the Bakers $11.3 million
in damages, and the District Court entered judgment on
the jury’s verdict.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed the District Court’s judgment, ruling, inter alia,
that Elwell’s testimony should not have been admitted. 86
F.3d 811 (1996). Assuming, arguendo, the existence of a
public policy exception to the full faith and credit
command, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
District Court erroneously relied on Missouri’s policy

favoring
disclosure
of
relevant,
nonprivileged
information, see id., at 818-819, for Missouri has an
“equally strong public policy in favor of full faith and
credit,” id., at 819.
The Eighth Circuit also determined that the evidence was
insufficient to show that the Michigan court would
modify *231 the injunction barring Elwell’s testimony.
See id., at 819-820. The Court of Appeals observed that
the Michigan court “has been asked on several occasions
to modify the injunction, [but] has yet to do so,” and
noted that, if the Michigan court did not intend to block
Elwell’s **663 testimony in cases like the Bakers’, “the
injunction would ... have been unnecessary.” Id., at 820.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the full faith and
credit requirement stops the Bakers, who were not parties
to the Michigan proceeding, from obtaining Elwell’s
testimony in their Missouri wrongful-death action. 520
U.S. 1142, 117 S.Ct. 1310, 137 L.Ed.2d 474 (1997).2

II

A
The Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause provides:
“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof.” Art. IV, § 1.3
Pursuant to that Clause, Congress has prescribed:
“Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies
thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith
and credit in every court within the United States and
its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or
*232 usage in the courts of such State, Territory or
Possession from which they are taken.” 28 U.S.C. §
1738.4
The animating purpose of the full faith and credit
command, as this Court explained in Milwaukee County v.
M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 56 S.Ct. 229, 80 L.Ed. 220
(1935),
“was to alter the status of the several states as
independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore
obligations created under the laws or by the judicial
proceedings of the others, and to make them integral
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parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy
upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right,
irrespective of the state of its origin.” Id., at 277, 56
S.Ct., at 234.
See also Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546, 68 S.Ct. 1213,
1217, 92 L.Ed. 1561 (1948) (the Full Faith and Credit
Clause “substituted a command for the earlier principles
of comity and thus basically altered the status of the
States as independent sovereigns”).
[1] [2] Our precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws
(legislative measures and common law) and to judgments.
“In numerous cases this Court has held that credit must be
given to the judgment of another state although the forum
would not be required to entertain the suit on which the
judgment was founded.” Milwaukee County, 296 U.S., at
277, 56 S.Ct., at 234. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
does not compel “a state to substitute the statutes of other
states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter
concerning which it is competent to legislate.” Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm ’n, 306
U.S. 493, 501, 59 S.Ct. 629, 632, 83 L.Ed. 940 (1939);
see Phillips *233 Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,
818-819, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 2977-2978, 86 L.Ed.2d 628
(1985). Regarding judgments, however, the full faith and
credit obligation is exacting. A final judgment in one
State, if rendered by a court **664 with adjudicatory
authority over the subject matter and persons governed by
the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the
land. For claim and issue preclusion (res judicata)
purposes,5 in other words, the judgment of the rendering
State gains nationwide force. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec.
Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373, 116 S.Ct.
873, 878, 134 L.Ed.2d 6 (1996); Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1899,
72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982); see also Reese & Johnson, The
Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 Colum.
L.Rev. 153 (1949).
[3] [4] A court may be guided by the forum State’s “public
policy” in determining the law applicable to a
controversy. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-424,
99 S.Ct. 1182, 1188-1190, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979).6 But
our decisions support no roving “public policy exception”
to the full faith and credit due judgments. See Estin, 334
U.S., at 546, 68 S.Ct., at 1217 (Full Faith and Credit
Clause “ordered submission ... even to hostile policies
reflected in the judgment of another State, because the
practical operation of the federal system, which the
Constitution designed, demanded it.”); Fauntleroy v. Lum,
210 U.S. 230, 237, 28 S.Ct. 641, 643, 52 L.Ed. 1039
(1908) (judgment of Missouri court *234 entitled to full
faith and credit in Mississippi even if Missouri judgment
rested on a misapprehension of Mississippi law). In

assuming the existence of a ubiquitous “public policy
exception” permitting one State to resist recognition of
another State’s judgment, the District Court in the Bakers’
wrongful-death action, see supra, at 662, misread our
precedent. “The full faith and credit clause is one of the
provisions incorporated into the Constitution by its
framers for the purpose of transforming an aggregation of
independent, sovereign States into a nation.” Sherrer v.
Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 1092-1093, 92
L.Ed. 1429 (1948). We are “aware of [no] considerations
of local policy or law which could rightly be deemed to
impair the force and effect which the full faith and credit
clause and the Act of Congress require to be given to [a
money] judgment outside the state of its rendition.”
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438, 64
S.Ct. 208, 213, 88 L.Ed. 149 (1943).
[5] The Court has never placed equity decrees outside the
full faith and credit domain. Equity decrees for the
payment of money have long been considered equivalent
to judgments at law entitled to nationwide recognition.
See, e.g., Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 65 S.Ct. 137, 89
L.Ed. 82 (1944) (unconditional adjudication of
petitioner’s right to recover a sum of money is entitled to
full faith and credit); see also A. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of
Laws § 51, p. 182 (rev. ed.1962) (describing as
“indefensible” the old doctrine that an equity decree,
because it does not “merge” the claim into the judgment,
does not qualify for recognition). We see no reason why
the preclusive effects of an adjudication on parties and
those “in privity” with them, i.e., claim preclusion and
issue preclusion (res judicata and collateral estoppel),7
should differ depending solely upon the type of relief
sought in a civil action. Cf. *235 Barber, 323 U.S., at 87,
65 S.Ct., at 141-142 (Jackson, J., concurring) **665 (Full
Faith and Credit Clause and its implementing statute
speak not of “judgments” but of “ ‘judicial proceedings’
without limitation”); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 2 (providing for
“one form of action to be known as ‘civil action,’ ” in lieu
of discretely labeled actions at law and suits in equity).
[6] Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that
States must adopt the practices of other States regarding
the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing
judgments. Enforcement measures do not travel with the
sister state judgment as preclusive effects do; such
measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of
forum law. See McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 13
Pet. 312, 325, 10 L.Ed. 177 (1839) (judgment may be
enforced only as “laws [of enforcing forum] may
permit”); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws § 99 (1969) (“The local law of the forum
determines the methods by which a judgment of another
state is enforced.”).8
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[7] Orders commanding action or inaction have been
denied enforcement in a sister State when they purported
to accomplish an official act within the exclusive province
of that other State or interfered with litigation over which
the ordering State had no authority. Thus, a sister State’s
decree concerning land ownership in another State has
been held ineffective to transfer title, see Fall v. Eastin,
215 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 3, 54 L.Ed. 65 (1909), although such
a decree may indeed preclusively adjudicate the rights and
obligations running between the parties to the foreign
litigation, see, e.g., Robertson v. Howard, 229 U.S. 254,
261, 33 S.Ct. 854, 856, 57 L.Ed. 1174 (1913) (“[I]t may
not be doubted that a *236 court of equity in one State in
a proper case could compel a defendant before it to
convey property situated in another State.”). And antisuit
injunctions regarding litigation elsewhere, even if
compatible with due process as a direction constraining
parties to the decree, see Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S.
107, 10 S.Ct. 269, 33 L.Ed. 538 (1890), in fact have not
controlled the second court’s actions regarding litigation
in that court. See, e.g., James v. Grand Trunk Western R.
Co., 14 Ill.2d 356, 372, 152 N.E.2d 858, 867 (1958); see
also E. Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws § 24.21, p. 981
(2d ed.1992) (observing that antisuit injunction “does not
address, and thus has no preclusive effect on, the merits of
the litigation [in the second forum]”).9 Sanctions for
violations of an injunction, in any event, are generally
administered by the court that issued the injunction. See,
e.g., Stiller v. Hardman, 324 F.2d 626, 628 (C.A.2 1963)
(nonrendition forum enforces monetary relief portion of a
judgment but leaves enforcement of injunctive portion to
rendition forum).

**666 *237 B

With these background principles in view, we turn to the
dimensions of the order GM relies upon to stop Elwell’s
testimony. Specifically, we take up the question: What
matters did the Michigan injunction legitimately
conclude?
As earlier recounted, see supra, at 661-662, the parties
before the Michigan County Court, Elwell and GM,
submitted an agreed-upon injunction, which the presiding
judge signed.10 While no issue was joined, expressly
litigated, and determined in the Michigan proceeding,11
that order is claim preclusive between Elwell and GM.
Elwell’s claim for *238 wrongful discharge and his
related contract and tort claims have “merged in the
judgment,” and he cannot sue again to recover more. See
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, n. 5,

99 S.Ct. 645, 649, n. 5, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (“Under
the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a
prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or
their privies based on the same cause of action.”); see also
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 17 (1980).
Similarly, GM cannot sue Elwell elsewhere on the
counterclaim GM asserted in Michigan. See id., § 23,
Comment a, p. 194 (“A defendant who interposes a
counterclaim is, in substance, a plaintiff, as far as the
counterclaim is concerned, and the plaintiff is, in
substance, a defendant.”).
[8] Michigan’s judgment, however, cannot reach beyond
the Elwell-GM controversy to control proceedings
against GM brought in other States, by other parties,
asserting claims the merits of which Michigan has not
considered. Michigan has no power over those parties,
and no basis for commanding them to become intervenors
in the Elwell-GM dispute. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S.
755, 761-763, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 2184-2185, 104 L.Ed.2d
835 (1989). Most essentially, Michigan lacks authority to
control courts elsewhere by precluding them, in actions
brought by strangers to the Michigan litigation, from
determining for themselves what witnesses are competent
to testify and what evidence is relevant and admissible in
their search for the truth. See Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws §§ 137-139 (1969 and rev.1988)
(forum’s own law governs witness competence and
grounds for excluding evidence); cf. Societe Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court fo r
Southern Dist. o f Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544, n. 29, 107
S.Ct. 2542, 2556, n. 29, 96 L.Ed.2d 461 (1987) (foreign
“blocking statute” barring disclosure of certain
information “do[es] not deprive an American court of the
power to order a party subject to its jurisdiction to
produce [the information]”); United States v. First Nat.
City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (C.A.2 1968) (New York bank
may not refuse to produce records of its German branch,
even **667 though doing so might subject the bank to
civil liability under German law).
*239 As the District Court recognized, Michigan’s decree
could operate against Elwell to preclude him from
volunteering his testimony. See App. to Pet. for Cert.
26a-27a. But a Michigan court cannot, by entering the
injunction to which Elwell and GM stipulated, dictate to a
court in another jurisdiction that evidence relevant in the
Bakers’ case— a controversy to which Michigan is
foreign—shall be inadmissible. This conclusion creates
no general exception to the full faith and credit command,
and surely does not permit a State to refuse to honor a
sister state judgment based on the forum’s choice of law
or policy preferences. Rather, we simply recognize that,
just as the mechanisms for enforcing a judgment do not
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travel with the judgment itself for purposes of full faith
and credit, see McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 13 Pet.
312, 10 L.Ed. 177 (1839); see also Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws § 99, and just as one State’s judgment
cannot automatically transfer title to land in another State,
see Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 3, 54 L.Ed. 65
(1909), similarly the Michigan decree cannot determine
evidentiary issues in a lawsuit brought by parties who
were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Michigan court.
Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S.Ct.
3090, 3108-3109, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (“[Exceptions
to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly
created nor expansively construed, for they are in
derogation of the search for truth.”).12
*240 The language of the consent decree is informative in
this regard. Excluding the then-pending Georgia action
from the ban on testimony by Elwell without GM’s
permission, the decree provides that it “shall not operate
to interfere with the jurisdiction of the Court in ...
Georgia.” Elwell v. General Motors Corp., No.
91-115946NZ
(Wayne Cty.) (Order Dismissing
Plaintiff’s Complaint and Granting Permanent Injunction,
p. 2), App. 30 (emphasis added). But if the Michigan
order, extended to the Georgia case, would have
“interfer[ed] with the jurisdiction” of the Georgia court,
Michigan’s ban would, in the same way, “interfere with
the jurisdiction” of courts in other States in cases similar
to the one pending in Georgia.
In line with its recognition of the interference potential of
the consent decree, GM provided in the settlement
agreement that, if another court ordered Elwell to testify,
his testimony would “in no way” render him vulnerable to
suit in Michigan for violation of the injunction or
agreement. See 86 F.3d, at 815, 820, n. 11. The Eighth
Circuit regarded this settlement agreement provision as
merely a concession by GM that “some courts might fail
to extend full faith and credit to the [Michigan]
injunction.” Ibid. As we have explained, however,
Michigan’s power does not reach into a Missouri
courtroom to displace the forum’s own determination
whether to admit or exclude evidence relevant in the
Bakers’ wrongful-death case before it. In that light, we
see no altruism in GM’s agreement not to institute
contempt or breach-of-contract proceedings against
Elwell in Michigan for giving subpoenaed testimony
elsewhere. Rather, we find it telling that GM ruled out
resort to the court that entered the injunction, for
injunctions are ordinarily enforced by the enjoining court,
not by a surrogate tribunal. See supra, at 665.
In sum, Michigan has no authority to shield a witness
from another jurisdiction’s subpoena power in a case

involving persons and causes outside Michigan’s
governance. Recognition, *241 under full faith and credit,
is owed to dispositions Michigan has authority to order.
But a Michigan decree cannot **668 command obedience
elsewhere on a matter the Michigan court lacks authority
to resolve. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448
U.S. 261, 282-283, 100 S.Ct. 2647, 2661, 65 L.Ed.2d 757
(1980) (plurality opinion) (“Full faith and credit must be
given to [a] determination that [a State’s tribunal] had the
authority to make; but by a parity of reasoning, full faith
and credit need not be given to determinations that it had
no power to make.”).

***
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.

Justice SCALIA, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that enforcement measures do not
travel with sister-state judgments as preclusive effects do.
Ante, at 665. It has long been established that “the
judgment of a state Court cannot be enforced out of the
state by an execution issued within it.” McElmoyle ex rel.
Bailey v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 325, 10 L.Ed. 177 (1839).
To recite that principle is to decide this case.
General Motors asked a District Court in Missouri to
enforce a Michigan injunction. The Missouri court was no
more obliged to enforce the Michigan injunction by
preventing Elwell from presenting his testimony than it
was obliged to enforce it by holding Elwell in contempt.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause “ ‘did not make the
judgments of other States domestic judgments to all
intents and purposes, but only gave a general validity,
faith, and credit to them, as evidence. No execution can
issue upon such judgments without a new suit in the
tribunals of other States.’ ” Thompson v. Whitman, 18
Wall. 457, 462-463, 21 L.Ed. 897 (1873) (emphasis *242
added) (quoting J. Story, Conflict of Laws § 609 (7th ed.
1872)). A judgment or decree of one State, to be sure,
may be grounds for an action (or a defense to one) in
another. But the Clause and its implementing statute
“establish a rule of evidence, rather than of jurisdiction.
While they make the record of a judgment, rendered
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after due notice in one State, conclusive evidence in the
courts of another State, or of the United States, of the
matter adjudged, they do not affect the jurisdiction,
either of the court in which the judgment is rendered, or
of the court in which it is offered in evidence.
Judgments recovered in one State of the Union, when
proved in the courts of another government, whether
state or national, within the United States, differ from
judgments recovered in a foreign country in no other
respect than in not being reexaminable on their merits,
nor impeachable for fraud in obtaining them, if
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and
of the parties.” Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S.
265, 291-292, 8 S.Ct. 1370, 1375, 32 L.Ed. 239 (1888)
(citation omitted).

faith and credit forbids the second State to question a
judgment on these grounds. There can be little doubt of
this proposition. We have often recognized the second
State’s obligation to give effect to another State’s
judgments even when the law underlying those judgments
contravenes the public policy of the second State. See,
e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 544-546, 68 S.Ct. 1213,
1216-1217, 92 L.Ed. 1561 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer,
334 U.S. 343, 354-355, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 1092-1093, 92
L.Ed. 1429 (1948); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320
U.S. 430, 438, 64 S.Ct. 208, 213, 88 L.Ed. 149 (1943);
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294-295, 63
S.Ct. 207, 210-212, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942); Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237, 28 S.Ct. 641, 643, 52 L.Ed. 1039
(1908).

The judgment that General Motors obtained in Michigan “
‘does not carry with it, into another State, the efficacy of a
judgment upon property or persons, to be enforced by
execution. To give it the force of a judgment in another
State, it must be made a judgment there; and can only be
executed in the latter as its laws may permit. ’ ” Lynde v.
Lynde, 181 U.S. 183, 187, 21 S.Ct. 555, 556, 45 L.Ed.
810 (1901) (quoting McElmoyle, supra, 13 Pet. at 325).
See, e.g., Watts v. Waddle, 6 Pet. 389, 392, 8 L.Ed. 437
(1832), a case involving a suit to obtain an equity decree
ordering the conveyance of land, duplicating such a
decree already issued in another State.

My concern is that the majority, having stated the
principle, proceeds to disregard it by announcing two
broad exceptions. First, the majority would allow courts
outside the issuing State to decline to enforce those
judgments “purporting] to accomplish an official act
within the exclusive province of [a sister] State.” Ante, at
665. Second, the basic rule of full faith and credit is said
not to cover injunctions “interfer[ing] with litigation over
which the ordering State had no authority.” Ibid., at 665.
The exceptions the majority recognizes are neither
consistent with its rejection of a public policy exception
to full faith and credit nor in accord with established rules
implementing the Full Faith and Credit Clause. As
employed to resolve this case, furthermore, the *244
exceptions to full faith and credit have a potential for
disrupting judgments, and this ought to give us
considerable pause.

Because neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause nor its
implementing statute requires Missouri to execute the
injunction issued by the courts of Michigan, I concur in
the judgment.

*243 Justice KENNEDY, with whom Justice
O’CONNOR and Justice THOMAS join, concurring in
the judgment.
I concur in the judgment. In my view the case is
controlled by well-settled full faith and credit principles
which render the majority’s extended analysis
unnecessary and, with **669 all due respect, problematic
in some degree. This separate opinion explains my
approach.

I
The majority, of course, is correct to hold that when a
judgment is presented to the courts of a second State it
may not be denied enforcement based upon some
disagreement with the laws of the State of rendition. Full

Our decisions have been careful not to foreclose all effect
for the types of injunctions the majority would place
outside the ambit of full faith and credit. These authorities
seem to be disregarded by today’s holding. For example,
the majority chooses to discuss the extent to which courts
may compel the conveyance of property in other
jurisdictions. That subject has proved to be quite difficult.
Some of our cases uphold actions by state courts affecting
land outside their territorial reach. E.g., Robertson v.
Howard, 229 U.S. 254, 261, 33 S.Ct. 854, 856, 57 L.Ed.
1174 (1913) (“[I]t may not be doubted that a court of
equity in one State in a proper case could compel a
defendant before it to convey property situated in another
State”); see also Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87,
105-106, 11 S.Ct. 960, 966, 35 L.Ed. 640 (1891); Muller
v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444, 449, 24 L.Ed. 207 (1876); Massie
v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148, 3 L.Ed. 181 (1810). See generally
11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2945, pp. 98-102
(2d ed.1995); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §
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102, Comment d (1969); Reese, Full Faith and Credit to
Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 Iowa L.Rev. 183, 199-200
(1957). Nor have we undertaken before today to announce
an exception which denies full faith and credit based on
the principle that the prior judgment interferes with
litigation pending in another jurisdiction. See, e.g., Cole v.
Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 116-117, 10 S.Ct. 269, 272,
33 L.Ed. 538 (1890); Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U.S.
115, 122, 35 S.Ct. 255, 257, 59 L.Ed. 492 (1915); cf.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 51-52,
62 S.Ct. 6, 9-10, 86 L.Ed. 28 (1941); Donovan v. Dallas,
377 U.S. 408, 415-418, 84 S.Ct. 1579, 1583-1585, 12
L.Ed.2d 409 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally
Reese, supra, at 198 (“[T]he Supreme Court has not yet
had occasion to determine whether [the practice of
ignoring antisuit injunctions] is consistent with full faith
and credit”). As a general matter, there is disagreement
among the state courts as to their duty to recognize
decrees enjoining proceedings in other courts. See
Schopler, Extraterritorial recognition of, and propriety of
counterinjunction against, injunction *245 against actions
in courts of other states, 74 A.L.R.2d 831-834, §§ 3-4
(1960 and Supp.1986).
**670 Subjects which are at once so fundamental and so
delicate as these ought to be addressed only in a case
necessarily requiring their discussion, and even then with
caution lest we announce rules which will not be sound in
later application. See Restatement, supra, § 102,
Comment c (“The Supreme Court of the United States has
not had occasion to determine whether full faith and
credit requires a State of the United States to enforce a
valid judgment of a sister State that orders the doing of an
act other than the payment of money or that enjoins the
doing of an act”); E. Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws §
24.9, p. 964 (2d ed.1992) (noting that interstate
recognition of equity decrees other than divorce decrees
and decrees ordering payment of money “has been a
matter of some uncertainty”). We might be required to
hold, if some future case raises the issue, that an
otherwise valid judgment cannot intrude upon essential
processes of courts outside the issuing State in certain
narrow circumstances, but we need not announce or
define that principle here. Even if some qualification of
full faith and credit were required where the judicial
processes of a second State are sought to be controlled in
their procedural and institutional aspects, the Court’s
discussion does not provide sufficient guidance on how
this exception should be construed in light of our
precedents. The majority’s broad review of these matters
does not articulate the rationale underlying its
conclusions. In the absence of more elaboration, it is
unclear what it is about the particular injunction here that
renders it undeserving of full faith and credit. The Court’s

reliance upon unidentified principles to justify omitting
certain types of injunctions from the doctrine’s
application leaves its decision in uneasy tension with its
own rejection of a broad public policy exception to full
faith and credit.
The following example illustrates the uncertainty
surrounding the majority’s approach. Suppose the Bakers
had anticipated the need for Elwell’s testimony in
Missouri and *246 had appeared in a Michigan court to
litigate the privileged character of the testimony it sought
to elicit. Assume further the law on privilege were the
same in both jurisdictions. If Elwell, General Motors
(GM), and the Bakers were before the Michigan court and
Michigan law gave its own injunction preclusive effect,
the Bakers could not relitigate the point, if general
principles of issue preclusion control. Perhaps the
argument can be made, as the majority appears to say, that
the integrity of Missouri’s judicial processes demands a
rule allowing relitigation of the issue; but, for the reasons
given below, we need not confront this interesting
question.
In any event, the rule would be an exception. Full faith
and credit requires courts to do more than provide for
direct enforcement of the judgments issued by other
States. It also “requires federal courts to give the same
preclusive effect to state court judgments that those
judgments would be given in the courts of the State from
which the judgments emerged.” Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889,
72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982); accord, Parsons Steel, Inc. v.
First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525, 106 S.Ct. 768,
772-773, 88 L.Ed.2d 877 (1986); Marrese v. American
Academy o f Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373,
380-381, 384, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 1331-1332, 1334, 84
L.Ed.2d 274 (1985); Migra v. Warren City School Dist.
Bd. o f Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 896, 79
L.Ed.2d 56 (1984); Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 313,
103 S.Ct. 2368, 2373, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415-416, 66
L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). Through full faith and credit, “the
local doctrines of res judicata, speaking generally,
become a part of national jurisprudence....” Riley v. New
York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349, 62 S.Ct. 608, 612, 86
L.Ed. 885 (1942). And whether or not an injunction is
enforceable in another State on its own terms, the courts
of a second State are required to honor its issue preclusive
effects. See Parsons Steel, supra; 18 Charles A. Wright,
Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 4467, p. 635 (1981).
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II
In the case before us, of course, the Bakers were neither
parties to the earlier litigation nor subject to the
jurisdiction *247 of the Michigan courts. The majority
pays scant **671 attention to this circumstance, which
becomes critical. The beginning point of full faith and
credit analysis requires a determination of the effect the
judgment has in the courts of the issuing State. In our
most recent full faith and credit cases, we have said that
determining the force and effect of a judgment should be
the first step in our analysis. Matsushita Elec. Industrial
Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 375, 116 S.Ct. 873, 878, 134
L.Ed.2d 6 (1996); Marrese, supra, at 381-382, 105 S.Ct.,
at 1332-1333; Haring, supra, at 314, 103 S.Ct., at
2373-2374; see also Kremer, supra, at 466-467, 102
S.Ct., at 1889-1890. “If the state courts would not give
preclusive effect to the prior judgment, ‘the courts of the
United States can accord it no greater efficacy’ under §
1738.” Haring, supra, at 313, n. 6, 103 S.Ct., at 2373, n. 6
(quoting Union & Planters’ Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S.
71, 75, 23 S.Ct. 604, 606, 47 L.Ed. 712 (1903)); accord,
Marrese, 470 U.S., at 384, 105 S.Ct., at 1334. A
conclusion that the issuing State would not give the prior
judgment preclusive effect ends the inquiry, making it
unnecessary to determine the existence of any exceptions
to full faith and credit. Id., at 383, 386, 105 S.Ct., at 1333,
1334-1335. We cannot decline to inquire into these
state-law questions when the inquiry will obviate new
extensions or exceptions to full faith and credit. See
Haring, supra, at 314, n. 8, 103 S.Ct., at 2374, n. 8.
If we honor the undoubted principle that courts need give
a prior judgment no more force or effect that the issuing
State gives it, the case before us is resolved. Here the
Court of Appeals and both parties in their arguments
before our Court seemed to embrace the assumption that
Michigan would apply the full force of its judgment to the
Bakers. Michigan law does not appear to support the
assumption.
The simple fact is that the Bakers were not parties to the
Michigan proceedings, and nothing indicates Michigan
would make the novel assertion that its earlier injunction
binds the Bakers or any other party not then before it or
subject to its jurisdiction. For collateral estoppel to apply
under Michigan law, “ ‘the same parties must have had a
full opportunity to litigate the issue, and there must be
mutuality of estoppel.’ ” *248 Nummer v. Treasury Dept.,
448 Mich. 534, 542, 533 N.W.2d 250, 253 (quoting
Storey v. Meijer, Inc., 431 Mich. 368, 373, n. 3, 429
N.W.2d 169, 171, n. 3 (1988)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 964,
116 S.Ct. 418, 133 L.Ed.2d 335 (1995). “Although there
is a trend in modern law to abolish the requirement of
mutuality, this Court reaffirmed its commitment to that

doctrine in 1971 in [Howell v. Vito’s Trucking &
Excavating Co., 386 Mich. 37, 191 N.W.2d 313].
Mutuality of estoppel remains the law in this
jurisdiction....” Lichon v. American Universal Ins. Co.,
435 Mich. 408, 427-428, 459 N.W.2d 288, 298 (1990)
(footnote omitted). Since the Bakers were not parties to
the Michigan proceedings and had no opportunity to
litigate any of the issues presented, it appears that
Michigan law would not treat them as bound by the
judgment. The majority cites no authority to the contrary.
It makes no difference that the judgment in question is an
injunction. The Michigan Supreme Court has twice
rejected arguments that injunctions have preclusive effect
in later litigation, relying in no small part on the fact that
the persons against whom preclusion is asserted were not
parties to the earlier litigation. Bacon v. Walden, 186
Mich. 139, 144, 152 N.W. 1061, 1063 (1915) (“Defendant
was not a party to [the prior injunctive] suit and was not
as a matter of law affected or bound by the decree
rendered in it”); Detroit v. Detroit Ry., 134 Mich. 11, 15,
95 N.W. 992, 993 (1903) (“[T]he fact that defendant was
in no way a party to the record is sufficient answer to the
contention that the holding of the circuit judge in that
[prior injunctive] case is a controlling determination of
the present”).
The opinion of the Court of Appeals suggests the
Michigan court which issued the injunction intended to
bind third parties in litigation in other States. 86 F.3d 811,
820 (C.A.8 1996). The question, however, is not what a
trial court intended in a particular case but the preclusive
effect its judgment has under the controlling legal
principles of its own State. Full faith and credit measures
the effect of a judgment by all the laws of the rendering
State, including authoritative *249 rulings of that State’s
highest court on **672 questions of issue preclusion and
jurisdiction over third parties. See Kremer, 456 U.S., at
466, 102 S.Ct., at 1889-1890; Matsushita, supra, at 375,
116 S.Ct. at 878.
The fact that other Michigan trial courts refused to
reconsider the injunction but instead required litigants to
return to the trial court which issued it in the first place
sheds little light on the substance of issue preclusion law
in Michigan. In construing state law, we must determine
how the highest court of the State would decide an issue.
See King v. Order o f United Commercial Travelers o f
America, 333 U.S. 153, 160-161, 68 S.Ct. 488, 492-493,
92 L.Ed. 608 (1948); Commissioner v. Estate o f Bosch,
387 U.S. 456, 464-465, 87 S.Ct. 1776, 1782-1783, 18
L.Ed.2d 886 (1967).
In this case, moreover, those Michigan trial courts which
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declined to modify the injunction did not appear to base
their rulings on preclusion law. They relied instead on
Michigan Court Rule 2.613(B), which directs parties
wishing to modify an injunction to present their
arguments to the court which entered it. See Brief for
Respondent 10. Rule 2.613(B) is a procedural rule based
on comity concerns, not a preclusion rule. It reflects
Michigan’s determination that, within the State of
Michigan itself, respect for the issuing court and judicial
resources are best preserved by allowing the issuing court
to determine whether the injunction should apply to
further proceedings. As a procedural rule, it is not binding
on courts of another State by virtue of full faith and credit.
See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722, 108 S.Ct.
2117, 2122, 100 L.Ed.2d 743 (1988) (“[A] State may
apply its own procedural rules to actions litigated in its
courts”). The Bakers have never appeared in a Michigan
court, and full faith and credit cannot be used to force
them to subject themselves to Michigan’s jurisdiction. See
Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394, 403, 37 S.Ct.
152, 155-156, 61 L.Ed. 386 (1917) ( “And to assume that
a party resident beyond the confines of a State is required
to come within its borders and submit his personal
controversy to its tribunals upon receiving notice of the
suit at the place of his residence is a futile attempt *250 to
extend the authority and control of a State beyond its own
territory”).
Under Michigan law, the burden of persuasion rests on
the party raising preclusion as a defense. See Detroit v.
Qualls, 434 Mich. 340, 357-358, 454 N.W.2d 374, 383
(1990); E & G Finance Co. v. Simms, 362 Mich. 592,
596, 107 N.W.2d 911, 914 (1961). In light of these
doctrines and the absence of contrary authority, one
cannot conclude that GM has carried its burden of
showing that Michigan courts would bind the Bakers to
the terms of the earlier injunction prohibiting Elwell from
testifying. The result should come as no surprise. It is
most unlikely that Michigan would give a judgment
preclusive effect against a person who was not a party to
the proceeding in which it was entered or who was not
otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the issuing court.
See Kremer, supra, at 480-481, 102 S.Ct., at 1897 (“We
have previously recognized that the judicially created
doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply when the

party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not
have a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate the claim or
issue”).
Although inconsistent on this point, GM disavows its
desire to issue preclude the Bakers, claiming “the only
party being ‘bound’ to the injunction is Elwell.” Brief for
Respondent 39. This is difficult to accept because in
assessing the preclusive reach of a judgment we look to
its practical effect. E.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755,
765, n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 2186 n. 6, 104 L.Ed.2d 835
(1989); cf., e.g., Donovan v. Dallas, 377 U.S., at 413, 84
S.Ct., at 1582 (“[I]t does not matter that the prohibition
here was addressed to the parties rather than to the federal
court itself’); Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas &
Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9, 60 S.Ct. 215, 218, 84 L.Ed. 537
(1940) (“That the injunction was a restraint of the parties
and was not formally directed against the state court itself
is immaterial”). Despite its disclaimer, GM seeks to alter
the course of the suit between it and the Bakers by
preventing the Bakers from litigating the admissibility of
Elwell’s testimony. Furthermore, even were we to accept
GM’s argument that *251 the Bakers are essentially
irrelevant to this dispute, GM’s argument **673 is flawed
on its own terms. Elwell, in the present litigation, does not
seek to relitigate anything; he is a witness, not a party.
In all events, determining as a threshold matter the extent
to which Michigan law gives preclusive effect to the
injunction eliminates the need to decide whether full faith
and credit applies to equitable decrees as a general matter
or the extent to which the general rules of full faith and
credit are subject to exceptions. Michigan law would not
seek to bind the Bakers to the injunction and that suffices
to resolve the case. For these reasons, I concur in the
judgment.

Parallel Citations
118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580, 66 USLW 4060, 98 Cal.
Daily Op. Serv. 282, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 383, 98 CJ
C.A.R. 163, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 289

Footnotes
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience
of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.
1

A judge new to the case, not the judge who conducted a hearing at the preliminary injunction stage, presided at the settlement stage
and entered the permanent injunction.

2

In conflict with the Eighth Circuit, many other lower courts have permitted Elwell to testify as to nonprivileged and
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non-trade-secret matters. See Addendum to Brief for Petitioners (citing cases).
3

Predating the Constitution, the Articles of Confederation contained a provision of the same order: “Full faith and credit shall be
given in each of these States to the records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State.”
Articles of Confederation, Art. IV. For a concise history of full faith and credit, see Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s
Clause of the Constitution, 45 Colum. L.Rev. 1 (1945).

4

The first Congress enacted the original full faith and credit statute in May 1790. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738) (“And the said records and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have
such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state
from whence the said records are or shall be taken.”). Although the text of the statute has been revised since then, the command for
full faith and credit to judgments has remained constant.

5

“Res judicata” is the term traditionally used to describe two discrete effects: (1) what we now call claim preclusion (a valid final
adjudication of a claim precludes a second action on that claim or any part of it), see Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 17-19
(1982); and (2) issue preclusion, long called “collateral estoppel” (an issue of fact or law, actually litigated and resolved by a valid
final judgment, binds the parties in a subsequent action, whether on the same or a different claim), see id., § 27. On use of the plain
English terms claim and issue preclusion in lieu of res judicata and collateral estoppel, see Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd.
o f Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 77, n. 1, 104 S.Ct. 892, 894, n. 1, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984).

6

See also Paulsen & Sovern, “Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws, 56 Colum. L.Rev. 969, 980-981 (1956) (noting traditional but
dubious use of the term “public policy” to obscure “an assertion of the forum’s right to have its [own] law applied to the
[controversy] because of the forum’s relationship to it”).

7

See supra, at 664, n. 5; 18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4467, p.
635 (1981) (Although “[a] second state need not directly enforce an injunction entered by another state ... [it] may often be
required to honor the issue preclusion effects of the first judgment.”).

8

Congress has provided for the interdistrict registration of federal-court judgments for the recovery of money or property. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1963 (upon registration, the judgment “shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the district where
registered and may be enforced in like manner”). A similar interstate registration procedure is effective in most States, as a result
of widespread adoption of the Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 13 U.L.A. 149 (1986). See id., at 13
(Supp.1997) (Table) (listing adoptions in 44 States and the District of Columbia).

9

This Court has held it impermissible for a state court to enjoin a party from proceeding in a federal court, see Donovan v. Dallas,
377 U.S. 408, 84 S.Ct. 1579, 12 L.Ed.2d 409 (1964), but has not yet ruled on the credit due to a state- court injunction barring a
party from maintaining litigation in another State, see Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last-in-Time
Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 Harv. L.Rev. 798, 823 (1969); see also Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees,
42 Iowa L.Rev. 183, 198 (1957) (urging that, although this Court “has not yet had occasion to determine [the issue], .... full faith
and credit does not require dismissal of an action whose prosecution has been enjoined,” for to hold otherwise “would mean in
effect that the courts of one state can control what goes on in the courts of another”). State courts that have dealt with the question
have, in the main, regarded antisuit injunctions as outside the full faith and credit ambit. See Ginsburg, 82 Haw.L.Rev. at 823, and
n. 99; see also id., at 828-829 (“The current state of the law, permitting [an antisuit] injunction to issue but not compelling any
deference outside the rendering state, may be the most reasonable compromise between ... extreme alternatives,” i.e., “[a] general
rule of respect for antisuit injunctions running between state courts,” or “a general rule denying the states authority to issue
injunctions directed at proceedings in other states”).

10

GM emphasizes that a key factor warranting the injunction was Elwell’s inability to assure that any testimony he might give would
steer clear of knowledge he gained from protected confidential communications. See Brief for Respondent 28-29; see also id., at
32 (contending that Elwell’s testimony “is pervasively and uncontrollably leavened with General Motors’ privileged information”).
Petitioners assert, and GM does not dispute, however, that at no point during Elwell’s testimony in the Bakers’ wrongful-death
action did GM object to any question or answer on the grounds of attorney-client, attorney-work product, or trade secrets privilege.
See Brief for Petitioners 9.

11

In no event, we have observed, can issue preclusion be invoked against one who did not participate in the prior adjudication. See
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University o f Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1443, 28 L.Ed.2d 788
(1971); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40, 61 S.Ct. 115, 117, 85 L.Ed. 22 (1940). Thus, Justice KENNEDY emphasizes the
obvious in noting that the Michigan judgment has no preclusive effect on the Bakers, for they were not parties to the Michigan
litigation. See post, at 670-671. Such an observation misses the thrust of GM’s argument. GM readily acknowledges “the
commonplace rule that a person may not be bound by a judgment in personam in a case to which he was not made a party.” Brief
for Respondent 35. But, GM adds, the Michigan decree does not bind the Bakers; it binds Elwell only. Most forcibly, GM insists
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that the Bakers cannot object to the binding effect GM seeks for the Michigan judgment because the Bakers have no
constitutionally protected interest in obtaining the testimony of a particular witness. See id., at 39 (“[T]he only party being ‘bound’
to the injunction is Elwell, and holding him to his legal obligations does not violate anyone’s due process rights.”). Given this
argument, it is clear that issue preclusion principles, standing alone, cannot resolve the controversy GM presents.
12

Justice KENNEDY inexplicably reads into our decision a sweeping exception to full faith and credit based solely on “the integrity
of Missouri’s judicial processes.” Post, at 670. The Michigan judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit, we have endeavored
to make plain, because it impermissibly interferes with Missouri’s control of litigation brought by parties who were not before the
Michigan court. Thus, Justice KENNEDY’s hypothetical, see ibid., misses the mark. If the Bakers had been parties to the
Michigan proceedings and had actually litigated the privileged character of Elwell’s testimony, the Bakers would of course be
precluded from relitigating that issue in Missouri. See Cromwell v. County o f Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 354, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876)
(“[Determination of a question directly involved in one action is conclusive as to that question in a second suit between the same
parties....”); see also supra, at 664, n. 5.

End of Document
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machine’s manufacturer, and thus was entitled
to the conditional or qualified protection for the
“work product” of an attorney. West’s
Ann.Code Civ.Proc. §§ 2016, 2016(b, g).

2 1 Cal.3 d 829

Suprem e Court of California.
George WILLIAMSON, Petitioner,
v.
The SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES
COUNTY, Respondent;
SHELL OIL COMPANY et al., Real Parties in
Interest.
L.A. 3 0 7 5 4 . | Aug. 14 , 1 9 7 8 . | Rehearing Denied Sept.
14, 1978.
Plaintiff in personal injury action petitioned for a writ of
mandate to compel the Superior Court, Los Angeles
County, to require disclosure of a report prepared by an
expert employed by counsel for one of the defendants.
The Supreme Court, Tobriner, J., held that: (1) an
arrangement whereby tire manufacturer agreed to
indemnify its codefendant, the manufacturer of a
tire-changing machine, if the codefendant would
withdraw a certain expert witness whose report was
unfavorable to the tire manufacturer amounted to a
bargain for the concealment or suppression of evidence,
and (2) because the manufacturer of the tire-changing
machine could not be permitted to withhold an expert’s
report that would have been discoverable but for the
payment of consideration by one of the parties to the
litigation, full disclosure of the expert’s report was
required.

11 Cases that cite this headnote

[2]

When it becomes reasonably certain that an
expert will give his professional opinion as a
witness on a material matter in dispute, then the
expert’s opinion has become a factor in the case
and, at that point, the expert ceases to be merely
a consultant and becomes a counter in the
litigation to be evaluated by appropriate pretrial
discovery. West’s Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 2016.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

[3]

Richardson, J., dissented and filed opinion.
Opinion, 135 Cal.Rptr. 744, vacated.

[1]

Pretrial Procedure
Work-product privilege
As an expert opinion developed as a result of the
initiative of counsel in preparing for trial of
personal injury action, investigator’s report
concerning cause of accident which occurred
while tire-changing machine was being used
constituted the ‘work product” of counsel for the

Pretrial Procedure
Facts known and opinions held by experts
While “good cause” normally must be shown to
compel discovery of expert opinions in advance
of trial, “good cause” includes a showing that
the expert may be called as a witness.

Writ of mandate issued.

West Headnotes (11)

Pretrial Procedure
Facts known and opinions held by experts

3 Cases that cite this headnote

[4]

Attorney and Client
Conduct of trial
An attorney acting in the best interest of his
client must be free to make whatever use of an
expert’s opinion will be most likely to insure a
good result for the client at trial; thus, an
attorney may properly decide not to call as a
witness even an expert whose opinion is
favorable to the client if, in the attorney’s
judgment, the client’s interests will otherwise be
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better served.

certain expert as a witness at trial withdrew the
expert as a witness. West’s Ann.Code Civ.Proc.
§ 2016.

Cases that cite this headnote

13 Cases that cite this headnote
[5]

Evidence
Evidence Withheld or Falsified
Evidence
Suppression or spoliation of evidence

[8]

The rule embodied in the Evidence Code
provision which permits the trier of fact to
consider, among other things, a party’s failure to
explain or to deny evidence against him or a
party’s willful suppression of evidence is
predicated on common sense and public policy
and reflects the purpose of a trial which is to
arrive at the true facts. West’s Ann.Evid.Code, §
413.
4 Cases that cite this headnote

[6]

Pretrial Procedure
Discovering truth, narrowing issues, and
eliminating surprise
One of the principal purposes of discovery is to
make a trial less a game of blindman’s bluff and
more a fair contest with the basic issues and
facts disclosed to the fullest possible extent.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

[9]

Contracts
Contracts with witnesses
Agreement whereby, in return for tire
manufacturer’s promise to pay consideration,
manufacturer of tire-changing machine agreed to
withdraw as an expert witness an investigator
who had concluded that the cause of the
accident which gave rise to the suit was a
defective tire and not any defect in the
tire-changing machine was a bargain for the
concealment or suppression of evidence which
could not be condoned.

Evidence
Evidence Withheld or Falsified
Though a party is not under a duty to produce
testimony adverse to himself, if he fails to
produce evidence that would naturally have
been produced he must take the risk that the trier
of fact will infer that the evidence, had it been
produced, would have been adverse. West’s
Ann.Evid.Code, § 413.

4 Cases that cite this headnote
4 Cases that cite this headnote

[10]
[7]

Pretrial Procedure
Work-product privilege
Although work product rules are designed
explicitly to protect a party’s expense and
industry in seeking out expert testimony, no
policy underlying the work product doctrine
justified arrangement whereby, in return for a
codefendant’s promise of indemnification,
defendant who originally intended to call a

Pretrial Procedure
Facts known and opinions held by experts
Where withdrawal of expert witness directly
flowed from defendants’ illegal agreement to
suppress evidence, full disclosure of the expert
witness’ report was required to prevent
defendants from reaping any untoward benefit
from their attempted illegal agreement. West’s
Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 2016(b).
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13 Cases that cite this headnote

[11]

Contracts
Procuring or suppressing evidence and
prosecuting action
Court cannot place its imprimatur upon planned
stratagems of purchased suppression of
evidence.
Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
*831 **128 ***41 Belli & Choulos, Belli, Ashe &
Choulos, Irmas, Simke, Chodos & Marshall, Irmas, Simke
& Chodos, Roman M. Silberfeld and David Manning
Chodos, Los Angeles, for petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.
Morgan, Wenzel & McNicholas, Dennis J. Sinclitico,
George H. Ellis, Belcher, Henzie & Biegenzahn, Leo J.
Biegenzahn and Uzzell S. Branson, III, Los Angeles, for
real parties in interest.
Opinion
*832 TOBRINER, Justice.

In this petition for writ of mandate plaintiff seeks to
discover a report prepared by an expert employed by
counsel for one of the defendants in the underlying
personal injury suit. Defendant had originally intended to
call the expert as a witness at trial, and hence, under the
relevant statute and case law, the expert’s report would
normally have been discoverable by plaintiff. In return for
a codefendant’s promise of indemnification, however, the
defendant who employed the expert subsequently
withdrew him as a witness. This case therefore presents
the question whether the withdrawal of the expert witness
on the basis of such an indemnification agreement
reestablishes the privilege against disclosure enjoyed by
defendant or leaves the plaintiff free to discover the
content of the report. Although the trial court denied

plaintiff access to the report, we have concluded that
under the circumstances of this case plaintiff is entitled to
discover the contents of the report.
In September 1971, plaintiff George Williamson filed suit
against defendants Shell Oil Company (Shell), Firestone
Tire and Rubber Company (Firestone), and Big Four
Automotive Equipment Corporation (Big Four), seeking
damages for personal injuries which he sustained in
Shell’s employ while using a tire-changing machine
manufactured by Big Four to install a Firestone tire.
Plaintiff alleged defects in both the tire and the
tire-changing machine.
During the course of discovery proceedings, Big Four
employed O. Edward Kurt to investigate the accident and
to submit a report. Following his investigation, Kurt
submitted a report which stated that in his opinion the
cause of the accident was Firestone’s defective tire, and
not any defect in the Big Four machine. After receiving
this report, which, of course, was quite favorable to its
case, Big Four designated Kurt as an expert witness to
testify at trial. Plaintiff arranged to take Kurt’s deposition
and thereby to learn the results of Kurt’s investigation.
Plaintiff, however, never learned the results of the
investigation. On the eve of Kurt’s scheduled deposition,
and following a meeting with Firestone’s counsel, Big
Four withdrew Kurt’s designation as expert witness.
Plaintiff states without contradiction that at the meeting
between defendants’ counsel, Big Four discussed Kurt’s
findings with Firestone *833 and turned over copies of
Kurt’s report to Firestone.1 After examining the report,
Firestone’s counsel, who naturally preferred the
nondisclosure of Kurt’s adverse findings, entered into an
agreement with Big Four which provided that if Big Four
withdrew Kurt as a witness, withheld his report from
plaintiff’s counsel, and refused to permit plaintiff’s
counsel to depose him, Firestone would indemnify Big
Four against any liability Big Four might incur arising
from plaintiff’s injuries. In other words, Big Four agreed
to silence its expert and withhold the information
contained in his report from plaintiff **129 in return for
valuable consideration indemnification from Firestone.
Big Four thereafter complied with its promise to
Firestone, withdrawing Kurt as a prospective witness and
rebuffing plaintiff’s ***42 attempt to depose Kurt or to
obtain a copy of Kurt’s report. Plaintiff sought an order of
the trial court to compel Kurt’s deposition and production
of his report. Although the trial court authorized the
deposition, it substantially limited the areas of plaintiff’s
inquiry, precluding plaintiff from discovering the results
of Kurt’s investigation and his analysis of the accident.
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Plaintiff then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the
Court of Appeal, seeking relief from the trial court’s
order. Although recognizing that extraordinary writs
should not issue routinely in discovery cases, the Court of
Appeal concluded that because the case presented
“questions of first impression that are of general
importance to the trial courts and to the profession”
(Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court (1962)
58 Cal.2d 180, 185-186, fn. 4, 23 Cal.Rptr. 375, 378, 373
P.2d 439, 442; see also Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 169-171, 84 Cal.Rptr. 718,
465 P.2d 854), an alternative writ should issue. After a
hearing, the Court of Appeal ultimately determined that a
preemptory writ of mandate should issue; we granted a
hearing in order to resolve the novel issue of work
product doctrine which this case presents.
Code of Civil Procedure section 2016, subdivision (b)
provides in pertinent part, “The work product of an
attorney shall not be discoverable unless the court
determines that denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice
the party seeking discovery in preparing his claim or
defense or will result in an injustice, and any writing that
reflects an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal research or theories shall not
*834 be
discoverable under any circumstances.” Accordingly,
subdivision (b) affords a conditional or qualified
protection for work product generally, and an absolute
protection as to an attorney’s impressions and
conclusions. As subdivision (g) of the same section
explains, “It is the policy of this state (i) to preserve the
rights of attorneys to prepare cases for trial with that
degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare
their cases thoroughly and to investigate not only the
favorable but the unfavorable aspects of such cases and
(ii) to prevent an attorney from taking undue advantage of
his adversary’s industry or efforts.”
[1] Section 2016 contains no definition of work product
beyond extending protection to “any writing that reflects
an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
research or theories.” The cases indicate generally,
however, that “material of a derivative character, such as
diagrams prepared for trial, audit reports, appraisals, and
Other expert opinions, developed as a result of the
initiative of counsel in preparing for trial,” are also to be
protected as work product. (Emphasis added.) (Mack v.
Superior Court (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 7, 10, 66 Cal.Rptr.
280, 283; accord, Southern Pacific Co. v. Superior Court
(1969) 3 Cal.App.3d 195, 198-199.) In San Diego
Professional Association v. Superior Court (1962) 58
Cal.2d 194, 204-205, 23 Cal.Rptr. 384, 373 P.2d 448, for
example, we held that expert engineers’ “evaluation and
opinions” commissioned by an attorney for the purpose of
preparing for trial was work product. “Whatever the
extent of the concept of an attorney’s work product may

be, it is clear that . . . it is . . . the attorney’s work, or that
of his agents or employees, that is involved . . . .”
(Emphasis omitted.) (Wilson v. Superior Court (1964)
226 Cal.App.2d 715, 724, 38 Cal.Rptr. 255, 261 (hg. den.,
May 27, 1964).) Thus as an expert opinion, developed as
a result of the initiative of counsel in preparing for trial,
Kurt’s report clearly constitutes the work product of Big
Four’s counsel.
[2] [3] The issue before us, however, is whether Kurt’s
report, as work product of Big Four’s counsel, should be
protected against disclosure under section 2016. While it
may be appropriate to give broad immunity from
discovery to an expert Consultant’s Report developed at
the initiative **130 of counsel in preparation for trial, the
courts agree that the initial status of the expert as
consultant changes once the expert becomes a designated
prospective witness. As the court stated in ***43
Swartzman v. Superior Court (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 195,
203, 41 Cal.Rptr. 721, 727, hg. den., Feb. 10, 1965,
“(w)hen it becomes reasonably certain an expert will give
his professional opinion as a witness on a material matter
in dispute, then his opinion has *835 become a factor in
the cause. At that point the expert has ceased to be merely
a consultant and has become a counter in the litigation,
one to be evaluated along with others. Such evaluation
properly includes appropriate pretrial discovery.” (See
also Mize v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. (1975) 46
Cal.App.3d 436, 449, 120 Cal.Rptr. 787; Bolles v.
Superior Court (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 962, 963, 93
Cal.Rptr. 719; Dow Chemical Co. v. Superior Court
(1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 1, 10, 82 Cal.Rptr. 288; Scotsman
Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court (1966) 242
Cal.App.2d 527, 530-532, 51 Cal.Rptr. 511.) While good
cause normally must be shown to compel discovery of
expert opinions in advance of trial, good cause includes a
showing that the expert may be called as a witness. (See
Sanders v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 270,
279, 109 Cal.Rptr. 770.)
[4] In the present case, the expert consultant did not long
retain his initial status as advisor, for after learning the
favorable nature of Kurt’s report, Big Four designated
Kurt as an expert witness to testify at trial. Indisputedly at
this point plaintiff was entitled to discover Kurt’s report;
if Big Four had used Kurt’s testimony at trial, the report
would surely have remained discoverable. Before Kurt’s
scheduled deposition took place, however, Big Four
withdrew Kurt’s designation as a witness. Big Four
argues that its withdrawal of Kurt as witness restored the
immunity from discovery which Kurt’s report originally
enjoyed. As Big Four contends, an attorney acting in the
best interest of his client must be free to make whatever
use of an expert’s opinion will be most likely to insure a
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good result for the client at trial; thus an attorney may
properly decide not to call as a witness even an expert
whose opinion is favorable to the client, if, in the
attorney’s judgment, the client’s interests will otherwise
be better served.
[5] [6] While a party may, indeed, enjoy the right to
withdraw an expert witness at any time prior to disclosure
of that witness’ proposed testimony,2 the record in the
present case demonstrates that Big Four did *836 not
decide unilaterally to withdraw Kurt as a matter of trial
tactics or personal litigation strategy. Big Four’s decision
stemmed rather from the agreement with Firestone:
Firestone offered to pay Big Four to withdraw Kurt, in
order to eliminate Kurt’s potentially damaging testimony
from the trial. Thus it was under Firestone’s influence and
in response to an offer of payment of indemnification that
Big Four secured Kurt’s withdrawal.

We do not accept defendants’ argument that their action
merely represents the sharing of information between two
nonadversary codefendants, and therefore constitutes
proper cooperation between parties sharing a common
interest. The court in **131 Gorman Rupp Industries, Inc.
v. Superior Court (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 28, 31, 97
Cal.Rptr. 377, 380, explained that the fact that two parties
are both defendants in no sense assures that they are not
adversaries: “Each codefendant seeks to disclaim any
responsibility for the alleged injuries, and ***44 argues
that if there is responsibility for the alleged injuries it is
due to the failure of the other. Certainly, there exists that
relationship which suggests a conflict of interest.
Petitioner (codefendant) has a vital interest in not relying
solely on its lack of negligence or other avoidance of
liability. Petitioner seeks to meet plaintiff’s claim by
showing the liability, if any, is that of another defendant.
This clearly falls within the (rule) that an ‘adverse’ party
includes one who may likely strive to win a point at issue
at the expense of the other.”
With respect to the issue toward which the Kurt report
was directed defects in Firestone’s tire the interests of Big
Four and Firestone unquestionably conflicted. Big Four’s
interest lay in finding no negligence on its own part and in
discovering a defect responsible for the accident in
someone else’s product here, Firestone’s. On the other
hand, Firestone’s interest lay in finding No defect in its
product. Because Kurt was about to testify in favor of Big
Four and against Firestone, only Firestone’s offer of
indemnification could have induced Big Four not to call
its favorable witness.
Moreover, the agreement between Big Four and Firestone
is not as benign as “normal cooperative action” between

codefendants bound by a common interest. Agreements to
suppress evidence have long been held void as against
public policy, both in California and in most common law
*837 jurisdictions.3 (See Valentine v. Stewart (1860) 15
Cal. 387, 404, in which this court invalidated a contract to
withdraw depositions taken in connection with litigation,
as “affected with a fatal taint of illegality”; Rest.,
Contracts, s 554; 6A Corbin, Contracts, s 1430, at p. 380:
“A bargain for the concealment or suppression of . . .
evidence is of course illegal.”) The agreement at issue in
the present case is clearly of such a nature. In return for
Firestone’s promise to pay consideration, Big Four has
agreed to suppress highly relevant evidence which, if
revealed at trial, would be harmful to Firestone.
Defendants do not nullify the agreement’s insidious effect
by attaching to it the seemingly innocuous label of
“contract of indemnification.”
The court in Petterson v. Superior Court (1974) 39
Cal.App.3d 267, 114 Cal.Rptr. 20, anticipating the
potential for encouraging just such illegal bargains,
declared unequivocally that discovery should be allowed
in order to deter similar suppression of evidence. In
Petterson, counsel for one claimant under a holographic
will disclosed to the executor the opinion of a handwriting
expert that the will was a forgery. Subsequently, when the
executor’s attorney sought to depose the expert, counsel
for another claimant under the holographic will objected
on the ground that he had hired the expert as a consultant,
and did not propose to call him as a witness at trial.
The court rejected the assertion of work product privilege,
and held that the privilege was waived with respect to the
handwriting expert’s opinion by virtue of the disclosure of
the expert’s observations and conclusions by the first
heir’s attorney to the executor’s attorney.4 In the course of
**132 its analysis, the court stated, “If we were to declare
that petitioners now may prevent real parties from taking
(the expert’s) *838 deposition, we would be setting a
precedent which eventually could lead to subtle but ***45
deliberate attempts to suppress relevant evidence. The
rule predicated on fairness articulated in the decisions is a
shield to prevent a litigant from taking undue advantage
of his adversary’s industry and effort, not a sword to be
used to thwart justice or to defeat the salut(a)ry objects of
the Discovery Act.” (39 Cal.App.3d at p. 273, 114
Cal.Rptr. at 24.)
[7] [8] [9] The Petterson court’s reasoning is instructive:
although the work product rules are designed explicitly to
protect a party’s expense and industry in seeking out
expert testimony,5 no policy underlying the work product
doctrine justifies defendants’ conduct in the present case.
If we were to hold otherwise, nothing would preclude a
party in a multi-party case from in effect auctioning off a
witness’ testimony to the highest bidder. Although the
present record does not disclose whether Big Four offered
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to retain Kurt as a witness if plaintiff bid more for his
testimony than Firestone, we point out that in the absence
of compelled disclosure such competitive bidding would
remain a grim possibility. One of the principal purposes
of discovery is to “ ‘make a trial less a game of
blindman’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic
issues and facts disclosed to the fullest possible extent. ’ ”
(Greyhound v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 376,
15 Cal.Rptr. 90, 99, 364 P.2d 266, 275.) We will not
sanction the “gamesmanship” involved in the suppression
of evidence by permitting Big Four to withhold an expert
report which would have been discoverable but for the
payment of consideration by one of the parties to this
litigation.
[10] [11] The agreement between Firestone and Big Four
clearly indicates the very real potential for “subtle but
deliberate attempts to suppress relevant evidence.” The
inevitable effect of the trial court’s order would be to
condone defendants’ concealment of evidence, in direct
contravention of this court’s insistence that neither party
to such an agreement should receive the aid of a court in
effectuating such an illegal scheme. (See Tappan v.
Albany Brewing Co. (1889) 80 Cal. 570, 572, 22 P. 257.)
This court cannot place its imprimatur upon planned
stratagems of purchased suppression of evidence. Because
Big Four’s withdrawal of Kurt directly flows from the
illegal agreement to repress evidence, surely under section
2016, subdivision (b) “denial of discovery . . . (would)
result in an injustice.” We therefore must order full
disclosure of Kurt’s report to *839 prevent Big Four and
Firestone from reaping any untoward benefit from their
attempted illegal agreement.

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed.

BIRD, C. J., and MOSK and MANUEL, JJ., concur.
RICHARDSON, Justice, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. As the majority opinion explains, it
is well established that work product protection must be
afforded to an experts’ reports and communications to an
attorney employing him in preparation for trial at least
until the expert has been designated as an actual trial
witness. (See Mize v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. (1975)
46 Cal.App.3d 436, 449, 120 Cal.Rptr. 787; Petterson v.
Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 267, 271-272, 114
Cal.Rptr. 20; Sanders v. Superior Court (1973) 34
Cal.App.3d 270, 278-279, 109 Cal.Rptr. 770; Bolles v.
Superior Court (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 962, 963, 93

Cal.Rptr. 719; Dow Chemical Co. v. Superior Court
(1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 1, 9-10, 82 Cal.Rptr. 288; Mack v.
Superior Court (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 7, 10-11, 66
Cal.Rptr. 280; Scotsman Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court
(1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 527, 529-532, 51 Cal.Rptr. 511;
**133 Swartzman v. Superior Court (1964) 231
Cal.App.2d 195, 202-203, 41 Cal.Rptr. 721.)
Under the foregoing rule, the Kurt report would have been
protected from discovery by reason of Big Four’s
announcement, prior ***46 to Kurt’s scheduled
deposition, that Kurt would not be called to testify. The
majority holds, however, that Big Four forfeited its work
product protection because it agreed with Firestone to
withdraw Kurt as a trial witness in return for Firestone’s
promise of indemnification. The majority questions the
legality of an agreement whereby one party “sells” his
silence to another regarding potentially relevant evidence.
It does appear to be the general rule that “A bargain that
has for its object or consideration the suppression of
evidence . . . is illegal.” (Rest., Contracts, s 554; see 6A
Corbin, Contracts, s 1430, at p. 380; see also Tappan v.
Albany Brewing Co. (1889) 80 Cal. 570.) It is not as
clear, however, that actual “suppression” of evidence is
involved here. The work product rules, by very definition,
in effect sanction a “suppression” of an expert’s report
unless and until the decision is made to call the expert as a
trial witness. Furthermore, assuming that the alleged
agreement between Big Four and Firestone was illegal
and unenforceable As between those parties, and that
appropriate sanction might have been *840 imposed, no
compelling reason exists for our holding that the making
of such an agreement resulted in a waiver by Big Four of
its work product protection Vis-a-vis the plaintiff.
Certainly, no such waiver was intended by Big Four who,
having engaged Kurt, should retain the right to decide For
itself whether or not to call him as a witness. The record
discloses that at the present time he will not be called.
Accordingly, under the authorities cited above, the Kurt
report remains Conditionally protected from disclosure to
plaintiff.
Under section 2016, subdivision (b), the Kurt report
would be discoverable upon a showing of prejudice or
injustice. Yet the trial court herein declined to enter such
a finding of prejudice or injustice, possibly reflecting the
fact that plaintiff had hired his own experts to investigate
the accident. The underlying evidence, upon which Kurt’s
expert conclusions were reached, presumably is fully
accessible to plaintiff’s experts; at least it is not alleged
that this evidence is not so available. If, in fact,
Firestone’s tire was defective and caused or contributed to
the accident, no reason whatever appears in the record
why plaintiff’s experts cannot reach the same conclusion

W
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as a result of their independent efforts.
Subdivision (g) of section 2016 announces a policy of this
state to prevent an attorney from taking undue advantage
of his adversary’s efforts, as well as to protect his
adversary’s privacy which, it must always be borne in
mind, is for the overriding protection of the lawyer’s
client. “Under such a policy a party cannot substitute the
wits of his adversary’s expert for wits of his own in
analyzing the case. (Citation.)” (Swartzman v. Superior
Court, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d 195, 203, 41 Cal.Rptr. 721,
727.)

CLARK, J., concurs.
Rehearing denied; CLARK,J.,dissenting.
Parallel Citations
21 Cal.3d 829, 582 P.2d 126

I would deny the writ.
Footnotes
1

The inadequacy of the record prevents our consideration of the effect of any alleged disclosure between Big Four and plaintiff.

2

Compare Evidence Code section 413: “In determining what inferences to draw from the evidence or facts in the case against a
party, the trier of fact may consider, among other things, the party’s failure to explain or to deny by his testimony such evidence or
facts in the case against him, or his willful suppression of evidence relating thereto, if such be the case.” As the court held in
Breland v. Traylor Engineering & Mfg. Co. (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 415, 426, 126 P.2d 455, 461, “The rule of (present Evidence
Code section 413) . . . is predicated on common sense, and public policy. The purpose of a trial is to arrive at the true facts. A trial
is not a game where one counsel safely may sit back and refuse to produce evidence where in the nature of things his client is the
only source from which that evidence may be secured. A defendant is not under a duty to produce testimony adverse to himself,
but if he fails to produce evidence that would naturally have been produced he must take the risk that the trier of fact will infer, and
properly so, that the evidence, had it been produced, would have been adverse.” (Emphasis added.)

3

Compare Penal Code section 136, subdivision (a): “Every person who willfully and unlawfully prevents or dissuades any person
who is or may become a witness, from attending upon any trial, proceeding, or inquiry, authorized by law, is guilty of a
misdemeanor”; and section 136 1/2: “Every person who gives or offers or promises to give to any witness or person about to be
called as a witness, any bribe upon any understanding or agreement that such person shall not attend upon any trial or other judicial
proceeding, or every person who attempts by means of any offer of a bribe to dissuade any such person from attending upon any
trial or other judicial proceeding, is guilty of a felony.” Although Firestone dealt exclusively with Big Four in attempting to silence
Kurt, the effect of Firestone’s agreement with Big Four is certainly analogous to an agreement directly with Kurt that Kurt “not
attend upon . . . trial.”

4

In the present case we do not reach plaintiff’s argument that Big Four waived any work product privilege through disclosure to
Firestone.

5

Contrary to defendants’ suggestion, our decision does not in any way prevent plaintiffs or defendants from arranging in advance
jointly to engage and consult a single expert, to promote economy of litigation.

End of Document
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Appeals looks to adequacy of other available
remedies such as appeal, and to over-all
economy of effort and money among litigants,
lawyers and courts; however, prohibition is used
in this discretionary way to correct only
substantial, clear-cut, legal errors plainly in
contravention of clear statutory, constitutional,
or common law mandate which may be resolved
independently of any disputed facts, and only in
cases where there is high probability that trial
will be completely reversed if error is not
corrected in advance.

2 0 0 W.Va. 270

Suprem e Court of Appeals of W est Virginia.
STATE of W est Virginia ex rel. Linda WARD, as
Executrix of th e E state of L. David W ard, and
Linda W ard, Individually and as M other and Next
Friend of Isaac W illard W ard, Benjam in David
W ard, Tiffany Sheree W ard and K enneth Ryan
W ard, Petitioners,
v.
H onorable George W. HILL, Jr., Judge of the
Circuit Court of W ood County; F.G. Powderly,
M.D.; Bruce Pierson, Jr., M.D.; an d Jorge E.
Prieto, M.D., Respondents.

Cases that cite this headnote

No. 2 3 9 8 9 . | Subm itted Ju n e 3 , 1 9 9 7 . | Decided July
2 , 1997.
[2]
Patient brought medical malpractice action in which three
physicians were named as defendants. After plaintiff
entered settlement with one physician, the Circuit Court,
Wood County, George W. Hill, Jr., J., entered order
which stated that remaining defendants could use
witnesses originally listed as experts by settling physician.
Plaintiff brought original proceeding for writ of
prohibition, and the Supreme Court of Appeals, Starcher,
J., held that: (1) trial court abused its discretion in holding
hearing on motion where non-moving parties had almost
no notice or time to prepare; (2) in litigation involving
multiple defendants, settling defendant’s expert witnesses
should generally not be allowed to testify for remaining
defendants; and (3) trial court abused its discretion in
ruling that settling physician’s experts could testify for
remaining defendants.

Because remedy sought by prohibition is
extraordinary, exercise by Supreme Court of
Appeals of its original jurisdiction in such
matters is limited to circumstances of an
extraordinary nature.
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[3]

West Headnotes (14)

Prohibition
Remedy by appeal in particular actions or
proceedings
Prohibition
Errors and irregularities
In determining whether to grant rule to show
cause in prohibition when court is not acting in
excess of its jurisdiction, Supreme Court of

Prohibition
Specific acts
Although
most
discovery
orders
are
interlocutory and reviewable only after final
judgment, in certain circumstances involving a
purely legal issue, a clear cut error, inadequate
alternate remedies, and judicial economy issues,
Supreme Court of Appeals may issue writ of
prohibition when circuit court abuses its
discretion with regard to discovery.

Writ granted.

[1]

Prohibition
Nature and scope of remedy

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[4]

Prohibition
Errors and irregularities

W
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1 Cases that cite this headnote

Writ of prohibition is available to correct clear
legal error resulting from trial court’s substantial
abuse of its discretion in regard to discovery
orders.
[8]
Cases that cite this headnote

[5]

Abuse of discretion standard is applied to orders
reducing notice requirements established by
Rules of Civil Procedure for motion practice.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 6(d).

Appeal and Error
Depositions, affidavits, or discovery

Cases that cite this headnote

Circuit court’s ruling on a discovery request is
generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
2

[6]

Cases that cite this headnote

Appeal and Error
Proceedings Preliminary to Trial

[9]

Evidence
Determination of question of competency
Trial court abused its discretion in holding
hearing on motion by defendant in medical
malpractice action, who sought determination
that he would be allowed to call at trial experts
listed by defendant who later entered settlement
which purportedly barred settling defendants’
experts from testifying for other parties, where
non-moving parties learned only late on day
before hearing that hearing was to be held and
had almost no notice or time to prepare. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 6(d).

Motions
Necessity
Purpose of requirement under Rules of Civil
Procedure that notice of motion be given prior to
hearing on motion is to prevent a party from
being prejudicially surprised by a motion. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 6(d).
Cases that cite this headnote

3 Cases that cite this headnote
[7]

Constitutional Law
Process or Other Notice
Motions
Service and filing
While language of provision Rules of Civil
Procedure governing notice prior to hearing on
motion clearly permits reduction of time
requirements for notice of hearing, where trial
court, in so acting, reduces time requirements to
extent that party entitled to notice is deprived of
all opportunity to prepare for hearing, such
action constitutes denial of due process of law
and is in excess of jurisdiction. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14; Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 6(d).

[10]

Appeal and Error
Rulings on admissibility of evidence in
general
Trial
Admission of evidence in general
Rulings on admissibility of evidence are largely
within trial court’s sound discretion and should
not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse
of discretion.
1 Cases that cite this headnote

W
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[11]

Evidence
Disqualification; bias or conflict of interest
Witnesses
A uthority to compel attendance
Public has a right to every man’s evidence, and
exceptions to the demand for every man’s
evidence are not lightly created nor expansively
construed, for they are in derogation of search
for the truth.
Cases that cite this headnote

[12]

Compromise and Settlement
Nature and Requisites
Compromise and Settlement
Validity
Law favors and encourages resolution of
controversies by contracts of compromise and
settlement rather than by litigation, and it is
policy of the law to uphold and enforce such
contracts if they are fairly made and are not in
contravention of some law or public policy.
Cases that cite this headnote

[13]

Compromise and Settlement
Operation and Effect
Settlement agreement between plaintiff in
medical malpractice action and one of three
defendants originally named, condition of which
was that all expert witnesses listed by settling
defendant would be withdrawn and all
depositions of witnesses scheduled by settling
defendant would be cancelled, was effective to
bar remaining defendants from calling as
witnesses experts listed by settling defendant.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

[14]

Compromise and Settlement
Operation and Effect

Absent a formal agreement among defendants in
litigation
proceeding
involving
multiple
defendants, circuit court should not generally
permit settling defendant’s expert witnesses to
testify for remaining defendants, and when
settlement agreement between settling defendant
and plaintiffs prohibits continued use of settling
defendant’s experts by remaining defendants,
circuit court, subject to discovery rules, should
honor that agreement by not permitting
remaining defendants to use or present such
information in preparation for or conduct of
trial. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 26(b)(4)(B).
3 Cases that cite this headnote

* * 2 6 *272 Syllabus by the Court

1. “ ‘In determining whether to grant a rule to show cause
in prohibition when a court is not acting in excess of its
jurisdiction, this Court will look to the adequacy of other
available remedies such as appeal and to the over-all
economy of effort and money among litigants, lawyers
and courts; however, this Court will use prohibition in this
discretionary way to correct only substantial, clear-cut,
legal errors plainly in contravention of a clear statutory,
constitutional, or common law mandate which may be
resolved independently of any disputed facts and only in
cases where there is a high probability that the trial will
be completely reversed if the error is not corrected in
advance.’ Syllabus Point 1, Hinkle v. Black, 164 W.Va.
112, 262 S.E.2d 744 (1979).” Syllabus Point 1, State ex
rel. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Canady, 194 W.Va.
431, 460 S.E.2d 677 (1995).
2. “ ‘A writ of prohibition is available to correct a clear
legal error resulting from a trial court’s substantial abuse
of its discretion in regard to discovery orders.’ Syllabus
Point 1, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Stephens, 188 W.Va. 622, 425 S.E.2d 577 (1992).
Syllabus Point 3, State ex rel. McCormick v. Zakaib, 189
W.Va. 258, 430 S.E.2d 316 (1993).” Syllabus Point 2,
State ex rel. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Canady, 194
W.Va. 431, 460 S.E.2d 677 (1995).
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3. “While the language of Rule 6(d) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure clearly permits a reduction of the time
requirements for notice of hearing, where a trial court, in
so acting, reduces time requirements to the extent that the
party entitled to notice is deprived of all opportunity to
prepare for hearing, such action constitutes a denial of due
process of law and is in excess of jurisdiction.” Syllabus,
Cremeans v. Goad, 158 W.Va. 192, 210 S.E.2d 169
(1974).
4. “ ‘The law favors and encourages the resolution of
controversies by contracts of compromise and settlement
rather than by litigation; and it is the policy of the law to
uphold and enforce such contracts if they are fairly made
and are not in contravention of some law or public
policy.’ Syllabus Point 1, Sanders v. Roselawn Memorial
Gardens, [Inc.] 152 W.Va. 91, 159 S.E.2d 784 (1968).
Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. Vapor Corp. v. Narick,
[173] W.Va. [770] 320 S.E.2d 345 (1984).” Syllabus
Point 1, Riggle v. Allied Chemical Corp., 180 W.Va. 561,
378 S.E.2d 282 (1989).
5. “ ‘Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are largely
within a trial court’s sound discretion and should not be
disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion.’
State v. Louk, 171 W.Va. 639, 301 S.E.2d 596, 599
(1983) [, overruled on other grounds, State v. Bradshaw,
193 W.Va. 519, 457 S.E.2d 456 (1995) ]. Syllabus Point
2, State v. Peyatt, [173] W.Va. [317] 315 S.E.2d 574
(1983). Syllabus Point 7, State v. Miller, [175] W.Va.
[616] 336 S.E.2d 910 (1985).” Syllabus Point 10 of Board
o f Ed. o f McDowell County v. Zando, Martin & Milstead,
Inc., 182 W.Va. 597, 390 S.E.2d 796 (1990).
6. Absent a formal agreement among defendants in a
litigation involving multiple defendants, the circuit court
should not generally permit a settling defendant’s expert
witnesses to testify for the remaining defendants. When a
settlement agreement between the settling defendant and
the plaintiffs prohibits the continued use of the settling
defendant’s expert witnesses by the remaining defendants,
the circuit court, subject to Rule 26(b)(4)(B) [1988] of the
West Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure, should honor that
agreement by not permitting the remaining defendants to
use or present such information in the preparation for or
conduct of the trial.
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Opinion
STARCHER, Justice.

This original proceeding for a writ of prohibition asks this
Court to vacate a January 24, 1997 ruling of the Circuit
Court of Wood County allowing the defendants who
remain in the underlying case to use the expert witnesses
designated by the defendant who settled his portion of the
case. The relators raise two questions in their petition:
first, did the circuit court violate Rule 6(d) [1978] of the
West Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure by holding a
hearing on a substantive issue when the relators, plaintiffs
in the underlying medical malpractice suit, were provided
less than twenty-four hours notice of the hearing? Second,
did the circuit court err in allowing the remaining
defendants to use the expert witnesses of the settling
defendant even through the settlement agreement between
the settling defendant and the relators prohibited such use
of the settling defendant’s experts? Because the circuit
court erred, we grant the requested writ.

I.

Facts and Background
The underlying case is a medical malpractice action
brought by the Estate of David Ward, filed by his
executrix and widow, Linda Ward, and the children of the
decedent (the plaintiffs). The defendants were the
decedent’s three (3) treating physicians, Jorge E. Prieto,
M.D., F.G. Powderly, M.D., and Bruce Pierson, M.D.
Trial in the case was scheduled for April 21, 1997 in the
Wood County Circuit Court.1
A discovery order entered on March 20, 1996 required the
plaintiffs to identify their expert witnesses sixty (60) days
after taking the defendants’ depositions. The defendants
were required to identify their expert witnesses sixty (60)
days from the disclosure of the plaintiffs’ expert
witnesses, provided plaintiffs’ experts were “available for
taking of their discovery depositions within the
designated 60 day [sic] period.”
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Plaintiffs identified their experts on June 17, 1996 with a
supplement filed on June 21, 1996. On August 20, 1996,
defendant Powderly filed his identification of expert
witnesses naming one physician, and he included the
following reservation:
This Defendant reserves the right to
designate additional experts if it
becomes necessary based on the
testimony of Plaintiff’s [sic]
experts.
On August 16, 1996, defendant Pierson filed his
identification of expert witnesses naming two physicians,
and he included the following reservations:
Defendant reserves the right to call any witness
identified by any other party to this litigation.
Defendant reserves the right to call any expert witness
needed to impeach the credibility of plaintiff’s [sic]
expert witnesses.
Defendant reserves the right to supplement this expert
witness list following further discovery.
Defendant Prieto, after requesting and receiving an
extension, filed his identification of expert witnesses on
December 17, 1996. Defendant Prieto identified by name
ten physicians, including the three defendants, and
generally any other physician associated with the
decedent’s care.
Depositions of the plaintiffs’ experts were taken in the fall
of 1996 through January 1997, and settlement
negotiations between defendant Prieto and the plaintiffs
were undertaken.
On January 17, 1997, the defendant Prieto and the
plaintiffs appeared to reach a settlement. According to a
letter dated January 22, 1997 from plaintiffs’ counsel to
counsel for defendant Prieto, the settlement was accepted
based on the following pertinent conditions:
**2 8 *274 (2) The withdrawal of all experts listed by

you on behalf of Dr. Prieto as experts to be called to
testify on behalf of Dr. Prieto on ANY issue, including
causation as well as negligence. (These experts are to
have no contact with any party or that party’s
representative without court order authorizing and
approving the same.)
(3) The immediate cancellation of any depositions
scheduled by you on behalf of Dr. Prieto of any

witness, including any expert retained by and on behalf
of Mrs. Ward. (emphasis in original).
There was no formal agreement among the defendants
concerning the use of the expert witnesses. Counsel for
remaining defendant Pierson attended a meeting during
which the settling defendant’s expert had discussed his
potential testimony. However, none of the remaining
defendants ever paid or, according to the plaintiffs, ever
offered to pay for the services of the settling defendant’s
experts. There was no communication regarding shared
usage, and no information was furnished by the remaining
defendants to the settling defendant.
On January 22, 1997, the date of the settlement
acceptance letter, counsel for remaining defendant
Pierson communicated, via facsimile, to counsel for the
plaintiffs that he wished to depose several of the experts
identified by the settling defendant. According to counsel
for remaining defendant Pierson, he telephoned plaintiffs’
counsel on January 22, 1997, indicating his intention to
use the settling defendant’s witnesses and to seek a
hearing on the expert witness issue on January 24, 1997.
On January 23, 1997, plaintiffs’ counsel, via facsimile,
objected to any contact with the settling defendant’s
expert witnesses.
On January 23, 1997, plaintiffs’ counsel received a notice
of a hearing set at the request of counsel for remaining
defendant Pierson for the next day (January 24, 1997) at
4:00 p.m. The notice arrived at approximately 5:00 p.m.
at the offices of plaintiffs’ lawyers. One of the plaintiffs’
lawyers did not personally receive notice of the hearing
until 10:30 a.m. on January 24, 1997; the other lawyer for
the plaintiffs received a telephone call on January 23,
1997 informing him of the hearing.
On January 24, 1997, plaintiffs’ counsel, arguing
insufficient notice of the hearing under Rule 6(d) [1978]
of the West Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure and
insufficient time to research applicable West Virginia law,
objected to the hearing and requested that the hearing be
continued.
The hearing was held as scheduled. Except for counsel for
remaining defendant Pierson who appeared in person,
counsel for the other parties appeared by telephone. The
hearing was conducted without a court reporter.
According to plaintiffs’ counsel, the hearing lasted only
ten (10) minutes and plaintiffs’ counsel had difficulty
hearing “all of the conservation between Judge Hill and
the defendant’s counsel.” The circuit court, after
dismissing plaintiffs’ objections based on inadequate
notice, ruled that remaining defendants could talk to and
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use at trial any expert listed by any defendant, including
the settling defendant.2 Claiming both procedural error
and substantive error, the plaintiffs petitioned this Court
to prohibit the order’s enforcement.

II.

Discussion

A.

Criteria fo r Awarding a Writ o f Prohibition
[1] Our general criteria for determining if we should issue
a rule to show cause in prohibition were stated in Syllabus
Point 1 of Hinkle v. Black, 164 W.Va. 112, 262 S.E.2d
744 (1979), which provides:
In determining whether to grant a
rule to show cause in prohibition
when a court is not acting in excess
of its jurisdiction, this Court will
look to the adequacy of other
available remedies such as appeal
and to the over-all economy of
effort and money among litigants,
lawyers and courts; however, this
Court will use prohibition **29
*275 in this discretionary way to
correct only substantial, clear-cut,
legal errors plainly in contravention
of a clear statutory, constitutional,
or common law mandate which
may be resolved independently of
any disputed facts and only in cases
where there is a high probability
that the trial will be completely
reversed if the error is not corrected
in advance.
In accord Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. W.Va. Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Karl, 199 W.Va. 678, 487 S.E.2d 336,
(1997); Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. George B. v.
Kaufman, 199 W.Va. 269, 483 S.E.2d 852 (1997);
Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Fidelity and Guaranty Co.
v. Canady, 194 W.Va. 431, 460 S.E.2d 677 (1995).

[2] We continue to emphasize the extraordinary nature of a
writ of prohibition. Because the remedy sought by
prohibition is extraordinary, we have limited the exercise
of our original jurisdiction “to circumstances ‘of an
extraordinary nature.’ ” Fidelity, id. 194 W.Va. at 436,
460 S.E.2d at 682, quoting, State ex rel Doe v. Troisi, 194
W.Va. 28, 31, 459 S.E.2d 139, 142 (1995). See State ex
rel. Smith v. Maynard, 193 W.Va. 1, 454 S.E.2d 46
(1994), overruled on other grounds, State ex rel. Mitchem
v. Kirkpatrick, 199 W.Va. 501, 485 S.E.2d 445 (1997);
State ex rel. Allen v. Bedell, 193 W.Va. 32, 454 S.E.2d 77
(1994).
[3] [4] Although most discovery orders are interlocutory
and reviewable only after final judgment, in certain
circumstances involving a purely legal issue, a clear cut
error, inadequate alternate remedies and judicial economy
issues, this Court may issue a writ of prohibition when a
circuit court abuses its discretion with regard to
discovery. See Fidelity, supra, 194 W.Va. at 437, 460
S.E.2d at 682-83 for a discussion of the criteria for
issuing a writ of prohibition involving discovery issues.
Syllabus Point 1 of State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Stephens, 188 W.Va. 622, 425 S.E.2d
577 (1992) states:
A writ of prohibition is available to
correct a clear legal error resulting
from a trial court’s substantial
abuse of its discretion in regard to
discovery orders.
In accord Syllabus Point 2, Fidelity, supra; Syllabus
Point 3, State ex rel. McCormick v. Zakaib, 189 W.Va.
258, 430 S.E.2d 316 (1993). See Nutter v. Maynard, 183
W.Va. 247, 250, 395 S.E.2d 491, 494 (1990)(
“extraordinary relief [may be granted] where a discovery
order presents a purely legal issue in an area where the
bench and bar are in need of guidelines”); State ex rel.
Bennett v. Keadle, 175 W.Va. 505, 334 S.E.2d 643
(1985).
In this case, we are asked for a writ of prohibition based
on two issues. The first issue concerning the amount of
notice required under Rule 6(d) [1978] of the West
Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure presents a clear-cut
issue without adequate alternate remedies because of the
time factor. The second issue concerning the use of a
settling defendant’s expert witnesses by remaining
defendants in violation of the settlement agreement
presents a legal issue requiring immediate resolution
because of judicial economy, namely, avoiding a second
trial because of a high probability of reversal on appeal.
Because these two issues should be addressed before a
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final judgment, we exercise our original jurisdiction to
resolve them.

B.

Rule 6(d) o f the West Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure

[5] Generally this Court reviews a circuit court’s ruling on
a discovery request for an abuse of discretion. The
importance of the West Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure
was noted in Fidelity, 194 W.Va. at 439, 460 S.E.2d at
685, quoting, McDougal v. McCammon, 193 W.Va. 229,
235, 455 S.E.2d 788, 794 (1995) by stating:
“[T]he West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure allocate
significant discretion to the trial court in making ...
procedural rulings. As the drafters of the rules appear to
recognize, ... procedural rulings, perhaps more than any
others, must be made quickly, without unnecessary fear
of reversal, and must be individualized to respond to
the specific facts of each case.... Thus, absent a few
exceptions, this Court will review all aspects of the
circuit court’s **3 0 *276 determinations under an
abuse of discretion standard.” (citations omitted).
In Fidelity, 194 W.Va. at 439, 460 S.E.2d at 685, we also
noted that a heighten review is given where the circuit
court has not followed the preference stated in the civil
procedure rule or where “the trial court makes no findings
or applies the wrong legal standard[.]” Fidelity, quoting
McDougal, 193 W.Va. at 238, 455 S.E.2d at 797, quoting,
State v. Farley, 192 W.Va. 247, 253, 452 S.E.2d 50, 56
(1994). “Where our Rules of Civil Procedure display a
preference for a particular outcome, our review of
decisions under those rules is sometimes more searching.”
Fidelity, 194 W.Va. at 439, 460 S.E.2d at 685.
With these standards of review in mind, we consider the
issue of notice under Rule 6(d) [1978] of the West
Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure. Rule 6(d) provides:
For
Motions—Affidavits.—A
written motion, other than one
which may be heard ex parte, and
notice o f the hearing thereof shall
be served not later than 7 days
before the time specified fo r the
hearing, unless a different period is
fixed by these rules or by order of
the court. Such an order may for

cause shown be made on ex parte
application. When a motion is
supported by affidavit, the affidavit
shall be served with the motion;
and, except as otherwise provided
in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits
may be served not later than 2 days
before the hearing, unless the court
permits them to be served at some
other time. (emphasis added).
[61 [7] Rule 6(d) requires notice of a hearing to be served
“not later than 7 days” before the hearing, unless a
different period is fixed “by order of the court.” In this
case, notice of the hearing was given about 24 hours
before the hearing. The purpose of the notice requirement
of “Rule 6(d) is to prevent a party from being
prejudicially surprised by a motion.” Daniel v. Stevens,
183 W.Va. 95, 104, 394 S.E.2d 79, 88 (1990). In Daniel,
we found that because the party opposing the motion was
not prejudicially surprised by the issue presented in the
motion, the lack of notice was harmless. In Cremeans v.
Goad, 158 W.Va. 192, 194-95, 210 S.E.2d 169, 171
(1974)(3 hours notice insufficient time to prepare for a
hearing), we noted that Rule 6(d) is not a hard and fast
rule, but sufficient time must be provided so that the
parties have time to prepare. The Syllabus of Cremeans
states:
While the language of Rule 6(d) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
permits a reduction of the time
requirements for notice of hearing,
where a trial court, in so acting,
reduces time requirements to the
extent that the party entitled to
notice is deprived of all opportunity
to prepare for hearing, such action
constitutes a denial of due process
of law and is in excess of
jurisdiction.
The relators-plaintiffs maintain that they were prejudiced
because they were unable to submit a brief to the circuit
court outlining their position on the substantive question
of expert witnesses. Although it appears that a deposition
scheduled for early February by the settling defendant of
one of his expert witnesses was the reason for holding the
hearing, this reason, while justifying some advancement
of the hearing, does not justify an immediate hearing. In
this case, the relators-plaintiffs were prejudiced because
they were unable to prepare for the hearing involving the
substantive issue concerning a settlement agreement and
the use of expert witnesses and were unable to present
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their arguments in written form advising the circuit court
of West Virginia precedent.
[8] [9] Given the language of Rule 6(d) permitting the
reduction of notice requirements, we apply an abuse of
discretion standard to the orders reducing Rule 6(d)’s
notice requirements. On the first issue of the lack of
notice under Rule 6(d), we find that the circuit court
abused its discretion in holding a hearing when the
non-moving parties were given almost no notice and no
time to prepare. Based on this finding, we grant a writ
prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing its January 24,
1997 ruling.

C.

Use o f Expert Witnesses Identified by Settling
Defendants
[10] The second issue concerns the use by the remaining
defendants of expert witnesses **31 *277 identified by
the settling defendant, in violation of the settlement
agreement between the plaintiffs and the settling
defendant. Our standard of review of evidentiary matters
is the well-settled rule stated in Syllabus Point 10 of
Board o f Ed. o f McDowell County v. Zando, Martin &
Milstead, Inc., 182 W.Va. 597, 390 S.E.2d 796 (1990):
“ ‘Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are largely
within a trial court’s sound discretion and should not be
disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion. ’
State v. Louk, 171 W.Va. 639, 301 S.E.2d 596, 599
(1983) [, overruled on other grounds, State v.
Bradshaw, 193 W.Va. 519, 457 S.E.2d 456 (1995) ].
Syllabus Point 2, State v. Peyatt, [173] W.Va. [317]
315 S.E.2d 574 (1983).” Syllabus Point 7, State v.
Miller, [175] W.Va. [616] 336 S.E.2d 910 (1985).
See West Virginia Dept. o f Highways v. Mountain, Inc.,
167 W.Va. 202, 279 S.E.2d 192 (1981); Casto v. Martin,
159 W.Va. 761, 230 S.E.2d 722 (1976).
[11] The issue of use by the remaining defendants of the
settling defendant’s expert witnesses presents two
important competing policies. One policy is based on the
principle that “ ‘the public ... has a right to every man’s
evidence.’ ” U.S. v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S.Ct.
724, 730, 94 L.Ed. 884, 891 (1950), quoting, John H.
Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 (3rd ed.). “[E]xceptions to the
demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created
nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of

the search for the truth. (footnote omitted).” U.S. v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3108, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039,
1065 (1974).
[12] The other policy is the encouragement of settlement
rather than litigation to resolve controversies by
upholding contracts fairly made that do not contravene
public policy. Indeed, “[t]he law favors and encourages
the resolution of controversies by contracts of
compromise and settlement rather than by litigation; and
it is the policy of the law to uphold and enforce such
contracts if they are fairly made and are not in
contravention of some law or public policy.” Syllabus
Point 1, Sanders v. Roselawn Memorial Gardens, Inc.,
152 W.Va. 91, 159 S.E.2d 784 (1968). In accord Syllabus
Point 1, Riggle v. Allied Chemical Corp., 180 W.Va. 561,
378 S.E.2d 282 (1989); Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel.
Vapor Corp. v. Narick, 173 W.Va. 770, 320 S.E.2d 345
(1984).
[13] However, the dilemma between these competing
policies was created by the remaining defendants who
then sought rescue from the circuit court claiming a right
to all available evidence. At this stage of discovery in a
medical malpractice case, the policies are in conflict. But,
the dilemma could have been avoided by the remaining
defendants. The remaining defendants had the same
opportunity as the settling defendant to select their own
expert witnesses and to identify those experts to the
plaintiffs, or the defendants could have agreed to a formal
arrangement to share expert witnesses. Neither was done
in this case.
We have addressed the issue of use of the settling
defendant’s expert witnesses by the remaining defendant
on two occasions. In Riggle v. Allied Chemical Corp.,
supra, we upheld the denial of a continuance for the
remaining defendant to obtain its own experts. The
request for the continuance occurred after Allied, a
co-defendant, settled after the first day of trial by a “Mary
Carter” settlement agreement.3 Because of the “Mary
Carter” settlement, Allied, who remained as a defendant,
“did not present the extensive defense it had originally
planned.” 180 W.Va. at 564, 378 S.E.2d at 285. In
upholding the denial of the continuance we “point[ed] out
that appellant had years to prepare its case, and had no
right to rely on expert evidence developed by Allied to
fight the plaintiffs’ claims.” 180 W.Va. at 569, 378 S.E.2d
at 290. After noting that settlement was a possibility, we
said, “if appellant wanted to fight plaintiffs’ claim, it
could have prepared its own case rather than relying on
Allied’s experts.” Id. We found the appellant **3 2 *278
“had only itself to blame for the result.” Id.
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A similar approach was taken in Board o f Ed. of
McDowell County v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc.,
supra, when Zando, Martin & Milstead (“ZMM”), the
remaining defendant, attempted to call the expert
witnesses of the settling defendant in violation of the
settlement agreement. In Zando, although the settlement
prohibiting the use of the settling defendant’s expert
witnesses was reached several weeks before trial, ZMM
attempted to use these experts at trial. The circuit court
granted “ZMM a recess to attempt to obtain an expert of
its own, but when trial resumed five days later, ZMM
asserted that it had been unable to locate any witnesses
who could offer the same testimony. (footnote omitted).”
Zando, 182 W.Va. at 613, 390 S.E.2d at 812. In Zando,
we upheld the circuit court’s refusal to allow the
remaining defendant, ZMM, to use the settling
defendant’s expert witnesses. In Zando, id., we
concluded:
It is obvious to any sophisticated
trial lawyer that in litigation
involving multiple defendants there
is the likelihood that settlements
will occur before trial. To rely on
another party defendant’s witnesses
without some formal agreement as
to shared use is to invite the
consequences that arose in Riggle
and in the present case. The end
result is that no error can be
claimed.
[14] Based on reasoning underlying Riggle and Zando, we
hold that, absent a formal agreement among defendants in
a litigation proceeding involving multiple defendants, the
circuit court should not generally permit a settling
defendant’s expert witnesses to testify for the remaining
defendants. When a settlement agreement between the
settling defendant and the plaintiffs prohibits the
continued use of the settling defendant’s expert witnesses
by the remaining defendants, the circuit court, subject to
Rule 26(b)(4)(B) [1988] of the West Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure, should honor that agreement by not
permitting the remaining defendants to use or present
such information in the preparation for or conduct of the
trial.4
Two other courts have addressed the question of public
policy and an expert witness limitation. The Texas
Supreme Court in Tom L. Scott, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798
S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex.1990) rejected the settlement
agreement’s redesignation of expert witnesses to preclude
the witnesses from testifying based on “[t]he primary
policy behind discovery is to seek truth so that disputes

may be decided by facts that are revealed rather than
concealed.” However, this approach was rejected in Wolt
v. Sherwood, a Div. O f Harsco Corp., 828 F.Supp. 1562,
1567 (D.Utah 1993), which after comparing the Texas
Supreme Court’s reasoning to our reasoning in Zando,
said that “the court is persuaded that West Virginia more
accurately states the rule that should be followed by this
court.” The Wolt court found that the purposes of
discovery were not frustrated by “allowing a plaintiff to
purchase the expertise of a settling defendant” because of
the availability of the “ ‘exceptional circumstances’
[exception] under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B). (footnote
omitted).” 828 F.Supp. at 1568.5 The determination of
upholding a settlement agreement that precludes the
testimony of a settling defendant’s expert witnesses “is
designed to promote fairness by precluding unreasonable
access to an opposing party’s diligent trial preparation.”
Wolt, 828 F.Supp. at 1568, quoting, Durflinger v. Artiles,
727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir.1984) (discussing
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B)).
In this case, the remaining defendants claim that the
reservations contained in their identification of expert
witnesses supposedly give them the “right” to use any
experts **3 3 *279 named by any other defendant or party.
These declarations are not a formal agreement about
sharing expert witnesses; they provide no notice to the
plaintiffs, and therefore, they should not be considered
adequate preparation in a litigation involving multiple
defendants. Such self-serving statements should not
deprive the plaintiffs of the settlement bargain which
included the removal of the settling defendant’s expert
witnesses.6 We note that in this case the remaining
defendants may still have the time and the opportunity to
develop their own defense. The effect of our holding in
this case is simply to prevent the remaining defendants
from using the trial preparation of the settling defendant,
who agreed not to allow such use in the settlement
agreement.
We find that the circuit court abused its discretion in
allowing the remaining defendants to use the settling
defendant’s expert witnesses in violation of the settlement
agreement. The plaintiffs should not be deprived of the
settlement bargain they gained by their strategy of divide
et impera.1
For the above stated reasons, the petition for a writ of
prohibition is granted. The underlying case shall proceed
below in accordance with the principles set forth in this
opinion.
Writ granted.
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Parallel Citations
489 S.E.2d 24
Footnotes
1

Because a writ of prohibition is sought, the factual information presented in this opinion is based on the petition, with attached
exhibits and the responses, with attached exhibits.

2

Because of an unrelated matter, Judge Hill voluntarily recused himself from the case about a week later. Thereafter the case was
reassigned to another judge.

3

In Riggle v. Allied, 180 W.Va. at 563 n. 5, 378 S.E.2d at 284 n. 5, we noted that the name for this type of settlement is derived from
Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So.2d 8 (Fla.App.1967), overruled, Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385 (Fla.1973).

4

Rule 26(b)(4)(B) [1988] of the West Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure provides:
A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another
party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as
provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable fo r the party seeking
discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. (emphasis added).

5

The exceptions permitting discovery provided in Rule 26(b)(4)(B) [1988] of the West Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure are similar
to the exceptions in the current federal rule.

6

In his supplemental response, remaining defendant Pierson argues that the circuit court’s ruling had no effect on the settlement
because, by order entered on March 18, 1997, the settling defendant was dismissed with prejudice. However, the plaintiffs by
petition filed on February 18, 1997, were already seeking review of the circuit court’s order allowing use of the expert witnesses.

7

According to J. Bartlett, Familiar Quotations (16th ed.1992) 118, divide et impera [divide and rule] is an ancient anonymous
political maxim cited by Machiavelli.
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